











Smuts and the Politics of Colonial Expansion: South African 
Strategy in Regard to South-West Africa [Namibia] and the 
League of Nations Mandate: c. 1914-1924 
Submitted for the Degree of Master of Arts in the Department of History at the 
University of Cape Town 
Trevor R. Getz 




















The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 













For the Degree of 
Master of Arts - Department of History 
Trevor R. Getz 
tgetz@wccusd.k12.ca. us 
'Smuts and ,the Politics of Colonial Expansion: South African Strategy in 
Regard to South-West Africa [Namibia] and the League of Nations Mandate: 
c.1914-1924' is an analysis of Jan Smuts's central role in the Union's conquest of 
South West Africa in 1915, the fight for annexation of the territory in 1918-1919, 
and his subsequent shaping of the Mandate as Prime Minister of the Union 
until 1924. In addition it is an investigation of Smuts's motivations during this 
period. 
Three significant conclusions emerge from this dissertation. Primarily, I 
argue that Smuts was involved in all three above described stages of the Union's 
acquisition of South-West Africa, as both a policy-maker and the lead 
representative of South Africa's interests. 
Most importantly, I evaluate Smuts's incentives for so passionately 
leading the attempt to incorporate South-West Africa and contend that Smuts 
wanted to annex the territory because of his desire to create a white-led superstate 
in southern Africa, independent of European influence and with regional 
hegemony, and that the annexation of South-West Africa was an important step 
in that direction for Smuts. 
Additonally, I assess Smuts's successes and failures and conclude that his 
failure to fully realize annexation of the territory was responsible for Namibia's 
eventual independence. 
In order to prove my assertions, I rely on both secondary and primary 
information from South African and Namibian archives. My primary sources 
are drawn from the papers of the Governor-General of the Union, the Prime 
Minister of the Union, the Secretary and Administrator of South-West Africa, 
and others such as the American Ambassador to South Africa. Additionally, I 
rely heavily on the extensive Smuts Papers and official documents from the 
Union and British governments during and after world War I. My secondary 
sources are too extensive to list here but concentrate mainly either on Smuts or 
on South African involvement in South-West Africa. I use these sources to 
support my thesis but equally often argue against the conclusion drawn by their 
authors. Central to my thesis are works by Donald, Maryse-Cockram, and 
William Hancock. 
My analysis of Smuts's involvement in South-West Africa during the 
period 1914 to 1924 is important in several ways. Primarily, I believe my 
conclusions in this field give an original explanation which can be applied to 
Smuts's involvement in the histories of South Africa, the surrounding African 
nations, and the United Nations. In addition, this thesis helps explain the failure 
of Union intervention in South-West Africa [Namibia], which is a poorly 
understood topic. Last, there is a paucity of academic research about the period 
1914-1924 in southern Africa, and especially in Namibia, and part of the 
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Comparatively few men or women in the history of our world can 
be said to have shaped the future of their country or their region. One of 
those men was Jan Smuts, and the bookshelves are full of his biographies. 
Some, like his son J.C. Smuts, say that he was 'essentially of the Herculean 
mould of nation-builder and statesman, a man of broad-minded 
tolerance' 1• Modern political culture, building on the new politically 
correct view of the past, casts him as a virulent racist. Keith Hancock,2 
along with other well-respected authors, perceives him as a more complex 
figure, one with great loyalties and huge disappointments, a man who was 
a brilliant captain but a mediocre general. This man, called 'Oom Jannie' 
by his friends, was to leave a lasting legacy on both his country and his 
world. I will present a new view of Smuts as an expansionist who 
believed in a great and moral destiny for his nation and who strove to 
achieve it. 
This dissertation is not an attempt to chronicle the life of Jan Smuts, 
nor will it present Smuts as a figure isolated and unaffected by the trends 
and social factors around him. It is meant to be a look at the· expansionist 
ideology, goals, and work of Jan Smuts by specifically studying one episode 
. 
of his career: the acquisition of South-West Africa as a League of Nations 
Mandate for the Union, and the subsequent administration of that 
territory during his first tenure as the Union's Prime Minister 
This thesis will outline three major parts Smuts played in the 
acquisition and management of South-West Africa. First, as Defense 
1 Smuts, J.C., Jan Christiaan Smuts, Cassell, London, 1952, p. 3. 












Minister, and in partnership with General Louis Botha, he conquered 
German South-West Africa, exerting physical control over the territory. 
Next, he took on the role of diplomat, and in creating the mandate system 
and acquiring the mandate at the Paris Peace Conference of 1918-1919 he 
fought the battle for international recognition of South African 
sovereignty over the region. Third, as Prime Minister he was the highest 
administrative authority for the mandate, responsible to the League of 
Nations, the South African people, and the population of South-West 
Africa. In this position he attempted to gain the acceptance of the South 
African administration by the many groups of people within the 
Protectorate. In all these roles his personal views, beliefs, and conception 
of political realities influenced much of the policy implemented by the 
administration of the mandate. 
The starting point for this thesis is Smuts's declaration, in a 1917 
speech in London: 
We have started in previous times to civilise Africa from the 
North. All these attempts to civilize Africa have failed. We now 
try to proceed from the other end - from South Africa... the time is 
coming when it will be a misnomer to speak of 'South Africa' 
because the northern limits of our civilization will have gone so far 
that it will be almost impossible to use the world 'South' any more 
except in reminder of our original starting point. 3 
The central thesis of this dissertation is that Smuts discerned, in the 
Union's expansion into South-West ·Africa, an opportunity to expand 
northward - to spread the Union's 'civilising' influence into the 
Namibian region. His eventual goal was the creation of a Union-led 
3 Smuts, J.C., from a speech given in 1917, London, reprinted in War Time Speeches, Hodder 












superstate in southern Africa. N.G. Garson put forth this theory when he 
wrote, 'Smut's African policy amounted to the single-minded pursuit of 
formal expansion from the Union as its base'4• Garson, however, did not 
fully address the question of why Smuts was so eager to amalgamate the 
other parts of Southern Africa with the Union. That issue is central to my 
argument. 
In this dissertation I will attempt to show that the forceful 
acquisition of South-West Africa, and the subsequent Union dominion of 
the territory, is an example of Smuts's attempts not only to secure white 
domination of southern Africa, but also to ensure that it was the Union of 
South Africa that accomplished this task, and not a foreign power. 
Ronald Hyam quotes Smuts as saying, in reply to Herbert 
Gladstone's question 'What is South Africa' in reference to the Union 
Defence Act, 'South Africa as used in the Bill is a geographical expression 
which we advisedly do not define. It would surely cover any part· of the 
continent of Africa South of the equator.'5 Smuts's imperialism, Hyam 
shows in his book The Failure of South African Expansion: 1908-1948, was 
almost boundless. 
Smuts's experiences during and after the Boer War in politics, on 
the battlefield, and as a representative of both the Afrikaner and the 
British point of view throughout his life helped shape his actions. Was he 
,,>:·,·_~)an Afrikaner nationalist, opening South-West Africa to his people, or 
a British imperialist, responding to the government's call to the 
Dominions to assist in the war effort and attempting to seize suzerainty of 
4 Garson, N.G., 'Smuts and Africa', Unpublished, University of Cape Town, 1977, p. 5. 













a profitable region?6 My research shows that he neither sought to increase 
British power (in fact, this paper will discuss ways in which he limited it 
for the Union's benefit), nor to exclude non-Afrikaners from enjoying the 
profits of the South-West African victory. Smuts was concerned with the 
success of creating a white-led superstate from the Union, not with 
serving solely British or Afrikaans ends. He himself referred to a 'Monroe 
Doctrine for the South'. 7 Smuts had grand designs for the junction of the 
Union and its neighbors, yet the only territory which he succeeded in 
adding to the Union was South-West Africa, the success of which this 
paper will evaluate. 
The central argument of this essay is that Smuts's personal concept 
of expansion was a driving force behind Union policy in South-West 
Africa during the period from 1914 to 1924. A further purpose of this 
dissertation is to discuss how and to what extent Smuts was able to 
implement policies he believed would bind the Mandated territory to the 
Union in order to achieve his goal. 
This dissertation will dispute the conclusions of some historians 
that Smuts's primary concern in supporting the campaign and demanding 
the mandate was for increased security, as argued by Maynard Swanson 
and other scholars.8 I will also dispute the limited role ascribed to Smuts 
by Gavin Lewis9 regarding the indigenous peoples of the territory, and by 
6 It is interesting to note that Piet Meiring's Afrikaans-language biography of Smuts, Smuts: die 
Afrikaner ( Tafelberg Press, Cape Town, 1975) , is translated in English to Smuts: the Pa.tr.iQL. 
7 Speech to the Royal Geographical Society, January 28, 1918, in Smuts, War Time Speeches, p. 
71.-84. 
8 Swanson M., 'South-West Africa in Trust', in Prosser, Gifford, and Louis Britain and Germany in 
Africa, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. 












other historians who overemphasize the role played by the Mandate 
Administration and undervalue that played by Smuts. 
Smuts's role in South-West Africa has never been researched 
holistically. The many books on Smuts mostly neglect the mandated 
territory. Historians such as Cockram10, and Taylor11, studying Namibia's 
past either explored Smuts's role only superficially or concentrated on his 
part in the debate over the region's future in the United Nations after 
1948. Cer'tain aspects of the topic, such as the annexation debate in the 
League of Nations, have been looked at intensely, but mostly from other 
points of view and paradigms - researchers such as George Curry12 have 
portrayed Wilson's view of Smuts's role, and Sara Pienaar13 looked 
intently into the views of Britain and the League of Nations on Smuts's 
attempts to establish sovereignty over the territory. This thesis, however, 
is original in its heuristic approach to the relationship between Smuts and 
the mandate. 
The most useful primary sources,, the Smuts Papers, were well 
organized by Hancock and van der Poel, but the extracts on South-West 
Africa - British and South African governmental papers, private letters, 
and speeches - have not been thoroughly researched by historians. The 
Administrator's Reports for South-West Africa appear to have been 
seldom used as well. In addition, newspapers, diaries, the papers of the 
IO Cockram, G., South West African Mandate, Juta and Company, Cape town, 1976. 
II Taylor, P., 'The Union Government's Treatment of the South-West Africa Mandate, 1920-
1924', MA Thesis, University of Cape Town, 1944. 
12 Curry, G., 'Woodrow Wilson, Jan Smuts, and the Versailles Settlement', in American 
Historical Review, LXVI, 4, 1961. 
13 Pienaar, S., South Africa and International Relations between the Two World Wars: The 












Administrator and Secretary of South-West Africa and the Governor-
General and Prime Minister of South Africa have proven very useful. 
I hope to be able to help re-evaluate a period in South-West Africa's 
history which is very confusing and has not been very well studied, but 
which has received new interest and can be more easily researched because 
South Africa's occupation has now ended.. I hope to contribute to the 
debate on Jan Smuts, a hero to some but a villain to others, by exploring 
his motives for expansion in South-West Africa and especially by 
discussing his understanding of the realities of his political situation in 
the Union. Lastly, this thesis will investigate information about the 
Treaty of Versailles, the Paris Peace Conference, and the creation of the 
mandates from a new perspective, and show in new detail the role played 












CHAPTER 2: SOME ASPECTS OF SOUTH-WEST AFRICA BEFORE WWI 
EUROPEANS AND AFRICANS 
In 1482 the first Portuguese sailor exploring in his newly developed lateen-
rigged caravel and charged by his prince to find a patl;l around the tip of 
Africa, landed at Cape Cross in Namibia. Although he was the first 
European to land on that desolate stretch of coastline, Diego Cao was to be 
followed by American, British, Dutch, and German explorers and 
conquerors. I 
The indigenous Namibians were, during most of this period, both 
oblivious to and uninterested in the actions of the westerners. The 19th 
century, however, saw expansion by white traders and missionaries into 
the Namibian interior. Some explorers, such as Charles John Anderson, 
pushed in to the sparsely populated Kaokoveland and Ovamboland, while 
other, mostly Rhenish missionaries, set themselves up in Namaland.2 
They could not believe that any significant population would live in the 
desert area that made up much of Namibia. 
In fact, there were several populations. Not only were there quite a 
few bushmen and Nama, but also six separate Bantu-speaking groups - the 
Herero, the Kavango, the East Caprivians, the Kaokolanders, the Tswana, 
and the Ovambo. The Nama and the Herero were, for much of that 
century, engaged in a war over the Windhoek plateau, which was 
valuable as pasture. 
1 Cooper, A., The Occupation of Namibia: Afrikanerdom's Attack on the British Empire, 
University Press of America, NY, p. 7 












Britain became the first colonizer in Namibia when, between 1861 
and 1866, it took control of several islands off the coast which were rich in 
guano deposits3. The islands were later transferred to the administration 
of the Cape Colony. In 1868, the Rhenish asked the British authorities in 
the Cape Colony for protection, but they declined the invitation to annex 
the region. In 1878, after a series of such petitions, the United Kingdom 
agreed to annex Walvis Bay, as it was the only good port in the region. 
Sixty years later, British politicians would explain " the assumption [was] 
that Britain, either directly or through the Cape Colony,4 was entitled to 
take over the administration of the Territory when local conditions 
justified the expense."5 These events would have a significant influence 
on the Union's future claims to the territory. 
By the late 1800s, immigrants from the Cape colony were also 
moving in to the area. These newcomers were both white Afrikaners and 
Coloureds. The 'Coloured' population, which became known as the 
Baasters (from Bastard), came originally from the Cape Colony. "Lonely 
white farmers and trekkers took Khoikhoi concubines to such an extent 
that a substantial mixed group emerged."6 The. colony at that time still 
bred prejudices against the khoikhoi, especially since they were slow to 
accept Christianity, and this meant that the children of these unions were 
not legitimized among white society. Instead, they tended to be 
marginalized and join with detribalized Khoikhoi to form their own 
communities. 
3 Ibid., p. 7 
4 italics inserted 
5 Amery, L.S., German Colonial Claim, London, Chambers Press, 1939, p. 54. 
6 Fredrickson, WM, White Supremacy: A Comparitive Study in American and South African 












The Germans, meanwhile, had set up a colony, called Luderitz in 
the southern part of the country, and the agent there asked if the British 
would protect their settlement. The British once again refused, and in 
1883 a German warship was sent to protect the settlement.7 
GERMAN COLONY 
Why Germany finally moved into the colonial field is a question 
that has long faced historians. The traditional theory is that Bismarck had 
always favoured the idea of an Imperial Germany and was just waiting for 
a good time to expand. However, modern historians exclude this theory. 
Gail Cockram argues that Bismarck "desired an anti-British 
combination with France in the colonial field"B For that reason, Germany 
formally annexed Angra Pequena (Luderitzbucht) and between September 
and October 1884 had convinced the natives to accept German protection.9 
Allan Cooper, however, believes that·~~~· Bismarck was influenced by 
internal groups, such as the Deutsche Kolonailverein, who were 
interested in German expansion for both economic and nationalist 
purposes. The latter theory seems very possible because 1884 was an 
election year in Germany. Immanuel Geiss, in his analysis of German 
foreign policy during this period, wrote 
Certain economic, political, and psychologiCal factors were at this 
time strong enough to render colonial expansion not only possible, 
but from the standpoint of Germany's ruling classes even necessary. 
Industrial expansion in Germany created increasing demands for 
7 Ibid, p. 55. 
8 Cockram, South-West African Mandate. p. 9. 
9 The same month the British proclaimed a protectorate in Bechuanaland, provoking border 











raw materials and markets for industrial goods. A feeling of power 
and pride after the founding of the Reich made for increased self-
confidence.10 
10 
Geiss does not expand on the economic factor, but the depression of 
1870-1873 hit Germany very hard, and there was a general feeling that the 
colonial system would soften future blows. This seems to confirm the 
theory that Bismarck was reacting to internal pressures when the Germans 
began their colonial adventures. 
Even in the 1880s, many members of the Reichstag opposed official 
colonialism. However, tentative steps were taken towards exerting 
national power in areas important to German industry such as Samoa. In 
1884, therefore, the Germans annexed their first official colony when 
Gustav Nachtigal, with a mandate from Bismarck, took over the South-
W est Africa territory. 
Although the British did not seem to resent this move very much, 
South Africans were split by it. On the one hand, the British South 
Africans were not happy to have a continental power on their northern 
border. Many Afrikaners, however, felt a certain kinship with the 
Germans and saw them as an ally for the Transvaal and Orange Free State 
republics. During the Boer war, in fact, the Transvaal government sent 
deputations to Germany to ask for guns and aid. Botha himself, at the 
end of the Boer war, had traveled with de la Rey and de Wet (later his 
enemy) to collect 80,000 pounds collected by the German people for the 
Boer people.11 
The opportunity for the Union to annex the territory had been lost 
to the Germans, but it was later to help form their annexation claim 
IO Geiss, I., German Foreign Policy. 1871-1914, Routledge Direct Editions, london, 1976. 












during the 1918-1919 Paris Peace Conference. The Afrikaners considered. 
South West Africa part of their heritage, and the failure of Britain to attach 
it to the Union was one of the many complaints they had towards the 
Empire. "Geographically and ethnically ... South West Africa was viewed 
as largely an extension of the karoo, steppe, and desert of the Cape and 
Kalahari hinterlands," writes Maynard Swanson.12 By the time the First 
World War began, two thousand 'Cape subjects' were living in the 
German territory. 14 These were Afrikaner farmers who had moved north, 
in the traditional direction of 'away from the British' with their families 
and their cattle. 
The Germans were inexperienced colonialists, and the first 
Minister-Resident, Heinrich Ernst Goring14 , was sent to London to study 
colonial administration before undertaking this appointment in 1885. His 
inexperience, and the inexperience of the German settlers, can be seen in 
their inability to stop the Nama-Herero wars from spiraling into the most 
important and tragic event of the German occupation, the Herera War in 
1904-1909.15 
The history of this event in general is well known. The fighting 
between the Nama and Herera continued until 1888, when Minister 
Goring interspersed German troops between them and called their leaders 
together to try to force a negotiated treaty. However, Chief Kamaherero 
told Goring that his was a sovereign territory and ordered Goring and his 
men to leave or be killed. In humiliation, Dr. Goring was forced to ask for 
British protection at Walvis Bay. 
12 Swanson, 'South-West Africa in Trust', _p. 633. 
14 'Memorandum on the Country known as Gennan South-West Africa'. Union Government 
Papers, 1915, PA, p. 6-7. 
14 Minister Goring was the father of the famous Nazi Luftwaffe commander, Hennann Goring. 












This provided Britain's second opportunity to gain South West 
Africa. Bismarck suggested to Joseph Chamberlain that Germany 
exchange Heligoland, a North Sea island, for South West Africa. 
However, the British refused the trade. 
THE HERERO WAR 
In 1904, the Germans were forced to once again deal with the 
rebellious Herera, this time with the help of certain Nama groups.16 They 
almost had to face the Nama as well. Samuel Maherero sent a note to 
Hendrik Witbooi, the Nama chief, inquiring about assistance in the 
upcoming war. The message never reached Witbooi. 
At the time of the rebellion, the German governor was Von Trotha. 
Subsequent British and Union propaganda painted Von Trotha as an evil, 
murdering Atilla. Certainly, he was an experienced commander who had 
fought in East Africa and the Boxer rebellion in China. By 1909, he had 
defeated the Herero, but their resistance was impressive and the war was 
long and hard-fought. 
The Herera rebellion is relevant for this dissertation in three ways. 
Primarily, the brutality of the war made it useful for Union propaganda 
purposes during the first world war and the subsequent Paris Peace 
Conference. The 1918 British report on the region was particularly critical 
of Von Trotha. 'Treachery and breaches of faith were to him 
admissable ... Von Trotha said, "let not man, woman, or child be spared -
kill them all".'17 The South Africans used this tool to such effect that in 
16 Cooper, The Occupation of Namibia. p. 22. 












1916 they were able to hold criminal trials of German military personnel, 
using information ·not only from native sources, but also from 
contemporary German critics of the handling of the Herero uprising. 
This, as we shall see, helped Smuts and his colleagues in 1915 and again in 
demanding the mandate in 1919. However, it is also indicative of the 
independence and pride of the indigenous peoples, whose struggles for 
rights were to cause Smuts trouble under the Union's administration as 
well. 
Second, the involvement of Afrikaners living in South West Africa 
in putting down the rebellion also had a propaganda effect when they 
were denied certain rights in later years. 'But for the assistance of 
hundreds of British and Dutch Afrikanders it is doubtful whether the 
Herero war would have been settled even in the space of four years. There 
are Boers in the country today who have rendered splendid service to the 
Germans, but who have been treated shamefully ever since., stated the 
Transvaal Chronicle in 1915'18 Certainly the Afrikaner population of the 
region decreased between 1909 and 1914, and, whatever the cause, this fact 
helped the Union government ensure the loyalty of many Afrikaners 
during the war. The Afrikaans and British settlers' treatment under the 
German administration would also later constitute part of the Union's 
claim at the Paris Peace Conference. 
The third interesting point was the effect the war had on the 
German people, both the local population and those in Germany. The war 
cost them 600 million marks, but more importantly it resulted in the 
deaths of 798 Germans casualties and 698 from disease. A German General 
wrote, "A country in which so many German sons have fallen and been 












buried can no longer be a foreign land to us, but rather a piece of the 
homeland, to care for which is our sacred duty."19 Germany's attachment 
to their first colony had now grown, and was going to strengthen their 
resolve to hold on to (and reclaim) the territory during the years covered 
by this dissertation. 
THE TERRITORY IN 1915 
The terrain of most of South West Africa is dry, making offensive 
military operations very difficult since water and transportation needs are 
hard to meet. There was, by 1915, one long railroad cutting through the 
middle of the country north to south, splitting at Windhoek to go west to 
Swakopmund. Along this, a defending German force could move 
quickly, while tearing up the tracks behind it. 
For this reason, the Germans felt quite safe in their protectorate, and 
it was valuable to them indeed. Mili arily, South West Africa fulfilled two 
major purposes. It provided a port (one of the few on the west coast of 
sub-Saharan Africa) big enough for the provisioning of large warships, 
and the Germans had constructed a radio tower in Windhoek which could 
receive signals from the South Atlantic fleet, relay them to Togo, and from 
there to Berlin, and vice-versa. 
To protect these assets, the Germans assembled 2,500 regular army troops 
known as the Protectorate Troop. They were assisted by 700 policemen, 
levies from the 12,000 strong German population, and, they hoped; the 
Afrikaners. 












Economically, South West Africa was important as a source of meat, but, 
more importantly, for its diamond mines which, though underdeveloped 
in 1915, had great potential. These diamonds, of course, were an added 
reason for South Africa to covet its neighbour to the north. The huge 
South African diamond industry was undercut by the low (ls 6d to 5s) 
extraction cost of the German South West African fields.2 1 
The Baaster groups had settled on extensive lands mostly centered around 
Reheboth and in the south. By the beginning of the 20th century, about 
19,000 of them lived in South West Africa, joined by about 32,000 other 
coloureds living mostly in the big cities - Windhoek, Walvis Bay, 
Luderitz, who did not identify with the Reheboth Baasters.22 By 1915, the 
Baasters had set up a strong community in the arid areas around 
Reheboth, centered mostly on the water-holes and wells which kept their 
all-important cattle alive during the dry heat of the summer. 
This was the status of German South West African on the eve of World 
War One. It was a profitable colony for Germany, although a sometimes 
troublesome one, bordering on a large British dominion to the South, 
with nine major population groups and two major industries. 
21 Calvert, A., South West Africa During the German Occupation. T. Werner Laurie Press, 
London, 1915, p. 90. 
22 Cockram, South-West African Mandate. p. 6. The latter group is mostly unimportant for our 
purposes because, although it formed about 3% of South West Africa's population, it was not 
significant in causing major trends, while the Baasters were central to several major events 












CHAPTER 3: THEMES IN THE LIFE OF JAN SMUTS 1870 - 1915 
Jan Smuts is a well-studied and controversial figure. Several 
themes in his life warrant discussion. As a yqung man, Smuts developed 
some of these interests and traits which were to shape his future 
relationship with South-West Africa. 
DIPLOMAT AND GENERAL 
Smuts was at times a military man. He was 'an electrifying 
presence ... who could drive men beyond exhaustion and sickness and not 
lose their faith in him. '1 , who led his troops on the greatest raid of the 
Boer war. 
Hancock indicates Smuts's brilliance in the creation of the 
Republics' grand strategy - the overall planning of the war. While it 
cannot be denied that Smuts was often privy to the goings on at the top, 
scholars of the East African campaign, of which Smuts had sole command 
might disagree with Hancock's theory that Smuts was a brilliant strategist. 
One anecdote about Smuts is that he once told a woman who 
accompanied him on a botany trip, when she expressed wonder that a 
military man should know so much about botany, 'but Madam, I'm only 
a General in my spare time.' 
Smut's true brilliance lay in his leadership of a Commando. During 
the Boer War, he led his men on the longest, deepest raid of the war - one 
considered impossible by the enemy. At one point he had eleven columns 
1 ' The Gennan East Africa Campaign 1914-1918, Various Dairy Extracts: The Diary of Brett 












of British troops after him. 2 The kind of leadership he provided was the 
kind needed during both the Boer war and the First World War. Smuts 
did his own reconnaissance, instead of sending out one of his junior 
officers.3 
By 1915, Smuts was also developing a reputation for diplomacy. 
Many of his contemporaries called him Slim4 Jannie, and he was described 
as 'a very clever, a very cunning man.'5 Smuts had ample opportunity to 
utilize his diplomatic skills in the service of the Transvaal Republic. 
During April 1899, he was the chief negotiator for the Republic before the 
Boer war, but these negotiations were also his first failures, for the British 
High Commissioner, Milner, and others were committed to war.6 After 
the war, Smuts was a prime advocate of the Union, and became the central 
figure in the creation of the Union in 1909. 
PERSONAL IMPERIALISM 
One of Smuts's most important interests, for the purposes of this 
dissertation, was his interest in acquiring new territory for the Union. 
There is no doubt he was pro-expansion. His 1917 speech in London, 
quoted earlier, is one glaring ex~mple. At various times during his life, 
his efforts were aimed at Tanganyika, Swaziland, Rhodesia, 
Bechuanaland, and Mocambique, as well as South-West Africa. But what 
was his motive for stimulating expansion? 
2 War Office Reports 32/877 file 8271, PA. 
3 J.C. Smuts, Jan Christiaan Smuts, p. 72. 
4 Slim, in South African contemporary lingo, meant slick or cunning. 
5 Harrison White Tribe of Africa. p. 59. 












Many historians and lay people certainly felt he was a British 
imperialist. He did, after all, study at Cambridge, and he served the British 
government in various capacities during the war years 1916-1918 and for a 
short while after. He earned the keys to London, York, and many other 
major English cities, and was asked by Lloyd George to occupy important 
posts in Palestine, Hungary, and elsewhere. In fact, he was so trusted by 
the British government that he was asked to mediate the problems in 
Ireland and Palestine.7 
Ronald Hyam explains much of Botha's and Smuts's attempts at 
expansion, including the incorporation of the High Commission 
Territories, as expressions of an Afrikaans movement to end British 
hegemony over the region. 'Deep-rooted desire for incorporation of the 
Territories can thus be seen as an aspect of the Afrikaner nationalist 
movement' .s Although in this case he was writing about a slightly later 
period, Hyam ascribes a lot of Smuts's imperialism to his Afrikaans 
heritage. Certainly many of Smuts's contemporaries, like Barry Hertzog, 
were opposed to Britain's power in the reason. Hertzog opposed offensive 
operations in South-West Africa because he feared at the end of the war 
the British would take it over.9 Smuts, however, had a completely 
different viewpoint from Hertzog because of his unique experiences. 
Smuts's first experience with expansionist policy came when, at the 
youthful age of 18, he was called upon to defend Rhodes attempts to open 
up the lands north of the Transvaal, speaking to an audience at the 
Kimberley Town Hall. His subject matter was interesting - mostly a 
7 Hancock, .s.m.uts., Vol.Ip. 432. 
8 Hyam, The Failure of South African Expansion 1908-1948, p.74. 












defense of Rhodes and a call for fusion of the two 'Teutonic races' in 
South Africa, a theme he was to repeat often.10 
But not everyone was so enthusiastic about Smuts's apparent 
imperialism. Not every Afrikaner was as convinced as Smuts was about 
reconciliation with the British, who, they felt, had made them a conquered 
people, imprisoning their women and children in concentration camps 
and killing their commandos. Later in his life, some Afrikaners blamed 
Smuts for splitting them as a people. 
Smuts sold us to the British. He became an Anglophile. He became 
'the greatest Empire builder of the day' so the London Times said. 
'A philosopher, a statesman and a soldier.' He was really a 
politician. We were under the impression, and we still are of the 
same conviction, that Smuts misled Botha ... Smuts wasn't a man 
with any feelings. He should not have been born an Afrikaner. He 
should have been born an American or a Britisher who had a big 
force behind him.11 
But Smuts himself took issue with the perception of him as an 
empire builder. ·As late as 1926, speaking at a monument to the women 
and children who had died during the Anglo-Boer War, Smuts said 'we 
stood alone in the world, a small people ranged against the mightiest 
Empire on earth'.12 He declared South-West Africa a part of the Afrikaans 
heri tage.13 
The result of Smuts's experiences with both European-style 
imperialism and the Afrikaans fixation with land and living space was to 
create a personal style of expansionism. From his Cambridge education 
and his work with Rhodes, he acquired a preoccupation with the duty of 
10 Smuts Papers, 23/20.3 
11 Henning Klepper, quoted in Harrison, The White Tribe of Africa, p. 59. 
12 Fry, A. Ruth, Emily Hobhouse, p. 290., quoted in Hancock, Smuts, p. 181. 
l3 SP 12/143A Smuts wrote, in this letter to D. Reitz, that once the war was over, those 













spreading 'civilisation'. From his Afrikaans upbringing and his 
association with leaders such as Kruger, he inherited a love of the land 
and a sense of an 'Afrikaans heritage' in southern Africa. However, he 
did not accept the idea that the Afrikaner had sole dominion over the 
land, nor that Britain should exercise full sovereignty. Instead, he came to 
believe in a unified South Africa and was extremely involved in the 
creation of the Union in 1910. 
Looking back on the South Africa Act in 1917, Smuts wrote 'I am 
not sure ... whether in the distant future the South Africa Act will notbe 
remembered as much for its appendix as for its principal contents.'14 The 
appendix was important because it failed to set any borders for the nation, 
and thus left expansion open as an option for the fledgeling nation. 
Smuts's view of that expansion, I argue, was the creation of a huge white-
led state encompassing the Union, the High Commission Territories of 
Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland, South-West Africa, and the 
Portuguese territories of Angola and Mocambique. 
Smuts believed very strongly in the unification of Boer and Britain. 
In a 1918 speech he wrote: 'We want to create a blend out· of the various 
nationalities and to create a new South African nation out of our allied 
racial stocks, and. if we succeed in doing that we shall achieve a new 
nationality embracing and harmonizing our various traits and blending 
them all into a richer national type than could otherwise have been 
achieved.'15 But it is Smuts's actions more than his words which show 
what his beliefs were - that he was a man who felt he was a better 
14 Smuts, War Time SDeeches. p.88. 












Afrikaner because he had learned to appreciate British culture. Some of 
these actions will be outlined later in this dissertation. 
SMUTS'S RACIAL BELIEFS 
It is against the backdrop of his personal opinions of expansionism 
that Smuts's policy towards non-whites comes into question. He believed 
in unifying the white races because they were, together, in opposition to a 
larger native population. '[In South Africa] you have an overwhelming 
black population with a small white population which has got a footing 
there and which has been trying to make that footing secure for more than 
two centuries', he commented in the same speech as he expounded on the 
unification of the white races. 
Hancock noted that Smuts believed that the whites in South Africa 
needed to exercise power over the black population responsibly or arouse 
feelings of resentment, and JC Smuts (the younger) wrote that his father 
was 'a man of broad-minded tolerance.'16 Yet there are questions about his 
racial beliefs, such as those were raised by those world figures who were to 
give South Africa the mandate. Would Smuts be 'broad-minded', or 
would his son's words fade before the task charged to him? Smuts may 
have exposed his own feelings by writing that blacks 'have the simplest 
minds ... and are almost animal-like in the simplicity of their minds and 
ways.' The issue of the treatment of indigenous people became very 
important in the administration of the mandate. 












But we cannot make the mistake of taking a man's whole life, 
diverse opinions, and changing ideas, and then create a static picture of 
him. Therefore three important periods of Smuts's life up to his 
involvement with South-West Africa need to be outlined. 
HIS EARLY LIFE: 1882-1915 
The first years of Smuts's life were spent in small towns in the 
Swartland of the Cape Colony. However, his family was quite influential 
and he eventually went to school at Stellenbosch and then to Cambridge. 
The dichotomy between his years in a strong Afrikaner environment and 
those spent in England were evident to him. It was during the period after 
his return that he supported Rhodes so str ngly. 
The Jameson raid was a blow to Smuts, especially when Rhodes was 
implicated. He had to question whether or not the Afrikaner could trust 
the Briton. He felt, however, that there was nobody he could trust in the 
Cape Colony17 • For that reason, he moved to the Transvaal. But this early 
period was important because between Stellenbosch, Cambridge, and 
Riebeeck West, Smuts's opinions were being formed. 
On 20 January, 1897, Smuts moved to the Transvaal. By the 
beginning of June, he was the State Attorney for the Transvaal Republic 
and he formed one of the two great partnerships of his life - as the right-












hand man of President Kruger. For a while, he was even considered for 
State Secretary, but it was decided that he was too young.ts 
Smuts could have had a long career in the service of the Transvaal, 
but it was destined not to happen. By 1898, conflict between the British 
Empire (or more correctly its administrators at the Cape) and the 
Transvaal and Free State Republics was coming to a head. It is not 
necessary to discuss the whole debate on the conflict here, but the 
important point is that Smuts, in his capacity of an officer of the Transvaal 
government, opposed the conflict. At the pre-war conference at 
Bloemfontein between Milner and Kruger he argued for peace, and in a 
letter to Hofmeyer on June 13th, he said 'for the sake of peace, the 
Republic is ready to go still further along the road of concession.' He also 
expressed his belief in the British instilled in him during his stay at 
Cambridge. He wrote to a friend 'England will never go to war when she 
knows what the true opinion of the Colonial Afrikaner is .. .'.19 Smuts 
supported the continuing of concessions and trusted that the other side of 
England would come through, until the last moment when necessity 
dictated that the man of peace should become a man of war. 
The Boer war was a very important event for the purposes of this 
dissertation because it was this war which made Smuts the General out of 
Smuts the politician. But the Boer War was important in Smuts's 
development for more than just military reasons. The end of the war had 
seen Lord Campbell-Bannerman come to power in England, and South 
Africans were waiting to see what his actions towards the defeated 
18 Hancock,~ p. 68. in the end F.W. Reitz got the job, with the understanding that Smuts 
would get his turn later. 












Republics would be. On the 7th of February, 1906, Smuts wrote to 
Camp bell-Bannerman, 
Do you want friends or enemies? You can have the Boers for 
friends, and they have proved what quality their friendship may 
mean. I pledge the friendship of my colleagues and myself if you 
wish it. You can choose to make them enemies, and possibly have 
another Ireland on your hands.20 
During the years between 1902 and 1914 Campbell-Bannerman and 
his contemporaries in British Government made their choice - to help the 
Afrikaners rebuild after the war, to assist in the creation of the Union, and 
to grant them, along with the other Dominions, certain rights. In 1915, the 
effect those promises had on Smuts, and other South Africans, would bear 
fruit. 
The third period of importance in Smuts's life up to the beginning 
of this dissertation is the years between the Treaty of Vereeniging which 
marked the end of the Boer War and the beginning of World War One in 
1914. During most of this period, Smuts was involved in the creation of 
the Union - something he fought for against taciturn Afrikaners and 
imperialist Britons alike. It was here that Smuts's dedication to the union 
of the two peoples and his ability to seem to represent both was most in 
use. Later, Smuts was to invite the Germans of South-West Africa to join 
this white alliance. 
When General Botha was elected the first Prime Minister of the 
Union, Smuts quickly took the role of right-hand man again, forming the 
second great friendship of his life. Contemporary views portrayed Botha 
as the gregarious leader and Smuts as the cunning organizer. 












Smuts's role as Defense Minister is the most interesting point of 
this period for our purposes. After the 1910 election, which was a qualified 
I 
victory for Botha's Nationalists - he took on the administration of three 
departments: Interior, Mines, and Defense. It was between 1911 and 1912 
that he produced the Defence Act that was to set up an army for the Union 
outside of the British troops stationed there. The Defense Act created the 
Permanent Force.21 The Permanent Force was vital to the upcoming 
campaign in South-West Africa because, as Smuts knew, in the event of 
war British troops would, for the most part, be withdrawn to fight on a 
European front. 
The Defense Act was a well-thought-out document. Smuts 
provided for five regiments of the Permanent Force, which were to be 
mounted riflemen, a unit both Afrikaners and the British inhabitants of 
South Africa were used to forming. It also led to the creation of a Citizen 
Force, basically commando groups which could be raised in time of war 
and supplied by the government. Lastly, it provided that the Minister of 
Defense (namely Smuts) would serve as Commander-in-Chief in case of 
war. This was to have great effect on the South African involvement in 
World War One. Smuts was also interested in aircraft and deeply 
concerned with building up supplies for the army. · The effect of this 
modernization was to create an army which could be used for campaigns 
in southern Africa for involvement wherever needed - they would see 
service in German South-West Africa and German East Africa, and some 
would volunteer to fight in Europe. This army would fight in the name of 
the British Empire, for the cause of South African expansion, and to 
further the policies of Louis Botha and Jan Smuts. 












This brings us to 1914. Botha and Smuts were facing a schism in the 
Afrikaner front with Hertzog and others moving on a more nationalist 
track.- International politics was becomrr quite dangerous, and Smuts's 
correspondences were full of letters from his fellow peacemakers writing 'I 
do trust you are not going to help the many who are trying to pick a 
quarrel with Germany'22 , while others were urging him to ensure that 
'we ... be strong enough to defend our country against anyone whatever, 
and to prevent South Africa from becoming the battle-ground of 
Europe.'.23 War had not yet broken out, but Smuts was being urged to both 
reduce and expand the South African military. Meanwhile, Broderbond 
leaders saw the upcoming conflict as a change to establish Afrikaner 
hegemony, and pro-British activists urged South Africa to fulfill her duty 
as a Dominion. The testing time for the new Union had come, and Smuts 
quickly saw that it involved South Africa's neighbor to the north - the 
German South-West African colony. 
22 SP 8/41. Smuts's duality as soldier and peacemaker created friendships with such pacifists as 
English Quakers like Emily Hobhouse, who wrote this letter, and committed hawks such as C.P. 
Crewe and Campbell-Bannerman. 












CHAPTER 4: THE CAMPAIGN OF 1914-1915 
On 4 August, 1914, Great Britain entered the First World War in 
response to German violation of Belgian neutrality - among other factors. 
England and Germany were now enemies. 
This change in international relations necessitated a major 
alteration of the relations between the Union and the German colonies in 
the region - South-West Africa and German East Africa. But what exactly 
was the Union's duty as a dominion of the British Empire and how did 
that alter their relationship with the Germans? 
SMUTS AND THE QUESTION OF WAR 
On the first day of Britain's entry into the war, the Union 
government started to perform its obligation to the Empire - offering to 
release British troops from service in South Africa while replacing them 
with part of the extensive Union Defense Force created by Smuts two years 
earlier.2 the South African government was just doing its duty, but it 
was not exactly clear where that duty ended. 
Smuts's views had been clearly expressed at the Imperial Defence 
Conference in 1909, when the question of the position of dominions in 
case of war was discussed. Smuts's view, which prevailed, was that 'each 
part of the Empire [should be] willing to make its preparations on such 
lines as will enable it, should it so desire, to take its share in the general 
defence of the Empire'3 The should it so desire phrase makes it seem as if 
2 Hancock, SJ:mtt.s.. vl/p. 379. 












Smuts was reserving the right of dominions not to join in. In fact, by 
encouraging the dominions to prepare for war, Smuts was preparing them 
to defend the Empire if necessary. 
In one of his many letters to Arthur Gillett in England, Smuts gave 
further evidence of his opinions on the war. In this letter, he held 
England blameless for the war, pointing out that Campbell-Bannerman 
(the Prime Minister in 1907) had tried to limit armaments and had 
undertaken to aid France in the North Atlantic in return for French help 
in the Mediterranean and that England could not pull back from its 
obligations. Smuts did not censure the German people, writing: 
I love German thought and culture and hope it will yet do much for 
mankind. But a stern limit must be set to her political system 
which is a menace to the world ... 4 
Although Smuts expressed appreciation for the German culture, he 
condemned what he saw as her expansionism and imperialism, and saw 
the English as doing their 'duty', even expressing it in terms of good and 
evil. About the upcoming campaign in South-West Africa, Smuts was 
very clear· that 'such was the wish of the English Government and Botha 
and I are not the men to desert England in this dark hour ... we are doing 
our duty'.5 
Others in the Union Cabinet had different opinions - notably Barry 
Hertzog, who wanted to keep South Africa out of European wars. His 
opposition will be important further on. Many of the Afrikaner generals, 
such as the Defense Force commander Christian Beyers, were opposed to 
fighting a war for their old enemy England, especially against Germany. 
Henning Klapper summed up their opinions when he pointed out that 













after the Anglo-Boer war, the Germans had collected £80,000 for the 
destitute Afrikaners 
And Botha knelt down before the man who presented the money 
and he thanked him. Yet he was the man who declared war on the 
German forces in South West. That made us bitter. How can you 
do that? How can you be such a hypocrite?6 
To Klopper, 'Smuts sold us to the British. He became an Anglophile 
... Smuts misled Botha.'7 The Nationalists, under Hertzog, expressed this 
feeling very clearly in opposing the upcoming war. 
Smuts, however, was firm in his convictions and his support for 
the British. The question of 'why' he wanted the war has been approached 
by many historians such as Maynard Swanson and W.K. Hancock, and 
several suggestions have been advanced. Each of these theories consider 
certain aspects of Smuts's personality and loyalties. 
SMUTS'S REASONS FOR SUPPORTING THE CAMPAIGN 
In ~is biography of Smuts, Hancock often stresses Smuts's loyalty 
and emotion, believes that Smuts supported the war out of duty - both to 
England and to former Prime Minister Campbell-Bannerman, his friend. 
In 1906, Smuts approached Campbell-Bannerman and said the English 
'can have Boers for friends, and they have proven what quality their 
friendship may mean', or they could choose to be enemies 'and possibly 
have another Ireland on [their] hands'.s 
Campbell Bannerman had chosen friendship, and he and Smuts 
had sought to bring Boer and Briton together in South Africa. Thus 
6 Harrison, White Tribe of Africa, p. 61. 
7 Ibid. 












Hancock suggests that 'That same night, Campbell-Bannerman made his 
choice of having the Boers for friends. Eight years later [WWI], Smuts 
made his choice of proving what Boer friendship could mean'.9 
Smuts, speaking of Botha and Campbell-Bannerman, said that 
magnanimity on both their parts paved the way for cooperation in the 
First World War. On their meeting, he wrote: 
Greatness of soul met greatness of soul, and a page was added to the 
story of human statesmanship ... seven years later Campbell-
Bannerman had passed away, but Botha was once more a 
commaner-in-chief in the field, this time, however, in common 
cause with Britain and over forces in which Dutch and British were 
comrades10 
Hancock, supported by Smuts's own words, reveals to us his 
opinion on how the General's own strong sense of loyalty and desire for 
British-Boer unity was a factor in pursuing the South-West Africa 
Campaign. Both Botha and Smuts, Hancock argues, were repaying the 
· kindness of Campbell-Bannerman and doing their duty to the British 
Empire. However, loyalty and duty are not enough to explain why the 
Union government, and specifically Jan Smuts, went beyond their 
obligation to release troops for Europe, and perhaps knock out the radio 
tower at Swakopmund, and instead led a wholescale invasion of first 
South-West Africa and then East Africa - acts which did not particularly 
aid the British struggle, but instead sapped potential Imperial troops from 
the European front! Therefore while Hancock's argument helps show 
why Smuts would be committed to the war, it does not explain why he 
and Botha invaded South-West Africa. 
9 Hancock. ~. v2/p. 5. 













Certainly, as historian Gerald L'Ange wrote, 'Some of the Dutch-
speaking South Africans .... shared his belief that, having made a pact with 
the British ... they were honour bound to help it fight its wars. •11 
However, the argument that the war was an exercise in Anglo-Boer unity 
is questionable because the decision to invade South-West Africa 
provoked an Afrikaner rebellion in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, 
and even L'Ange admits that many of the Afrikaners joined the campaign 
out of loyalty to Botha and the sheer love of a fight.12 
Another often used argument was that the Union invaded South-
west Africa for security reasons - that Smuts and Botha were afraid to 
have a German colony on their northern border. Certainly Smuts made 
use of this argument, especially when addressing British politicians and 
leaders. In his famous 1917 Speech to Parliament in England, he said: 
You are aware of the great German scheme which existed before the 
war, and which no doubt is still in the background of many minds 
in Germany, of creating a great Central African Empire.... which 
would have a very large population and ... in which it would be 
possible to train one of the most powerful black armies of the 
world13 
Interestingly, Smuts was aware that the Union could raise ten times 
the troops that the Germans had stationed in South-West Africa. In fact, 
he had taken part in a war in which lightly armed Afrikaner commandos 
had held the largest professional army in the world at bay for four years, so 
it seems doubtful he was afraid of a small force of Germans with 
unreliable native troops invading his strongly held nation - even with the 
help of a minority of the Afrikaners.1 4 
11 L'ange, G., Urgent Imperial Service, Ashanti Publishing, Rivonia, 1991, p. 4. 
12 L'ange quotes Coen Brits, who wrote to Botha "My men are ready; who do we fight - the 
English or the Germans". Ibid. 
13 Smuts, JC, War Time Speeches, p. 91-2. 












Though Smuts used the security argument time and again, both 
before the campaign and during the Peace Conference negotiations, he did 
so only publicly. For the British (and later all the allies), security from the 
German threat internationally was a major point, and to much of the 
South African public fear of the Germans was a powerful motivational 
force in support of the campaign. However, the security issue is not 
· significantly discussed in Smuts's private papers. Security was not the 
main factor for Smuts. 
Most of Smuts's letters and discussions seem to ignore this factor 
and instead point to an intense belief in expansion. As pointed out 
before, Smuts often talked of 'Civilizing Africa... from South Africa,' and 
creating a country in which 'it will be almost impossible to use the word 
South any more except in reminder of our original starting point'. 15 
Where did his expansionism come from? Some called Smuts a 
British Imperialist, others point to Smuts's Afrikaner heritage of trekking 
to new places,but Hancock believes hey were combined. 'From Kruger 
and Rhodes and even from thei  former British conquerors they [Smuts 
and Botha] had inherited an expansionist concept of security - wider 
frontiers for the Union and an economic and political hegemony 
extending beyond those frontiers far into equitorial Africa.'16 
While Smuts had expansionism ingrained from both his British 
and Afrikaans heritages, neither heritage alone explains his desire to 
occupy South-West Africa. In Chapter 3, I advanced the argument that 
Smuts's expansionist leanings were in support of the creation of a 
Southern African superstate. When opposed by Hertzog, Beyers, and 
15 Ibid, p. 90 












others, Smuts wrote that he had 'faith in South Africa'.17 It was for the 
benefit of South Africa, not for Britain and not solely for the Afrikaans, 
that Smuts supported war. 
Botha and Smuts were partners in this endeavor. It would be a 
mistake to ignore Botha's influence (as Prime Minister) in shaping the 
South-West African campaign. Botha and Smuts agreed on the invasion. 
Botha stated that even if the British government had not asked the Union 
to attack South-West Africa, it 'would have done so on its· own accord.' 18 
Smuts, two weeks later, said 'There is now the prospect of the Union 
becoming. almost double its present size ... and we shall leave to our 
children a huge country, in which to develop a type for themselves.'19 
Smuts's reasons for supporting the South-W st campaign were 
typical of his objectives. When Smuts later led the attack on German East 
Africa, it was not in order to take that country for the Union and remove 
it as a threat, but to hold it to trade with the Portuguese for Mocambique.2° 
In both campaigns, the German threat and British objectives were 
secondary to Smuts's expansionist tendencies. 
Obviously this expansionism in South-West Africa did have a 
purpose beyond just 'expanding' politically. There were economic 
considerations as well. South-West Africa had the best port facilities on 
the west coast of sub-Saharan Africa. The territory had large cattle stocks 
as well. Even more importantly, South-West African mines produced 
copper, lead, zinc, mica, vanadium, graphite, rock salt, and other minerals, 
17 SP 12/145 to J.X. Merriman, 2 October, 1914. 
l8 'The South West Africa Campaign'The Cape Times, front page, August 5, 1915. 
l9 Millin, S., Gener! Smuts, Faber and Faber, London, 1936, p327. Unfortunately, the book is 
not footnoted and I have been unable, as Maynard Swanson was before me, to find the actual 
speech. • 












and diamonds worth £9,250,250 had been mined between 1908 and 1914.21 
The Imperial Government was aware of this, as was the Union. These 
factors can, however, be explained as part of Smuts and Botha's 
expansionist plans. The many resources in South-West Africa were as 
desirable to the Union's leaders as the land itself. 
N.G. Garson wrote that 'Smuts's African policy amounted to the 
single-minded pursuit of formal expansion from the Union as base'. 22 
This is simplistic, for Smuts's policies were more complex than that, but 
he certainly saw South-West Africa as a logical extension of the Union's 
_ reach. Not only was Smuts prepared to theorize about it, he was prepared 
to take action, and from 1910 onwards, as Minister of Defense, Smuts 
planned and carried out the actions which prepared th  Union for war and 
was instrumental as a leader in the campaign for South-West Africa. 
THE DECISION TO FIGHT 
After the South African Party's slim victory in the 1910 elections, 
Smuts had asumed the roles of Minister of Interior,Minister of Mines, and 
Minister of Defense. His main role as Minister of Defense was to prepare 
the Union for a war that he, among others, foresaw. Throughout 1911 and 
1912 he worked on a Defense Act which changed the Union's defense 
forces. 
The bi1123 was well thought out. It had as its general principle the 
idea that 'every [man is] liable to war service'. However, Smuts did not 
intend to draft the population. Instead, every man between 15 and 30 
21 British Foreign Office publication, South West Africa, September 1914, p. 72. 
22 Garson, NG, 'Smuts and Africa' , p. 5. 












years of age would serve either in the Active Citizen Force or in a Rifle 
Association, both of which drew on the heritage of Boer commandos and 
English light horsemen in creating groups that were both military and 
social in nature. The intent was to create a large group of trained men for 
military service. 
In 1913, this bill created 44,193 voluntary registrants, and in 1915, 
the Active Citizen Force was able to provide the preponderance of the 
expeditionary force.24 
Just as importantly, when the British Government declared war, 
the Union was able to offer to release the British troops to fight in the 
European theatre and replace them with its own. On 7 August , the 
British Secretary of State responded, and in a message to Governor-
General Buxton not only accepted the offer but aslso asked whether the 
South Africans 'if [they] desire and feel themselves able to seize such parts 
of Germlan South-West Africa as will give them command of 
Swakopmund, Luderitzbucht, and the wireless stations there or in the 
interior,•25 could do so. 
On 11 August, the Union government agreed and Smuts began to 
organize the Active Citizen Force 'for contingencies.'25 None-the-less, the 
issue was not settled because their was opposition to the campaign both 
amongst the population and within Parliament. The main opposition 
came from Barry Hertzog's nationalist party within Parliament, and from 
segments of the Afrikaner rural population (some of whom went into 
open revolt). Hertzog argued that the Union had no duty to fight a foreign 
war, and that his duty was to his people, not the Empire. 
24 Collyer. The Campaign in German South West Africa, p. 17. 












Smuts, arguing for the campaign, presented a different view. 'Our 
mother countries have been attacked by an enemy,' he said, 'we have 
Belgian, French and English blood. •26 He Warned of the German threat to 
South Africa, and lectured on the Union's duty to fight. He never 
mentioned what might happen after the war, but Botha had already asked 
the Imperial government what the status of South-West Africa would be 
if captured by the Union. 27 The resolution to attack South-West Africa 
was paassed by a vote of 92 to 12, and South Africa was at war with 
Germany.28 
SMUTS'S ROLE IN THE CAMPAIGN 
Smuts was no longer a general, but a statesman. Still, his role in 
the upcoming campaign was vital. Botha's second-in-command, General 
Collyer, discerned that the Minister of Defense was the Supreme 
Commander of the c~mpaign.29 The Reuter's correspondents attached to 
the force pointed out his importance, even to naming their book (released 
in 1916) How Botha and Smuts Conquered German South West.30 Yet, 
Smuts commanded in the field for only a month and a half. It would be 
26 The Star, September 10, 1914, p. 2. 
27 British Command Papersl914-1916 Cd.7873, Correspondance to the Proposed Naval and 
Militazy Expedition against German South West Africa. no 45. 
28 L'ange, Urgent Imperial Service. p. 17. 
29 Collyer.The Campaign in German South-West Africa, p. 9. This begs the question ... if Botha 
commanded in the field, Smuts was his superior. Yet Botha, as Prime Minister, was Smuts's 
superior as Minister of Defense. Once again, this relationship can only be called a partnership. 
30 Rayner, WS, and WW O'Shaughnessy, How Botha and Smuts Conquered German South West 












easy to either discount Smuts's role or to declare, from Collyer's 
statement, that he was the central figure of the invasion. While Smuts 
played an important part in the campaign, he was not the only principal 
figure in the occupation. 
Botha, by late September, had decided to take full command of the 
forces in the field. With Botha commanding the expeditionary force, 
Smuts had 'the task of administrative and military organisation at the seat 
of government in Pretoria'31• The recruitment, disposition, provisioning, 
and officering of the army fell to him. 
As early as August, Smuts was hard at work on this task. A series of 
letters to and from Brigadier General Charles Crewe32 reveal Smuts's 
recruitment work. 'I strongly urge commanding officers must come from 
the Permanent Forces or Police ... .', 33 was one of Crewe's pieces of advice. 
More advice came from other officers - advice on recruitment, 
provisioning, all aspects of war. Smuts also communicated with the 
British high command, such as his request for more supplies on August 
17th, when he wrote to Sir James Murray: 'Ministers are being pressed to 
take active steps in German South-West Africa and yet, when they ask for 
certain equipment fom the Imperial stores, they are informed that the 
only things that can be given to them are vehicles whose serviceableness 
is under grave suspicion.'34. 
Although he had people to help him and superiors to request aid 
from, Smuts was thus the person responsible for all these details - Officers 
31 Hancock,~. vl/p385. 
32 Chief recruiting officer for the Union, a British officer during the Anglo-Boer War. 
33 SP 12/33, 12 August, 1914. 












wrote to him for supplies of arsenite soda to defeat flies, for details of the 
whereabouts of their horses, even to complain ·about each other. 
Then, in October rebellion broke out amongst a group of 
Afrikaners under General Beyers and de Wet who opposed the campaign. 
Smuts advised Botha to declare martial law, which was declared the next 
day35 but with Botha planning to leave the country, the implementation 
was left up to Smuts. One of his wiser decisions was to defeat the rebels 
using loyal Afrikaner troops, rather than levies from Natal or the Cape, 
which helped isolate the rebellion. It was also Smuts who appointed Coen 
Brits to command the forces putting down the rebellion.36 
The Germans were not idle during this time, and while preparing 
their defenses, in December issued a statement saying: 
The German Government never intended permanently to occupy 
the South African Union, and desires that the hostilities forced 
upon her by the South African Union should cease. So long as the 
Union abstains from further hostilities against German territory 
and evacuates the territory already invaded, South Africans may 
establish a neutral state which will be officially recognised by 
Germany, as also its political independance and territorial 
integrity.37 
However, the South Africans had already decided to proceed. 
Forces had already landed at Luderit~bucht (18 September) and had 
marched across land from the border as well (23 September). Smuts was 
now involved in moving men, horses, equipment, and even railway cars 
and ties to South-West Africa to support the invasion. 
Equally importantly, Smuts was issuing general orders promoting 
and transferring officers, appointing men to positions, creating and 
decommisioning units, and generally coordinating the invasion's logistics 
35 Hancock, ~. v l/p386. 
36 L'ange, Urgent Imperial Service, p. 53 
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39 
while Botha was on the northern route of attack.38 By this time, the South 
Africans had four forces in the field. McKenzie's 'Central' force was made 
out of the troops operating from Luderitzbuch. The 'Southern' force 
under Van Deventer was to strike North overland from Upington in the 
Union to join with him near Keetmanshoop. The Eastern Force would 
march from Kuruman into GSWA. A small force of mounted rifleman, it 
would have to cross the Kalahari. Meanwhile, General Botha himself 
would command the northern force on its march from Swakopmund to 
Windhuk along the central railway spine. The primary constituency of all 
these forces was a strong cavalry contingent totalling 13000 men -
commandos and light horse. 
During the early months of 1915, Smuts was occupied running the 
army - and the country - from his desk in Pretoria. Much of his time he 
was fielding requests from commanders - even Botha who pronounced: 
'my advance... depends solely on measure of assistance which can be 
afforded by Defence Headquarters. •39 
Smuts, however competently he performed his job, chafed at being 
confined to his desk. He wrote a lugubrious letter to Henry Hull 
complaining about spending his time on supplies, Parlaiment ('You are 
well out of it') and how hard it was to deal with Hertzogites and Labour, 
and commenting wistfully on the campaign, 'Now that you have broken 
the strong defensive line at Jakalswater and Reit the enemy will probably 
retire ... '.40 Two weeks earlier, Botha had written 'Stand fast and hurry 
through [parliament] and come in yourself at one end.' 41 Smuts began to 
38 All orders went out under Smuts's name. See Union Defence Forces General Orders 1914-1915 
nos. 1-64. 
39 SP 13/IOA 3 February, 1915, Botha to Smuts. 
40 SP 13/137, 25 March, 1915. 















make his plans and in early April, abandoned his post and took command 
of the Southern and Eastern forces. 
It was Smuts's responsibility was to clean up the German forces in 
the south centered around Keetmanshoop. He was a political leader as 
well as a general and his biggest problem was to reconcile MacKenzie (an 
excellent cavalry commander, but very strongly pro-British) and Lukin 
(whose brigade was mostly made up of Free Staters). Aware of the delicacy 
of the situation, Smuts decided to put Lukin senior to MacKenzie and 
putting MacKenzie in charge of an all-cavalry brigade, as if it were a 
promotion. In another politically motivated move, Smuts released all the 
drafted Cape burghers and the six-month enlisted men in the cavalry,42 a 
move guaranteed to appeal to the home front. 
On the 17th of April, Governor-General Buxton informed the 
Imperial Secretary of State that Smuts 'ha[d] officially taken command of 
the Southern, Eastern and Central Force.' 
He is making an advance in force in three columns compsosed of 
mounted men from the Southern and Eastern Force; the object is to 
surround and capture Keetmanshoop and the railway north of it.43 
Smuts now prepared his plan to take several large brigades of 
cavalry to Aus, to take it quickly with overwhelming force and then move 
on to Keetmanshoop. Smuts's son, in his biography of his father, alleges 
that Smuts's subsequent flannking attack on Aus was Jannie's stroke of 
genius. 
My father avoided frontal attacks. He was an inveterate exponent, 
like all Boers, of the enveloping flanking movement. Thus Aus, an 
42 SP CXIl/34, 5 April, 1915,.official telegram to General Botha. 












important point on the road to Keetmanshoop, though well held 
and tactically strong, fell without trouble.44 
41 
This does not seem to be true. Botha convinced him to change his 
plans, which he considered faulty, and advised: 'Where you want to go in, 
smaller comman~ groups should go it.. .. You should ... form two wings out 
l-· 
of the cavalry.'45 
Nevertheless, Smuts's leadership was quite good. He did much of 
his own scouting, and succeeded in several victories after Aus. On the 20th 
of April, Kabus was taken by Colonel van Deventer, whilst the main force 
under MacKenzie took Gibeon on the 27th after a hard fight. Most of the 
Germans, however, escaped.46 On the next day, Smuts issued a 
proclaimation 'announcing that the Defense forces of the Union of South 
Africa were in occupation of enemy territory to the latitude of Gibeon.'47 
The result of this was that the southern campaign was basically 
over. On the 29th, Smuts went to a meeting with Botha in Swakopmund 
and it was decided that, his task done (though his hunger barely sated), he 
should return home. His letter to his old Cambridge lecturer, J. 
Wostelhome, shows his satisfaction: 
I came back today from German South-West Africa where I had 
commanded the southern army of invasion, but we have occupied 
all that part of the enemy's country, so I have disbanded a large 
portion of my forces and sent the rest to assist Generall Botha in the 
north, and have myself returned to my civil duties.48 
Smuts's return to the Union did not keep him from taking part in 
the war, however, and in May a new issue began to arise: the issue of 
44 Smuts, J.C. Smuts, p. 157. 
45 SP 13/15 30 March, 1915, Botha to Smuts. 
46 Collyer. The Campaign in German SWA. 1914-1915, p. 91. 
47 Quoted in Rayner and O'Shaugnessy, How Both and Smuts Conquered South-West Africa, p. 
146. 















surrender terms. Dr. Seitz, the German colony's governer, approached 
Botha with a letter in which he outlined the succeses of Germany in 
Europe and called for an end to the bloodshed in Africa. 'South Africa is 
not so rich in men and capital as to be able to afford to throw away both 
uselessly in order to attain military victory ... What has determined me to 
arrange a compromise is the fact that I as a member of the white race must 
use every means to stop further murdering of whites by natives,'48 an 
argument he believed would appeal to his opponents. 
Botha forwarded the letter to Smuts and discussed with him the 
reply, which suggested 'I am in entire sympathy with the desire expressed 
by Your Excellency to avoid any unnecessary shedding of blood and am 
prepared at any time to meet Your Excellency fo discussion .. .'49 Smuts and 
Lord Buxton approved the reply on the 15th, and Smuts added: 
Any peace which does not involve surrender of German Forces 
woul have bad effect politically in Union and lose us much prestige 
and would for future leave it open to Germans to argue that their 
country and army were never really conquered.50 
There can be only one reason why this· was important to Smuts. In 
order for South Africa to press its claim to legitimate sovreignty over 
South-West Africa, Smuts knew they must well and truly defeat the 
Germans without any trace of doubt - not for security reasons, but in order 
to claim the territory for the Union. 
On May 20th, Botha met with Dr. Seitz and Colonel Franke, the 
commander of the German forces. At this meeting, the Germans 
proposed a cessation of hostilities, with both sides maintaining control 
48 SP CXIl/35 
49 SP CXII/36 












over the land they had taken. Botha, however, refused the offer and the 
South Africans decided to demand unconditional surrender, a notion 
which, for reasons explained above, was appealing to Smuts. 
Thus the war was still continuing in June. However, Smuts the 
optimist decided that the Union had to start setting up some sort of civil 
government and appointed E.H.L. Gorges Chief Civil Secretary of the 
South-West African Protectorate.51 The same proclaimation created the 
position of Military Governor, also to be appointed by Smuts. 
Things were proceeding apace in the field, and as July 1915 
approached, Governor Seitz once again asked for surrender terms. On July 
7th, Botha and Seitz met and laid out a proposal for a general armistice wit 
five conditions: that the reservists were to be disbanded, the active troops 
collected in one place with their guns and batteries on them, the reserve 
batteries would be handed over, the police would be treated as active 
troops, and the Government of the German colony woud hand over all 
property to the Union. 
Smuts reviewed the te ms, and disagreed with the second 
condition. 'Malan and Watt here agree with me that second term of 
agreement impossible as it keeps armed German Army in existence ... and 
publication of such peace will have disastrous political effect after our 
complete victory ... '52 Smuts was determined that South-West African 
should be unreservedly South African, and his objection was agreed to in 
the final armistice. 
On the 9th of July, 1915, Dr. Seitz and the German government of 
South-West Africa surrendered to the Union. From then until the 31st of 
5! South African Minister of Defense, Proclamation of 11 July, 1915. 












December, 1920, a military government was to rule the Protectorate under 
martial law. 
SUMMARY 
Smuts was involved in some way in every part of the campaign -
the planning, carrying it out, the German surrender and the advent of 
martial law. However, he had a much more important role in the 
decision to invade and in the conclusion of the campaign than in the 
actual battle. 
It was Smuts, along with Botha, who was the most vehement 
proponent of the invasion. Although his commitment to the British, his 
hope for Anglo-Boer cooperation, and his wariness of the Germans on the 
Union's northern border all contributed to his decision, the invasion was 
mostly an exercise in. expansionism, and he fought for it in Parliament 
and against the Afrikaans rebels. He was also instrumental, as Minister of 
Defense, in preparing the nation for war. 
The invasion itself was led by Botha, and while Smuts held an 
important position in Pretoria, his role could have been carried out by 
another capable leader. He was a partner in the invasion, but his 
influence was less important here as he became an administrator and 
bureaucrat, rather than an idealogue. 
In refusing certain terms of the German surrender, Smuts played a 
very important part in ending the campaign. Looking to the future and 
without the benefit of knowing there would be a British victory, he saw 
that an armed German force might threaten the future of the Union's 












German's request to keep their reserves armed - a provision Botha may 
very well have otherwise accepted. 
Smuts was also able to appoint the Military Governor and Civil 
Secretary of the territory, and appointed administrators who would be 
sympathetic to his plans for South-West Africa. 
FROM CAMPAIGN TO MANDATE 
Smuts had assumed that since South Africa had been conquered by 
the Union, it would become South African territory after the war. 
However, the Imperial government had made it clear that 'any territory 
now occupied must be at the disposal of the Imperial Government for 
purposes of an ultimate settlement at the conclusion of the war' .53 Thus 
Smuts knew his job was not completed just because the Union had 
conquered this territory. 
The next two year Smuts's task was therefore to convince the 
British and South Africans that the Union should control this territory. In 
England, he promised that a greater South Africa would be a regional 
stabilizer, and declared 'a new Monroe Doctrine for the South, such as to 
protect it against European militarism.'5 4 He also opposed the return of 
the German colonies, and the first of the Empire's War Aims he declared 
was the temination 'of the German Colonial system with a view to the 
future security of all communications vital to the British Empire.'55 
53 Britsh Command Papers 1914-1916, Code 7873 Correspondances on the Proposed Expedition 
against German South West Africa, p4. 
54 Speech to the Royal Geographical Society, January 28, 1918, in War Time Sveeches, p. 71-84. 












Smuts also had to defend his relationship with the Imperial 
government back home. He defended Botha and Himself when the 
Nationalists attacked them as British, saying 'We want one South Africa, 
one united people, and on October 15th, 1916, remarked 'I am a man of 
Peace .. [and] I shall work with my last breath for the good of South 
Africa.'56 
At first his position with the British government was very 
defensible, for in February 1916 he was asked to command the Imperial 
forces in East Africa (i.e. Tanganyika).57 This campaign was more 
appealing to the average South African than sending troops to France. It 
was much closer, and had as its ends tangible results. John Merriman, a 
member of the Union Assembly, advised Smuts that 'if [East Africa] were 
conquered by us we could probably effect an exchange with Mozambique 
and so consolidate our territories south of the Zambesi and Kunene.'58 
Smuts could therefore logically argue that he was working for the 
Union. However, whilst the campaign lingered on in East Africa, in 
January 1917, Smuts allowed himself to be lured to London to work for the 
British government. 
'The suggestion had been put to Smuts more than once in 1915 that 
he ought to go to London,'59 writes Hancock in his biography of Smuts. 
However, Smuts had always seen his duty as being in South Africa. 
Hancock remarks that it was Botha who asked Smuts to go to London60 , 
56 Quoted in Smuts, JC Smuts. p159. 
57 He was first asked in November, 1915, but refused because the Union was unsettled after the 
close election. However, he took over after General Smith-Dorrien fell ill at Cape Town. 
58 SP 13/89, Merriman to Smuts, undated but probably November 1915. 
59 Hancock,~. vl/p408. 
60 Hancock,~. vl/p423, the author mentions a telegram from Botha, although a June letter 
from Jan Smuts to his wife reads "You know I have been asked to attend the War Cabinet 
regularly and, with General Botha's permission, I have agreed, making it seem much more 












and the reason was the Imperial Conference being held with 
representatives from all the Dominions at that time. By mid June, Smuts 
was a full member of the War Cabinet. 
Now there was some basis to the charge that he was betraying the 
Afrikaners for the British could be laid at his feet. But it was really un 
unfair charge. On the 10th of May, Smuts refused an offer to administrate 
Palestine for the British Government61 even though both the British 
Government and the Union Cabinet advised him to accept it. On the 19th 
of that month, the Bishop of Ossory, along with others, urged him to take 
charge of the situation in Ireland 'Some ... have suggested you shoudl take 
a hand in finding a solution for the Irish problem ... a task that has broken 
many hearts and reputations.'62 Indeed, Lloyd George, the British Prime 
Minister himself urged Smuts to become chairman of an Irish 
Convention. 
Smuts saw his denials as part of his almost mystical connection 
with South Africa. 'I have today declined the Palestine commmand, ' he 
wrote to M.C. Gillett, 'I was taken on a high hill and shown the kingdoms 
of the world. And I have renounced them. '63 The biblical reference is 
obvious. Smuts did choose South Africa over all other countries - even 
the British Empire. But he was not to return home, for the war was 
coming to an end and he was to play a large part in the settlement at its 
termination - and a new order for South Africa, South-West Africa, and 
the world. 
Foremost in his mind remained the question of South-West 
Africa. 'for I expect a great row over the German colonies, in whic we in 
6! SP 15/76 10 May, 1917, and enclosure within. 
62 SP 16/155A 19 May, 1917. 












South Africa have such a radical interest,' he wrote home to his wife, 
explaining why he would not be returning home,' I do not know what to 
do.'64 












CHAPTER 5 - ANNEXATION IN ALL BUT NAME 
It is a commonly quoted aphorism that possession is nine-tenths of 
the law. The physical possession of South-West Africa did not, however, 
necessarily confer ownership upon the Union. By July 1915, the military 
occupation of the territory complete, South Africa began the longer task of 
gaining legitimacy, in both foreign and domestic eyes, for the permanent 
annexation of the territory. 
THE TASK 
Smuts was one statesman who did not believe that simply by 
occupying South-West Africa the Union had claimed it as a territory. He 
was sure, however, that it was in the Union's best interests to obtain it. 
From the beginning of the campaign in 1915, the South African objective 
had been to occupy the territory completely. A letter from Botha to Smuts 
in April expressed the view: 
True we are doing a good deal by agreeing to take German South-
west Africa, but we should not lose sight of the fact that we are 
taking the country for ourselves and not for anyone else.I 
Smuts's own opinions coincided with this. The annexation of 
South-West Africa was a step towards the attainment of his goal of a 
super-African state as detailed in chapter 2. Smuts regarded it not only as 
'a part of our Afrikaans heritage',2 but as a logical extension of the Union. 
He knew, however, that conquering the territory was not enough. The 
Union would have to gain the acquiesce of both the British government 
and the Principle Allied and Associated Powers. 
1 Smuts Papers 12/60. The letter is unfortunately undated. 












With the victory of the Allies in 1918, Smuts's position on the War 
Council gave him a central role in the planning for the Paris Peace 
Conference. Smuts, however, turned down a role in the British 
deputation and instead joined his long-time political partner, Louis Botha, 
in leading the South African group. 
Gaining international recognition of the Union's sovereignty in 
South-West Africa was a tough job, complicated by the possibility of 
having to deal with a supra-national organization - an idea which was by 
April 1918 becoming increasingly bandied-around by governments and 
private groups. 
Smuts and his fellow ministers thus set out to write a manifesto on 
the future of South-West Africa - a document which would set forward 
their case. This document, entitled the Memorandum on the Question of 
the Future of South-West Africa3 , was completed and given to the 
Governor-General marked secret, but with a note that Lord Buxton could 
publish it if he so chose. The document is significant because it outlined 
three of the main arguments that Smuts would use over the next year in 
his attempts to gain first the annexation and then the mandate for South-
west Africa. 
The memorandum based its argument for the South African 
annexation of South-West Africa on the threat of Germany. The first part 
of the threat was the danger the German colony posed to the Union and 
the British Empire. 
It is the firm conviction of the great majority of the European 
population of the Union that if South-West Africa were restored to 
the Germans, the permanent security and peace of the Union and, 











indeed, of the whole of British South Africa would be gravely 
imperiled.4 
51 
The second argument presented by this document was the 
treatment of the indigenous people by the Germans, which 'lead to a 
continual state of dissatisfaction and unrest, culminating in risings, 
massacres, and brutalities'. The Union government promised to take the 
high ground. '[The natives] have openly declared their intention of 
leaving the territory if it is restored to the Germans' 
This argument was not left to stand by itself. The British Foreign 
Office published a number of 'atrocity Blue Books' between 1916 and 1918 
on the various wartime atrocities attributed to German troops, and one of 
these focused on the Herero massacres instigated by the Germans in 19045 
as well as other alleged attacks by the German administration in South-
West Africa. 
The third argument presented in the Memorandum was the 
expansionist one - that South-West Africa was really a part of the 
continuous British territory in Southern Africa. 
When German pretensions in Damaraland first became known in 
the Eighties, the Government of the Cape Colony repeatedly 
protested against the admission of a great European Power to 
territory .... geographically and ethnologically ... closely related to the 
rest of South Africa. The Orange River on the South did not 
constitute a natural barrier, while on the East it was impossible to 
fix any border except a line drawn arbitrarily through the desert. 
This was a direct echo of Smuts's 'Northward Expansion' speech in 
19176 and promoted the idea of hegemony of a region which was 
naturally united but which had been split by colonial powers - a hegemony 
under Union leadership. 
4 ibid 
5 British Command Papers 1914-1916, Cd. 8371 volXX. 












Having now gained military control of South-West Africa, it was 
the task of Smuts and the other members of his deputation to receive 
international support for the annexation - to establish legal sovereignty. 
According to many historians of the Paris Peace Conference, such as 
William Louis, security was the major concern of Smuts, rather than 
expansionism. 7 He argues that Smuts based his arguments on economic 
and political factors, mainly the safety of the Union against aggression 
from European colonial powers. Maynard Swanson, on the other hand, 
saw Smuts's advocacy as both 
popular and idealistic ... he invoked the v1s10n of a Greater South 
Africa that would give his own people a broadening national 
experience and his purpose in association with the liberal world 
empire he saw in the British dominions.s 
Both liberal ideals and national security influenced Smuts, for he 
was a philosopher as well as the Union's Minister of Defense. Smuts was 
indeed driven by both pragmatic and moralistic zeals, but they were not 
confined to either the arguments set forth in the Memorandum nor those 
outlined by Swanson and Louis. 
The major factors driving Smuts were, idealistically, his belief in 
the expansion of European civilization embodied in English, Afrikaans, 
and (we shall later see) German peoples; and, pragmatically, the political 
situation back in South Africa, both of which Smuts believed necessitated 
the annexation of South-West Africa, a point which will be argued later in 
this chapter. 
7 Louis, William, 'The South West African Origins of the Sacred Trust, 1914-1919.', African 
Affairs. January 1-7, 1967. 
8 Swanson, Maynard, 'South West Africa in Trust', in Louis and Gifford's Britain and Germany in 












SMUTS ENTERS THE DEBATE 
Smuts joined the issue of the disposal of former German colonies 
in 1917, when, at the Imperial War Conference, he gave a speech at a 
banquet given by Parliament in which he said: 
This great Commonwealth to which we all belong .. .is dependent for 
its very existence on world-wide communications or this Empire 
goes to pieces. Everywhere on your communications Germany has 
settled down; everywhere upon your communications you will find 
a German colony here and there, and the day would have come 
when your Empire would have been in very great jeopardy from 
your lines of communications being cut ... Now one of the by-
products of this war has been that the whole world outside Europe 
has been swept clear of the enemy.10 
It is significant that Smuts at this time emphasized the need for 
security. As a delegate at the Imperial War Conference, Smuts 
emphasized not the changing nature of the Empire, but its continuing 
need for security. In the same speech, he says the member-states of the 
Empire 'have not fought for material gain, or territory; we have fought for 
security in the future.' But it is significant that he uses 'you' throughout 
this part of the speech - as if he were not a representative of part of the 
Empire, but of an independent country separate from it. 
However, Smuts allowed himself to be convinced to join the 
British War Council later that same year, and on 14 November, 1918, 
published a 'Practical Suggestion' on the League of Nations. 11 The 
document is significant as a model for an international league, but is more 
important to this paper for what it says on mandates. 
10 SP, Box H, No. 10, Speech at a banquet in his honour given by both Houses of Parliament on 
15 May, 1917. 













Smuts discussed the League of Nations' role as a mandatory power 
for the first time, calling for 'No annexations, and the self determination 
of nations' for territories of Turkey and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but 
not for German colonies, especially those in the Pacific and Asia, which 
should be given to new colonists based on the interests of their 
populations, the Germans having proven, he wrote, brutal colonists. 
In a speech to a number of American newspaper editors on 14 
November, Smuts made his meaning more clear: 'Some of these 
[German] colonies are quite fairly and properly claimed and will have to be 
given to the British Dominions which conquered them, and for whose 
future development or security they are necessary' .12 This was the 
argument which he used time and again to justify annexation for South-
west Africa, and is quite clearly a reference to it. 
In revealing his plans for the German colonies, Smuts drew a very 
clear line between the mandates he called for in Europe, to ease the defeat 
of the Central Powers, and the annexations of colonial territories which he 
felt must take place. This split gave rise to the traditional view of a man 
trapped by his own brilliance in suggesting the mandatory system and 
therefore giving up annexation of the territory he had conquered and 
wanted so badly. 
Not long after this speech, the other man responsible for the 
creation of the mandate system, Woodrow Wilson, declared that 'he 
thought that the German colonies should be declared the common 
property of the League of Nations and [be] administered by small 
nations' 13 
12 SP, Box H, No 27, Speech to American newspaper editors on 14 November, 1918. 












This small difference in the ideas of two visionaries was to prove, 
in coming years, the battle ground of the mandate argument. Smuts, on 
the one hand, confined mandates to the Turkish and Austro-Hungarian 
territories, while Wilson extended them to former German colonies 
including, of course, South-West Africa. 14 
The Paris Peace Conference, in 1919, was a watershed year for the 
future of South-West Africa, as it was for many parts of the world. Smuts 
arrived as one of the head delegates for the South African delegation on 11 
January15 , having resigned his position on the War Cabinet.16 
Smuts was undoubtedly happy to rejoin his own nation - for 
although having given good service to the Empire, he certainly regarded 
South Africa as his homeland. He immediately b gan to confer with 
Botha. Undoubtedly, one of the things they discussed during long walks 
in the woods on 11 and 12 January was public opinion back in South 
Africa. Patriotic vitriol at the victory had stepped to the forefront - in both 
the Afrikaans and the English language press. The Cape Times wrote on 
the 17 January: 
If the British Ministry imagined ... that the Union, New Zealand and 
Australia would consent to give back what they have taken from 
Germany merely in a spirit of lofty altruism and self-effacement, the 
British Ministry would be very much mistaken ... public opinion in 
the Union will not be in the smallest degree impressed by what 
reads uncommonly like unctuous balderdash.17 
This opinion was not isolated. The Rand Daily Mail called for the 
incorporation of South-West Africa in an almost identical article a year 
14 Curry, 'Wilson, Smuts and the Versailles Settlement', AHR, LXVI, 4(1961), p. 977. 
15 SP v22/192, a letter to Arthur Clark. 
16 SP v20/207 'My dear Prime Minister. Now that the elections are over I must ask you to 
release me from further service on the War Cabinet.' 












later, just on the eve of the conference 18 • In addition, Sarah Millin quotes 
the 'Nationalists' as saying that Botha and Smuts had better not 'show 
themselves before the public of South Africa without German South-West 
in their pockets'. 19 
The agreement on the topic from both the British Union press and 
the Nationalists illustrates the importance control of South-West Africa 
was to Smuts's and Botha's political futures. 
Smuts's dreams of Empire must have finally seemed open to him. 
Certainly Botha thought Mozambique might be available, as well as 
South-West Africa, and Smuts was still entertaining his plan for a trade 
with Portugal to bring that colony into the Union's control.2° At the very 
least, they must have felt, it was within their right to demand South-West 
Africa, a territory conquered solely by Union troops at the request of the 
British government. 
To help prove their point, in late August the South Africans had 
prepared another set of papers, which they distributed to the other 
delegates. This collection reite ated many of the points of the earlier 
Memorandum on the Question of the Future of South-West Africa, and 
was called the Memoranda on the Constitution and Government of the 
Protectorate of South-West Africa.21 A large part of the paper was 
dedicated to 'The Case for not Restoring the Protectorate to Germany and 
for Transferring its Administration to the Union after Cession to the King 
by the Treaty of Peace'. 
l8 Rand Daily Mail November 25, 1918, quoted in Gail Cockram 1976. 
19 Millin , General Smuts, p. 240. Op. Cited. 
20 7 See Chapter III. 
21 SP CXV/2. These Memoranda were a bit premature, since the Protectorate had not yet been 
granted to the Union, but that is indicative of the confidence the South Africans enjoyed before 












Once again, two of the main arguments were the 'complete 
unfitness with which the Germans in the Protectorate have, during their 
occupation thereof, displayed for the responsibility of governing its native 
inhabitants' and 'the evidence which is available as to Germany's designs 
after the conclusion of hostilities in the event of the restoration to her of 
her African colonies' - in other words, native concerns and security. 
This time, however, another argument was added which was based 
'on the consideration of the geographical position of the Protectorate'. 
This was the first time that the official documents of the South African 
delegation reflected the idea that the Union had a right to South-West 
Africa based solely on its position within their sphere of influence. This 
expansionism fit in perfectly with Smuts 'natural frontiers' idea, that 
South-West Africa was rightly a part of the southern African superstate, 
which the Union was fit to rule. 
Smuts had, in a 1918 speech, called for a 'New Monroe Doctrine for 
the South ... to protect it against European militarism.' Behind the 
sheltering wall of such a doctrine, they promise to build up a new peaceful 
world, not only for themsel es but for the many millions of black people 
entrusted to their care.22 He saw South African imperialism as protecting 
Southern Africa from such threats as German militarism, as being a shield 
for Africa. 
Maynard Swanson, in his article 'South-West Africa in Trust' 23 • 
declares that 'Ultimately the claim for South-West Africa rested upon the 
two main pillars of national security and German misrule of dependent 
22 Speech to the Royal Geographical Society, Jauary 28, 1918, in Smuts, War Time Speeches, 
pp. 71-84. 
23 Swanson, Maynard, South West Africa in Trust, in Prosser, Gifford and William Louis, Britain 












peoples. We have seen that many of the pre-conference documents 
surrounding the Union's arguments for annexation of the protectorate, as 
well as many of Smuts's speeches, use these arguments. as the peace 
conference began, Smuts's ideas of expansionism had been added to those 
of national security and native welfare. The idea of expansionism was not 
one as easily voiced to leaders such as Wilson, who were committed to 
new liberal ideals, but as Smuts began his task of securing South-West 
Africa for the Union, the ability of South Africa to expand northward was 
foremost in his mind. 
THE CONFERENCE 
Jan Smuts has a reputation for being 'slick', or wily. But he never 
hid his intentions for South-West Africa. At the very beginning of the 
Peace Conference, he moved: 
Having regard to the record of German administration in the 
colonies formerly belonging to the German Empire, and to the 
menace which the possession by Germany of submarine bases in 
many parts of the world would necessarily constitute to the freedom 
and security of all nations, the Allied and Associated powers are 
agreed that in no circumstances should any of the German colonies 
be restored to Germany24 
Smuts was the kind of man who was always prepared and who 
always came to meetings or conferences with an idea on paper. At the 
South African Constitutional Convention, he had been the only delegate 
to arrive with a scheme for the constitution on paper25 and the Practical 
Suggestion was also one of his blueprints, this time for the Versailles 
treaty. But Smuts was also a leader who knew how to compromise - he 
24 Millin, General Smuts. v2/239. op. cit. 












knew that Anglo-Boer reconciliation was the only way to create a strong 
Union; and he was opposed to heavy fines against Germany which would 
cause resentment.26 So while Smuts went into the Peace Conference with 
set ideas, he was very willing to compromise. Still, to compromise on 
South-West Africa would have been a significant concession, endangering 
Smuts's political position in the Union as well as his personal beliefs. 
Wilson had already set himself up as an opponent of annexation, 
and Smuts correctly identified him as the leader who would have to be 
convinced of the necessity. On the other hand, Smuts had already gained 
several allies, amongst them Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, 
who had told Wilson on December 28th, 1918, that he thought 'German 
Southwest (sic) Africa could not be separated from the South African 
Union'27, as well as the delegations from New Zealand and Australia, who 
wanted to annex German Pacific territories they had captured during the 
war. 
Wilson was intent on prohibiting annexation in the former 
German colonies all over the world. On 7 January , in Paris, Wilson 
proposed what later became known as the first Paris draft of the Versailles 
Settlement which included many of Smuts's ideas but on the issue of 
mandates added that they should be administered: 
In respect of the peoples and territories which formerly belonged to 
Austria-Hungary, and to Turkey, and in respect of the colonies 
formerly under the dominion of the German Empire. 28 
26 SP v101n3 is one of the key indicators of this stance, in which Smuts argues 'we must...avoid 
all appearance of dismembering [Germany J or subjecting her to indefinite economic servitude 
and pauperism'. Hancock (Smuts, p. 512) writes 'appeasement was the new word which Smuts 
put into circulation' 
27 Lloyd George, Memoirs, I, 114-115. 












Smuts seems to have been slow to publicly gear up in opposition to 
Wilson's inclusion of the former German colonies. He went through a 
series of discussions with Wilson on the issue of mandates but failed to 
change his mind on the issue of annexation. He wrote to M.C. Gillett, a 
long-time friend that Wilson, 'is entirely opposed to our annexing a little 
German colony here or there, which pains me deeply ... '29 
Part of the reason Smuts seemed so slow to act on the issue of 
South-West Africa was that he was frantically involved in the reparations 
debate - Smuts spent much of January opposing Poincare of France, who 
opened the Conference by calling for 'justice' against the Germans, and the 
others who wanted harsh terms for Germany.30 Smuts argued that if 
Germany were destroyed Europe would also be destroyed, and warned of 
the constant menace of Bolshevism. 
For these reasons (and others stated above), many contemporary 
politicians such as Lloyd George believed Smuts was being hypocritical in 
suggesting easy terms for Germany - and no annexation of German 
continental territory - but calling for the annexation of Germany's 
overseas colonies. For example, Lloyd George (admittedly on June 3) 
asked Smuts if he was willing to trade German South-West Africa and the 
other colonies back to Germany, since he was so anxious to 'induce the 
[European] allies to accept smaller reparations. 31 
Smuts, however, was very wily in his riposte and to some extent 
used the 'security' issue to forward his argument. He reiterated often his 
argument from the January 2nd, 1918 Speech in which he had stated that if 
the Germans were given the chance to create a Mittelafrika it would cut 
29 SP v22/197, written on January 20th. 
30 Hancock, ~. vl/506-510. 













the sea lanes which kept the Empire together - an argument which must 
have had some effect on the British. 
Smuts's deeper reasons for opposing the return of Germany's 
colonies were reserved for his colleagues such as Lloyd George, to whom 
he wrote in his reply to the letter of 3 June: 
.believe me, the repercussions of the Peace Treaty in South Africa is 
going to be tremendous. Events may soon prove that it has made 
the position of men like General Botha and myself very difficult, if 
not impossible.32 
The importance of this letter is that it is another piece of evidence 
which shows that the impetus behind Smuts's arguments was not just 
security, but more importantly the political mood in South Africa which, 
like Smuts himself, was very pro-expansion. South Africans believed that 
since South-West Africa had been conquered by them it now belonged to 
them. Farmers and miners who had fought believing the territory would 
become theirs for settlement and investement could understand the 
return of Germany's colonies even less than statesmen such as Smuts and 
Botha. 
Throughout January, although Smuts was very busy with a number 
of issues, South-West Africa was never completely shoved into the 
background and by 24 January was once again the main issue on his 
agenda. This date marked the meeting of the Council of Ten, held within 
the auspices of the Paris Peace Conference. Smuts had not been lax during 
this time, and he had with him not only a prepared speech on why the 
Union should be granted annexation rights but also a group of allies from 
the Union's fellow dominions - New Zealand and Australia.33 
32 SP, vlOl/100. It is important to note that this letter was written months after the annexation of 
GSW A had been rejected. 
33 This is not to claim that Smuts had brought the group together. Hughes of Australia and Massey 












The Australians laid claim to Papua and the Marshall Islands and 
the New Zealanders to Samoa. Both dominions justified their claims 
based on the same basic reasoning as the Union - they had conquered these 
territories during the war. 
According to Wilson, Hughes of Australia and New Zealand's 
Massey made claims 'based on strategic importance'34 Premier Massey 
pointed out that Samoa lay on New Zealand's route to the Panama 
Canal31 , and Premier Hughes said that if the Germans regained the 
islands 'there would be no peace for Australia, for any strong power 
controlling New Guinea controlled Australia'35 .Smuts on the other hand, 
had other contentions which he calculated would be effective for his 
audience. 
Much of his speech was taken up with the arguments of security 
and German maladministration which were the mainstays of the Union's 
argument. However, he elaborated on his 'Monroe doctrine for the 
South' by making several expansionist arguments. First he argued that 
South-West Africa should have been annexed to South Africa in 1884 but 
that Bismarck had snatched it up.36 He also suggested that the country was 
even then being improved by the settling of Boer ranchers.37 
Smuts also justified his expansionism by pointing out the France 
was claiming Alsace-Loirraine and wanted to directly annex it. Why then 
should South Africa not be able to annex South-West Africa, he argued. 
One day later, on 25 January , Smuts once again wrote to his old friend 
34 Lansing Papers, Desk Diary, January 24, 1919. These are the unpublished diaries of the 
Secretary of State of the USA, Robert Lansing, quoted in Curry, 'Wilson and Smuts at Versailles'. 
31 Foreign Relations, US, Paris Peace Conference (1919) Vol III, p. 725, quoted in Cockram, 
South-West African Mandate, p. 42. 
35 Ibid p. 751, quoted in Cockram, South-West African Mandate. p. 42. 
36 Cockram, South-West African Mandate,p. 41. 













M.C. Gillett in London, and told him that his argument 'was principally 
that it was a desert, a part of the Kalahari no good to anybody, least of all so 
magnificent a body as the League of Nations!'38 
Why should Smuts single out that argument as his principle one? 
In arguing that South-West Africa was of no use to anyone, he was really 
saying that it could only be improved by one group of people - the farmers 
and ranchers who made up much of the population of the Union and for 
whom the idea of huge open areas of land was a cultural imperative. 
Indeed, no great power had much use at that time for Namibia (except 
perhaps Germany, who was starved for colonies!), but Smuts knew that 
South Africa had both a cultural and political necessity to own that piece 
of 'desert'. This argument, which Smuts himself saw as the most 
important he had made, was not rooted in security or the welfare of the 
indigenous population, but rather it very subtly espoused the expansion of 
the South African state. 
South-West Africa was not granted to the Union on the 24th. The 
Council of Ten got as far as to agree to the general principle of non-
restoration of the German colonies, but no further. 39 The British 
delegation submitted a Draft Convention Regarding Mandates40 which 
proposed guidelines on the powers and limitations of both mandatory and 
mandated territory, but which, as Robert Bradford wrote, 'avoided the 
most difficult question of all - to which colonies would its principles 
apply'. However, over the next six days this question was to become the 
center of discussion. 
38 SP v22/200. 
39 Cockram, South-West African Mandate p. 41. 
40 British delegation, Draft Convention Regarding Mandates, January 24, 19.19, quoted in 
Bradford, 'Origins and Concessions of the League of Nations Class 'C' Mandate for South-West 












On 27 January, debate began in earnest with Wilson's speech on the 
mandates. Wilson started off by saying that there was a feeling in the 
world that had sprung up against further annexations.41 If the colonies 
were not to be returned to Germany, and he conceded that all were agreed 
they were not, then someone else must administer them - and he 
proposed administration through mandatories acting on behalf of the 
League of Nations. Then he went further and used South-West Africa as 
the example. 
The case of South-West Africa would be found a most favourable 
instance to make a clear picture. South-West Africa has very few 
inhabitants, and those have been so maltreated, and their numbers 
have been so reduced under German administration, that the 
whole area is open to a development that can not yet be 
determined. 
It is significant that Wilson used South-West Africa as his example. 
Wilson was very familiar with Smuts's goals and made it clear through 
this example that he disapproved of annexation. Wilson accepted Smuts's 
arguments that the territory was a desert but then rejected South African 
sovereignty, for the purpose of the post-war settlement, he argued, was to 
serve the people of South-West Africa and guard them from abuses and 
further, to 'assure their development' so that at some time they may be 
developed enough to decide their own role. As a sop, Wilson stated that 
that role might be union with the mandatory power. He then went on to 
lay the ground rules for the mandate. 
Smuts now turned to his allies, and on January 28th, the 
dominions and the British delegation met together. The result of this 
meeting was a draft of what would eventually become Article XXII of the 












League Covenant.42 The resolution, drafted by Smuts and Philip Kerr of 
Great Britain, was in fact partly a reply to Wilson's speech in two ways, 
both of which distinctly show the stamp of Jan Smuts. 
First, the resolution never mentions the sovereignty of the League 
of Nations. Instead, the proposal used the words 'the Allied and 
Associated Powers' throughout. This was significant because it replied to 
Wilson's idea of 'administration through mandatories acting on behalf of 
the League of Nations', 43 and Smuts was to use the technicality of the 
difference between the League and the Allied and Associated Powers, 
which based upon his proposal appeared in the official 'C' Class Mandates 
such as that for South-West Africa, to his benefit several times. It is too 
simplistic to put this down only to cunning, since all documents at that 
time used 'Allied and Associated Powers', but the emphasis laid on that 
institution as the power behind the mandatory system is striking. 
The second important reply to Wilson's attack on annexation 
proposed by Smuts and Kerr was to propose that, if there were to be 
mandates: 
The Allied and Associated Powers are of the opinion that the 
character of the ma dates must differ according to the stage of 
development of the people, the geographical situation of the 
territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances. 
In other words, Smuts and Kerr proposed that different areas have 
different types of mandates, thus allowing the more 'primitive areas' to 
come under virtual annexation, with just a few safeguards - protection 
from slave trade, arms traffic, liquor traffic, the prevention of native 
42 British Delegation, Draft Resolution in Reference to Mandatories, January 28, 1919. Text can 
also be found in Lloyd George, Memoirs. I, 357-358. 












military training and military fortifications - none of which were really 
concessions which Smuts minded.44 
There followed a short period in which Smuts, Botha, and Lloyd 
George talked the opposing teams - on the one side Wilson and on the 
other Massey and Hughes - into accepting the compromise proposal. 45 
On 30 January , the compromise was accepted by the interested 
parties. On 14 February the provisional draft of Article 22 of the 
convention was accepted. 46 
To whom does the victory go - Smuts or Wilson? Some historians, 
such as Gail Cockram, argue that Wilson won. She points out that 
'Wilson's views prevailed. The mandates system was also to extend to the 
German colonies in the hands of the dominions.' 47 Certainly, Smuts did 
not get the license for annexation he wanted to come home with. 
However, those historians who make this argument are basically 
stop their argument at the question of full annexation, which was rejected 
in January. Instead, it is important to realize that the argument was not 
over - and that Smuts, once he had lost annexation, was fighting for 
'annexation in all but name'.48 
On 26 February, Botha wrote a letter to Smuts, enjoining him to 
continue the paper battle for South-West Africa, even though annexation 
was out of the question. 'We must keep [South West-Africa]', he wrote, 
'for we and the Germans will not again live together on a friendly footing 
if they keep German West'.49 
44 See Chapter 7. 
45 Bradford, 'Origins and Concessions of the League of Nations Class 'C' Mandate for South-West 
Africa'p. 107 -109. The discussions are peripheral to this paper. 
46 The final draft to be accepted on April 28, 1919. 
47 Cockram, South West African Mandate, p. 42. 
48 SP v21/5, 20th of March. 













Smuts's task had now changed. He was no longer arguing for 
annexation, but for the best possible mandate - one which granted South 
Africa the ability to expand northward. The issue had become one of who 
would have sovereignty over the mandate. Wilson believed it should be 
the League of Nations. Smuts disagreed. In a letter to L.S. Amery, in the 
Colonial Office in London, he wrote 'in cases B and C,50 the German 
territory should be vested in the mandatory state [not the League of 
Nations].' 51 
A minor victory, and an expected one, was won on the 7th of May 
when the Council of Four - Britain's Lloyd George, France's Clemenceau, 
Wilson, and Orlando of Italy - granted the mandates. The agreement 
stated 'It is agreed that in the case of German South-West Africa the 
mandate shall be held by the Union of South Africa'. This was important 
to Smuts because it was the Principle Allied Powers who were granting the 
mandate through the four principal powers, as he had hoped.52 
Smuts now got together with Milner, who was acting as a British 
delegate, and proposed the guidelines for Class 'C' mandates - of which he 
hoped South-West Africa would be one. When the peace treaty was 
passed on 28 June, 1919, this proposal was in the works. Essentially taken 
from the Smuts-Kerr Proposal, its most important clause was one which 
said: 
[The Mandatory Power] shall have full rights of administration and 
legislation over [the Mandated territory] as an integral portion of 
[The Mandatory Power] and may apply the laws of [The Mandatory 
Power] to [The Mandated territory] subject to such local 
modifications as circumstances may require.53 
50 The three types of mandates had been proposed and settled upon by this point. 
51 SP v22/147, 21st of March. 
52 SP XXXVII/WCP40 












Several points in this proposal were very important to Smuts. The 
first was the 'full rights of administration and legislation' point, which 
would give the Union the right to extend its policies - including 
settlement - into South-West Africa. Even more important is that the 
Union could govern its protectorate as 'an integral portion'. This is 
'annexation in all but name'. If this proposal were accepted, South 
African native policy, fiscal policy, administration, and everything else 
could be imposed upon South-West Africa - essentially making it a fifth 
province. 
How successful was Smuts in getting this clause applied to South-
West Africa? When the Mandate for South-West Africa was passed (not 
until 17, December, 1920) it included the following clauses: 
The Mandatory shall have full power of administration and 
legislation over the territory subject to the present Mandate as an 
integral portion of the Union of South Africa, and may apply the 
laws of the Union of South Africa to the territory subject to such 
local modifications as circumstances may require. 
The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and moral 
well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory 
subject to the present Mandate54 
The proposal and the final form of the mandate are almost exactly 
alike, except for the added second paragraph, which at the time did not 
concern Smuts much, and the fact that the League of Nations was going to 
pass the Mandate act, not the Principle Allied and Associated Powers. 
But in July I August 1919, the passing of the actual mandate was in 
the future, and Smuts returned to South Africa on 4 August. On the 28th, 
Jan Smuts longtime political partner and friend, Louis Botha, died of a 












heart attack, and Smuts was no longer South Africa's diplomat, but its 
Prime Minister. 
THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE 
The conferring of the South-West African Mandate on South Africa 
did not settle the question of who really owned the land. Many South 
Africans agreed with Senator R.A. Kerr who declared, in 1922, that 'we 
fought and won German South-West Africa in a fair way in battle and ... as 
a result of that war and that fight, we are the owners of South-West 
Africa'.55 Many world leaders, however, pointed out that 'ownership' of 
South-West Africa was 'a sacred trust'56 held for the League of Nations 
and the natives of the territory. 
As we have seen, Smuts was a proponent of the former theory - one 
which argued that the Mandate was a step on the way to annexation. 
However, believing it is so does not make it so, and Smuts had yet to 
convince the international community that South Africa was the 
sovereign power. 
The South African government had the dual task of convincing the 
League of Nations and the British government that they held sovereignty 
over South-West Africa, and after Smuts and his party won the 1920 
election, they set out to do so. 
Perhaps the greatest indication of Smuts's beliefs is the speech he 
gave to the Germans in Windhoek during his tour in September, 1920 (a 
speech which will be discussed several times in this paper).57 
55 Senate Debates, 3rd March, 1930, column 280, cited in Peinaar, p. 119. 
56 Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 22, June 28, 1919. 













Smuts repeatedly told his audience, mainly Germans, that the 
League of Nations was not the sovereign power over South-West Africa.52 
'The League of Nations has nothing to do with the giving of the Mandate,' 
he told the crowd. 'Under the Peace Treaty Germany renounces her 
Colonies not to the League of Nations but to the Great Powers.' This 
argument is, in fact, not quite correct, since the Mandate stated that the 
Union 'has undertaken to exercise [the Mandate] on behalf of the League 
of Nations'.58 
Smuts further argued that the League of Nations 'is concerned with 
the Mandate in one way ..... natives', and that the Union 'has complete 
authority over this territory, to deal with it as an integral portion of the 
Union.' 
In the next section of his speech, the Prime Minister expressed his 
own (hopeful) expansionist ideals by stating that the Union 'can declare 
South-West Africa a province of the Union, and it can give to the 
inhabitants of South-West Africa representation in the Union 
Parliament'. This was a very controversial statement, because this was not 
internationally believed to be the case. 
In concluding his arguments on sovereignty, Smuts said 'The 
country with its population is entrusted to the Union, and the Union, 
therefore, is the only country which can speak for them and act for them 
both here and internationally.' 
Much of Smuts's speech was based on his understanding of the 
terms of the Mandate which was only granted three months after his 
South Africa at Windhuk(sic)', September 16, 1920. 
52 Indeed, he repeated this point three times, which is in itself quite indicative of the strength of 
his feelings. 
58 League of Nations, 'Mandate for South West Africa', preamble, December 17, 1920. The 












South-West African trip. The Mandate document, however, tells us 
something different. It declares that the arguments shall be submitted to 
the Permanent Court of International Justice (i.e. the League of Nations).59 
Smuts may be accused of believing the idiom that saying something 
often enough will make it fact. However, he was hoping to back his 
assertions up with legal and political fact. 
The first part of his crusade had started in 1919. At that point, the 
mandate was not yet passed, and South-West Africa was under South 
African martial law. Therefore the Union Parliament passed Act 49 of 
1919 in July 1919 which gave the Governor-General authority over South-
West Africa - an authority which he already held from the British 
government. 60 
The Governor-General was a British appointee, but Smuts wished 
South-West Africa to come under sole control of the Union. The issue 
came to a head in 1919, when the Nationalists in parliament charged that 
the Union was neither competent to sign the Peace Treaty nor to legislate 
for South-West Africa, since that was the King's role. Smuts argued that 
the Union had been delegated control over South-West Africa and that 
right now belonged to the Union - not to the Empire. In a telegram to the 
British Secretary of State, he relayed: 
I explained that King through royal prerogative was competent to 
extend legislative jurisdiction of Union, and that in this case King 
had tacitly done so as one of the Great Powers who conferred the 
Mandate over South West Africa on Union61 
Smuts then told the Secretary of State that 'Mandate over Samoa is 
given to New Zealand not to United Kingdom ... the King in his British 
59 Ibid, Article 7. 
60 Act 49 of 1919, Union Parliament, in the Union Gazette Extraordinary, 20 September, 1919. 












Government or Privy Council is beside the point'. He went on to explain 
that only East Africa, for which Britain had itself been given the Mandate, 
was answerable to the King as the head of state of Britain. 
The interesting part of this declaration is not that Smuts faced down 
challenges to Union sovereignty from within (though that is of some 
interest), but that he declared, in a roundabout manner by using New 
Zealand as his example, that the South-West Africa Mandate was held not 
by Britain (the Empire), but by the Union (the dominion). 
There is a lot of speculation on why the British did not challenge 
Smuts. Cooper suggests that there were two reasons: 
One is that Britain was exhausted from world wars, colonial 
disputes, and pressures for decolonization ... Another is that .. South 
Africa ... always maintained an 'open door' economic policy in the 
territory ... the largest mineral prizes in Namibia were given to 
American and British companies.62 
This theory centers on the motivations of Britain, but ignores the 
equally valid importance of South African motives. Smuts actively 
pursued recognition of Union sovereignty, and proceeded to justify it by 
using the legal system of the Union. 
His chance to judicially establish the Union's primacy came after the 
Bondelswartz Rebellion of 1922 (discussed in Chapter 7). The question of 
sovereignty was tested by the government's case that the Bondels, and 
their leader Jacobus Christian, had committed treason against the 
government by fighting the Administrator's forces (representing the 
government) who had been sent to fight them. The Supreme Court in 
Windhoek returned a verdict of guilty63, and the Appellate Division in 
62 Cooper, The Occupation of Namibia, p. 116. 
63 Pienaar, Sara, South Africa and International Relations Between the Two World Wars: The 












Bloemfontein ruled that treason can only be committed against a person 
or persons possessing sovereignty. 
Thus the case rested on the question of whether or not the Union 
had sovereignty over South-West Africa. The court ruled affirmatively: 
the crime of high treason ... can be committed against a state which 
possesses internal sovereignty, even though its external powers 
may be limited in certain respects. 
The Government of the Union... as mandatory of South-West 
Africa under the treaty of Versailles, possesses sufficient internal 
sovereignty to warrant a charge of high treason against an 
inhabitant of the mandated territory who takes up arms with 
hostile intent against the Government of that territory.64 
This decision must have pleased Smuts, as it strengthened his 
argument based at least on South African law. Not only did the court 
support South African sovereignty, but it also denied the sovereignty of 
the League of Nations by stating that 
The League is not a State, nor do the principal Powers constitute 
one .. That Government [Union] has, by virtue of treaty obligations, 
consented to certain limitations of its powers. But those limitations 
are not inconsistent with the possession of majestas within its own 
territory; and such majestas which formerly resided in the German 
Government must now reside in the new authority. There is no 
other State or Power in which it can be vested.65 
There were several fundamental flaws in Smuts's argument. The 
most important was that, despite the argument of the Union's courts that 
the League was not a sovereign power, the fact was that neither was the 
Union. The Union was a British dominion, and the Mandate clearly stated 
that the territory was the responsibility of His Britannic Majesty, not of the 
Union. 
64 1924 South African Law Reports (Appellate Division), p. 101. 












The South Africa Act of 1909, which created the Union, gave the 
Union the ability to divide and combine province, but not add new 
territories to the nation - that was the prerogative of the British King.66 
The other 'C' class Mandatories which were British Dominions 
accepted the fact that they did not have sovereignty. South Africa, 
however, did not. The Australians granted limited self-government to 
the Naruans in 1921. New Zealand eventually accepted British 
sovereignty.67 South Africa, under Smuts, actively pursued sovereignty 
and while the British continued to advise New Zealand and Australia in 
Naruan, New Guinean, and Samoan administration, they declined 
involvement in South-West African affairs, where Smuts was intent on 
his dream of Union hegemony over southern Africa. 
The British government, which had every right to involve itself in 
the running of the territory, abstained for two reasons. First, as Cooper 
stated, it was not interested in administering new territories. More 
importantly, however, Smuts's vehemence and opposition to their 
involvement, expressed through speeches and in the courts, convinced 
them to abstain from fighting for primacy in the protectorate. 
The case of Rex vs. Christian was not enough to settle the matter 
with the League of Nations, however. The Permanent Mandates 
Commission, to which South Africa as a mandatory power was pledged to 
report, was frustrated by the attitude of Smuts's government both in the 
Bondelswartz case and on other issues throughout Smuts's first term as 
Prime Minister - and beyond. 
66 Cooper, The Occupation of Namibia, p. 125. 












THE RESULTS BY 1924 
Historians such as George Curry and Gail-Maryse Cockram debate 
whether Smuts or Wilson was the victor at the Paris Peace Conference. It 
is important, in order to answer this question, to understand what Smuts's 
goals were. The many Historians who look at the creation of the South-
west Africa Mandate often portray 'security' or 'native welfare' as Smuts's 
main arguments. I have argued that Smuts's main interest was instead 
the expansion of South Africa. 
In fact, he did use the arguments on the welfare of the indigenous 
people and the security of the Empire, as well as others, because they 
effective for his audience. Still, we can see that Smuts's main concern was 
expansion. If he were not interested in South Africa's expansion, then 
why was he unwilling to accept a mandate which could secure both 
'native welfare' and 'security' for South Africa and the Empire? 
Additionally, why was he so concerned with the question of sovereignty? 
If we accept that Smuts's ideal condition was annexation, then we 
can evaluate his success at the Paris Peace Conference. It is more 
revealing, however, to evaluate his success by 1924, when his first term of 
office ended - in terms of sovereignty. 
Although the Permanent Mandates Commission was upset by 
certain actions of the South African government - its treatment of the 
Bondelswartz rebellion, the agreement establishing the border with 
Angola which recited that South Africa 'possesses sovereignty' over 
South-West Africa,68 the 1922 Railway and Harbours Act discussed in the 
next chapter, etc. - they generally had little power to change the situation. 












Smuts's government was able to generally ignore the 
blandishments of the League of Nations - even in extreme cases such as 
the Bondelswartz affair. Smuts, in fact, was confident enough to remind 
the Permanent Mandates Commission that: 
the Union has full power of legislation and administration over 
South-West Africa as an integral portion of the Union, and, that the 
effect is very much the same as if they were incorporated into the 
Union.70 
By January, 1923, the League of Nations was forced by the various 
mandatory powers to agree that petitions against an administration could 
only be submitted to the PMC through the mandatory power. Even before 
then, the Smuts government had been negligent in its duties to the 
League of Nations, but afterwards, they were to act as if annexation had 
really taken place. 
The British, who also had a de jure claim to sovereignty, were in 
fact distanced from the administration of the region, by both their 
disinterest and the Union's opposition to their involvement. 
The fact remains that while the League of Nations could at least 
argue that it was itself the sovereign power, Jan Smuts's expansionist 
ideology had assisted him in enforcing his will internationally and 
successfully gaining for the Union administrative control of South-West 
Africa, access for its settlers, and the extension of South African laws - in 
other words, 'annexation in all but name'. 
12. 
70 League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commision, Minutes, II, 1922, Annex 6, 'Letter from 












CHAPTER 6: THEMES OF THE MANDATE 1919-1924 
In 1919, Smuts began his first tenure as Prime Minister of the 
Union, a position he held until 1924, when Bary Hertzog replaced him. 
During these years, Smuts was heavily involved with the South-West 
African territory, both before and after the Mandate was officially granted 
in December 1920. In some areas his involvement was integral to events, 
such as the integration of the German people and the promotion of Union 
settlers. Sometimes he set policy, which was then carried out by others, as 
generally happened in affairs which dealt with the indigenous population. 
This chapter will outline the main themes of the period 1919-1924. 
Subsequent chapters will discuss Smuts's roles in dealing with them. 
LEGISLATION AND BUREAUCRACY 
Before the official granting of the Mandate in 1920, South-West 
Africa was a 'protectorate' of the Union of South Africa. For part of this 
time (1915-1919), it was run by a military governor under martial law. 
Towards the end, a Secretary and then Administrator was appointed to 
govern the Protectorate with advice from a council of citizens. The 
Administrator was responsible to the Union government for his 
decisions. From 1919 onwards this administrator was Guys Hofmeyr. 
After the occupation of the territory, the Union began to apply its 
laws to the Protectorate even though it had no legal sovereignty over the 
region; for example, the Customs and Tariffs Acts which were applied by 












The incorporation of South-West African Administration into the 
Union Government, allowed for in Article 2 of the Mandate leapt forward 
in 1920. This was a transitional year. In September 1919 the Union 
Parliament accepted the Mandate1 even though it was not actually offered 
by the League of Nations until 1 December, 1920. 
Many of the ensuing proclamations simply extended Union law to 
the territory as if it were a fifth province. Act 5 of 1920 extended stock theft 
laws to South-West Africa, Act 6 dealt with intoxicating liquors for non-
whites. Other acts implemented Union laws on deeds, land settlement, 
mining, and even holidays. Some laws were extended from the Cape 
Province, such as the Masters, Servants, and Apprentices Laws which 
became Proclamation No. 34. Others came from the Transvaal, such as 
Proclamation No. 35, which was a copy of the Transvaal Company Law. 
South African judicial practices were extended to the territory by 
Proclamations Nos. 51 and 52, but were slightly amended to allow for 
German law practices in some respects.2 
In 1920, Hofmeyr issued Proclamations Nos. 69 and 70, which 
'provide[d] for the acquisition of the railways built during the war period 
and the continued management of the railways as an integral portion of 
the Union Railways.'3 The word choice is interesting, because it echoes 
the Mandate Document (which was official by this time) which stated in 
Section two that the Union would have full power over the Mandate 'as 
an integral portion of the Union of South Africa.'4 
1 UG Act 49 of 1919, "For Carrying into effect any Mandate issued in pursuance of the Treaty to 
the Union of South Africa with reference to the territory of South West Africa ... " 20th September, 
1919. 
2 UG 26-21, Report of the Administrator of South West Africa for the Year 1920,lOth March, 
1921. 
3 SAS 12/45 Memorandum on Railways: Parliamentary Section, of 5 January, 1921. 












In 1922, during a slight drought and depression in South-West 
Africa, the Union government passed Act 20 of 1922, which officially 
transferred the railways from South-West African finances to the Union 
Government - which became the direct owners. 
Legislation in South-West Africa can be divided into three types. 
The first two types, shown above, either extended Union laws into the 
territory or combined Union and South-West African institutions. The 
third class of legislation was meant to solve specifically South-West 
African problems, such as the legislation on Walvis Bay. 
THE QUESTION OF WAL VIS BAY 
Walvis Bay (or Walfish Bay) is a port town on the coast of South-
West Africa below Swakopmund. Walvis Bay had, before the First World 
War, been a British enclave5 , and it was occupied in 1914 by the German 
Imperial forces in South-West Africa. 
Although Walvis Bay had been administratively annexed to the 
Cape Colony in 1884, after 1910 it did not become part of the Union. 
Instead, Walvis Bay was officially British territory, but the Union 
government was its de facto administrator between 1910-1915.6 After the 
granting of the South-West Africa Mandate, the Union felt it should 
become part of the mandated territory. 
The Union Government decided to set up a test case in their own 
courts to 'see if they could legally impose their laws upon Walvis Bay. The 
5 Since March 12, 1878. Berat, L., Walvis Bay, Yale University Press, 1990, p.37. 














case was Rex vs. Mahoney, a situation in which the defendant was accused 
of providing a Coloured man with three bottles of brandy, an act 
technically illegal in South-West Africa and one which, interestingly 
enough, contravened the terms of the Mandate given by the League of 
Nations .. The accused was tried on Act No. 28 of 1883 - an act passed in the 
Cape Province and extended to the Mandate in 1916, but not necessarily 
enforceable in Walvis Bay. 
The Union judges, however, concluded that the act, which was not 
illegal according to British law, could not be tried in South African Court. 
Justice Fagan, concluded: 
1) That there has been no valid promulgation of the Protectorate 
proclamations in Walfish Bay. 
2.) That this particular proclamation forms part of the fiscal and 
administrative law of the Protectorate, which cannot be applied to 
Walfish Bay.7 
South African Act No. 35 of 19218 , passed in the wake of this case, 
stated that the Mandate would be regarded as part of the Union for 
purposes of collecting excises and customs (in itself significant), and that 
for these purposes Walvis Bay would be regarded as part of South Africa, 
however the British government had not yet agreed to this. Smuts then 
appealed to Governor-General Buxton, who turned to the Colonial Office 
for instructions. By Proclamation 145 of 1922, he turned administrative 
power for Walvis Bay over to the Union as of 1 October, 1922.9 However, it 
was the SWA Administration, and not the Union Government, which 
was given authority over the port - legislative as well as judicial. This 
7 Cape Times, "Protectorate Proclamations: Position of Walfish Bay", May 28, 1921. 
8 UG 44-22, Report of the Administrator of South West Africa for the Year 1921, 30 June, 1922. 












kept the Union from claiming direct sovereignty over Walvis Bay, and 
Smuts was not entirely satisfied. 
While this was not full annexation, it was the furthest the Union 
government got during Smuts's first administration .. 
THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE 
During the South-West African campaign, much of the black 
population was pro-Union. Botha wrote to Smuts on 3 April, 1915, 
'Native population very bitter against Germans and will be impossible for 
latter carry on guerrilla war ... .', However, he added, 'Am using all my 
influence [to] prevent natives [from] taking part against enemy in this 
war.'1° 
The Germans were quite unpopular among the indigenous groups, 
and under their dominion the territory had experienced uprisings and 
wars between the Germans and every one of the major black and Coloured 
groups - the campaign against the Herero being particularly bloody. For 
this reason, many non-whites were willing to help the invaders. The 
South African force did use non-whites as scouts - such as Abraham 
Morris, future leader of the Bondelswartz11 - however they did not support 
native uprisings against the Germans nor allow them to join the fight. 
Many of the non-whites welcomed Union rule. Botha's victory and 
Buxton's visit to the protectorate prompted the Coloured population to 
present the Governor-General with a letter which stated: 
We ... wish to convey our congratulations through your Lordship to 
his Majesty the King and Allies for the victory over the enemy. 
10 SP CXII (18) telegram Botha to Smuts, 3 April, 1915. 











Now that the war is over and this protectorate being under the 
British Administration ... we beg your Lordship to receive our 
congratulations ... 12 
82 
The Coloured population believed the new rule would be more 
benevolent than the last and used the letter to ask for new privileges, 
including exemption from the Native Laws and improved hospitals, 
railways, and schools. They also expected the new administration to 
protect their rights. 
The Union made much of the support they enjoyed from the non-
whites, especially the coloureds, in their campaign to gain annexation in 
the League of Nations. They published the Report on the Suffering of 
Natives Under German Rule, discussed in Chapter 5, and made it 
available to the delegates at the Paris Peace Conference in 1918. Among 
other assertions, the document declared 'they ... compelled women and 
even children of eight years of age and upwards to work,' as well as 
slaughtered and abused the men, and suggested that 'There is a further 
point which may be worth mentioning and that is the danger of the 
existence just beyond the Union border of a native population in a 
constant state of dissatisfaction and unrest...'.13 
The alleged German maltreatment of blacks and coloureds gave the 
Union a lever to use in acquiring the territory. The articles of the Mandate 
set out several specific protections for the indigenous people: the 
prohibitions of the slave trade and forced labour, trafficking in arms, 
supplying alcohol, and raising armies indigenous soldiers.1 4 
12 GG 50/800, 2 October 1919. 
13 SP 19/103, Report on Suffering of Natives under German Rule. and preamble, 21 January, 
1918. 












Much of the Union's policy during the early years of the Mandate 
was, thus ironically, a continuation of German colonial policy. The 
Germans had established reserves, which were 'recognized and adopted' 
by the new administration.15 These reserves fit in perfectly with the 
Union's own system of reserves. Indeed, one union official said '[the 
Africans] soon realised that conditions would remain practically the 
same ... as they were in German times.'16 
Some German policies could not be extended to the new Mandate, 
either because they did not fit in with Smuts's plans or because they 
contravened the League of Nations Mandate. The Germans, for example, 
were able to use forced labour. The Union was restricted by the Mandate 
from doing this, and instead hid its policy behind subtle technicalities -
such as vagrant laws and hut and dog taxes, which had forced blacks in the 
Union to work in the mines and, it was hoped, would serve the same 
purpose in South-West Africa. 
Aside from the labour laws, Smuts's government lived up to the 
word, if not the spirit, of the Mandate. In 1920, Proclamation 6 made it 
illegal to supply liquor to non-whites and Coloured persons,17 and other 
proclamations and acts outlawed the provisioning of arms and 
ammunition to non-whites. Smuts, of course, had no plans to raise a 
native army. 
Outside of these provisions, the Administration's policy towards 
blacks and coloureds was generally quite harsh. In 1921, 'native' families 
were scheduled to be confined to reserves. It is true the reserves were to 
l5 ADM 51/509, Warbad Magistrate to Secretary for Protectorate, 21 March, 1918. 
16 League of Nations PMC, Min, III, 19th Meeting, August 1, 1923, p. 129, quoted in Bradford, p. 
90. 













occupy 2.5 million hectares of land, but as usual, the land was generally 
not suitable for farming. 
The year 1922 was one of major policy implementation in the 
Mandate. In April, the administration extended Union acts dealing with 
native 'locations' in urban areas, structuring them to provide labour and 
restrict vagrancy, as well as to extract fees for occupation sites. 
More significantly, the Native Administration Act was 
proclaimed.18 This act extended pass laws to all non-whites in the territory: 
No native may travel within or leave the territory without a 
permit ... A native found beyond the confines of a location, reserve, 
farm or place of residence or employment shall exhibit on demand 
by police, duly authorized municipal official, landowner or lessee 
his pass and on neglect to produce it may be arrested.19 
Although the regulation did not apply in Ovamboland or 
Okavango,20 it did apply to coloureds such as the Rheheboth Basters and 
khoi tribes such as the Bondelswartz, who were indignant at it. 
The purpose of the law was to tie non-Europeans to a certain area of 
land and compel them to take what work was available there. Along with 
the dog and hut taxes, it was expected that this would make labour more 
available to the farmers and ranchers. As Hofmeyr wrote in his 1920 
report, 'The native question ... is synonymous with the Labour question. '21 
In the end, however, this combination was to lead to rebellions by several 
groups, the most significant of which was the Bondelswartz Rebellion of 
1922, which will be dealt with in detail in the next chapter. 
18 ADM 11 of '22, Act 11 of 1922, Native Administration Act, Administration of South West 
Africa, October 1922. 
19 UG 21-23, Report of the Administrator of SWA for the Year 1922, 10 April, 1922, p. 13. 
20 probably due to the impossibility of enforcing it in these areas. 












The German population complained about instances of unrest, 
comparing the Administration's handling of them to that of the former 
government. 'doubts arise within one as to who the real master of the 
situation is at present, the Administration or the Native,•22 questioned 
one German-language newspaper. Pressure was thus kept up by the white 
population on Smuts and Hofmeyr to implement harsh policies dealing 
with non-whites. 
THE BONDELSWARTZ 'AFFAIR' OF 1922 
The Bondelswartz Rebellion has been well researched by historians 
studying the League of Nations and the South-West Africa Mandate. Gail-
Maryse Cockram devoted a whole chapter of her book South-West Africa 
Mandate to the uprising, and Gottshalk and Swanson both refer to it in 
detail. One of the most comprehensive discussions on the rebellion, 
however, was a 1977 masters thesis at Rhodes University written by Gavin 
Llewellyn Lewis.23 
The rebellion was the largest single uprising by a non-white group 
between 1914 and 1924. At issue were economic, social, political, and 
territorial questions. It was not only a protest against existing conditions, 
but tested the sovereignty of the Union in both military and legal circuits. 
Its eventual resolution led to conflict both inside the territory, within the 
Union, and between the Union and the League of Nations. 
The Bondelswartz were a mainly pastoralist tribe of Nama, or khoi, 
extraction. Their 1903 revolt is sometimes seen as the signal for the 
22 "Anarchical Native Conditions", Landes-Zeitung, 12 August, 1922. 














This clause would have had all German civilian and military officials 
withdrawn, and all other Germans suspended from the territory for 
twelve months.35 
While the Union was quite happy with the first point, they were 
not about to have the business of running South-West Africa, for which it 
was imperative to keep certain Germans in the protectorate, disrupted. 
Nor would Botha and Smuts have been happy to have exported whites, 
whom they saw as a valuable commodity. The clause was not included in 
the final draft of the mandate. 
Still, the German question was a large one. In the long run, as 
Green had pointed out, citizenship was a major question. The shorter 
term issue, however, was repatriation. At wars end there were about 8,000 
settlers who were allowed to stay when all the military and civil officers 
were forced to withdraw.36 Their status was a major question for Botha 
and, from 1919 on, for Smuts. 
The 1919 repatriations served to 'clear the district of the most 
undesirable class'.37 The three main classes of repatriates were military and 
official, undesirables, and voluntary repatriations. The 1919 Report of the 
Administrator reveals that the forced repatriation of military, official, and 
police personnel totaled 2,300 men and approximately 900 dependents. In 
addition, 1,223 men, women, and children were excluded from the 
territory as undesirables. 
The repatriation of German subjects served, inter alia, to remove 
possible disturbing elements in the preservation of law and order, 
especially in regard to the administration of native affairs.38 
35 ibid, enclosure. 
36 Hancock, ~. p. 103. 














So reported the District Commissioner for Keetmanshoop. Thus 
were possible disturbing elements - German loyalists, the poor, and 
activists - purged from the territory. The exodus of 1,433 voluntary exiles 
meant further security, because these were mainly people who strongly 
supported German rule in the Mandated territory. 
The German population did not, for obvious reasons, support the 
repatriation. The District Commissioner for Windhoek noted that 'it is 
only natural that they ... condemn the repatriation' and yet 'the better class 
of German ... expresses his unconditional approval of a policy which rid 
the country of the criminal class and of officials. '39 It seems very possible 
that the repatriation of criminals and the lower class Germans was 
popular, but it ~s doubtful that the forced repatriation of officials received 
the same support from the German population. 
When, in September 1920, Smuts began his tour of the South-West 
Africa Protectorate, he expected to receive both ideas and criticisms. 
However, he could not have expected the deluge of petitions which 
gree.ted him at every stop. There were 62 official petitions and addresses 
presented to him.4° In Swakopmund alone he was presented with seven. 
They came from merchants and farmers interested in economic issues, 
lawyers concerned about judicial practices, missionaries hoping for loans, 
even individuals applying for ration payments and clamoring for the 
return of their loved ones. 
Most important were the various petitions given to him by the 
municipalities of Swakopmund, Omaruru, Koraseb, Karibib, 
Keetmanshoop, and Windhoek. These solicitations had many of the same 
39 ibid 
40 ADM 427/18.3, 'Petitions and Addresses Presented to The Prime Minister, on occasion of his 












themes; most of which were complaints by the German population 
having to do with Union governance. 
Claiming that the peace program concluded by Wilson set down the 
basis of the Union's interactions with the Germans, and quoting Wilson4I, 
the signatories of the petition from the municipality of Wind~11.ilt, called for: 
free, honest, absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, 
based upon the strict observation of the principle that when all 
such sovereignty questions are decided the interests of the 
populations concerned shall enjoy the same consideration as the 
reasonable claims of any government whose claims shall be 
decided upon.42 
Thus asserting their rights, the many municipalities declared as the 
main concerns the following: 'the continuation of German institutions, 
introduction of German capital, return of repatriated Germans, a new 
German consulate, the use of German as the official language, and the 
retention of the German Civil Code,'43 as well as German-medium 
education. In short, a return to German-style rule. 
The issue which the German population was most concerned with 
was education, and the question around which debate centered was 
whether education would be German, Dutch-Afrikaans, or English 
medium. 
In 1919, the administration of South-West Africa, emerging from 
martial law, decided upon a solution to the education problem - a solution 
which was just the beginning. Until this date, German schools had been 
separate and not government funded. There were 23 public 'British' 
schools - although Dutch44 was the prevailing medium of 13 of these 
41 Manifest of the President of 27th September, 1918. 
42 ADM 1899/3,' Resolution of Windhuk Municipality', 16 September, 1920. 
43 The Times, September 20, 1920, quoted in Swanson p653. 












schools.45 The administrator, Gorges, in consultation with Botha and 
Smuts, proposed that German-medium schools be set up to provide public 
education for the German population. The terms were as follows: 
In such German schools the medium for the first four years will be 
German, but a daily lesson will be given in a Union language to be 
chosen by the parents. In 1924, the Union language will be the 
medium of instruction in the Fifth standard, in 1925 in Standards V 
and VI... and in 1927 all standards. In all these upper standards 
German will be taught as a language for at least one lesson daily by 
qualified teachers. 46 
The Administration practically fell over from patting itself on the 
back for this compromise, pointing out how it contrasted to the 'rigorous 
and unsympathetic treatment of immigrants from the Uni n ... under the 
late Government.' The Germans were not as satisfied, as we know from 
the 1920 petitions to Smuts. For one thing, English and Afrikaans 
medium private schools were government-subsidied, but German ones 
were not. 
Gorges was replaced at the end of 1919 by Hofmeyr, who began to 
immediately negotiate with German officials as to the assimilation of their 
schooling. His more complex plan assimilated German speaking teachers 
into the Union's pay scale but required that from Standard VII the 
medium of education be wholly Dutch or English.47 In no other way did it 
differ from the previous plans, and the negotiations continued. 
By 1921, with the negotiations ongoing, the enrollment at English 
and Afrikaans medium public schools was 1,213, and at German-medium 
public schools it was 367. The negotiations were completed on 11th 
November, 1921, and the agreement did not diverge significantly from 
45 UG 40-20, Report of the Administrator of South West Africa for the Year 1919, 25 May 1920, 
p. 9. 
46 Ibid, p. 10. 












The report clearly pointed out that for the German population to 
vote and hold office, they must be citizens of the Mandatory power - in 
this case British citizens, as all other South Africans. 
The Commission presented two plans for doing this. The first was 
to naturalize every German man who signed a form expressing the desire 
to become a British citizen. The other plan was to make every adult 
German male a citizen unless he signed a form expressing the desire to 
retain his German citizenship. The Commission made it clear that it 
supported the latter alternative. 
The Commission declared that in its view, naturalization of the 
German population must occur. They declared: 
it is clear to your commission that it is impossible to permit persons 
who do not owe allegiance to the Union to participate in shaping 
the political affairs of a territory which is to be administered by the 
Union as an integral part thereof.52 
Between 1920 and 1922, the Administration of South-West Africa 
attempted to find a compromise which would allow naturalization to take 
place. In 1923, through Smuts's personal action, the League of Nations 
accepted the plan.53 
In early 1923, the Union Government thus put a resolution 
regarding future government in the territory and guaranteeing 
representation for all the European population before the white 
population of South-West Africa. Attached to the end of the resolution 
was a point which would provide for naturalization. 
The resolution passed in all the districts of South-West Africa 
except for Windhoek, where it was soundly defeated.54 The American 
52 ibid. 
53 PMC, quoted in Cockram, South-West Africa Mandate, p. 170. 












Consul General in Cape Town wrote to the State Department '... it is 
apparent that there is considerable dissatisfaction among the ... German 
population. Many of them continue to demonstrate their extreme 
unwillingness to change their allegiance to the [British] Empire. '55 Still, 
after victory in the vote, Smuts could proceed if he could gain the support 
of the German government. He therefore organized the 1923 London 
Conference to gain this support. 
The meeting took place on the 22nd and 23rd of October, 1923. The 
participants themselves made out that it was friendly, Smuts writing 'I 
wish to express to you [de Haas] and Dr. Ruppel my appreciation of the 
friendly spirit in which the matter has been dealt and disposed of,' and de 
Haas replying 'the friendly feelings which you express... are fully 
appreciated by Dr. Ruppel and myself.'56 
The German side of the compromise was embodied in the 
introduction. Simply, it would 'advise its nationals to adopt in respect of 
the proposed law for the automatic grant of Union citizenship to the 
Germans domiciled in South-West Africa.'57 
In return, Smuts conceded eleven points to the German population. 
Primarily, he was to agree that the Germans of South-West Africa receive 
the same privileges and responsibilities as all other citizens. Additionally, 
however, he was to grant them special privileges. 
The German language, the document provided, could be used in 
public offices and official correspondence, and the government would 
reply in the same language whenever possible. German churches and 
p. 394. 
55 USC, Despatch No. 307 of US Consul to South Africa. August 9th, 1922. 
56 Letters published in "South-West African Germans", The Times, P. 1., 29 January, 1924. 












missions would be_ treated sympathetically. Germans would be able to 
immigrate under the same provisions as for the union, and German co-
operative societies could be formed. 
In a move that was very important to the German population of 
South-West Africa, the Agreement stated that they could not be forced to 
take military service against Germany for thirty years (until 1953). This 
concession would rebound on Smuts in 1939 and cause problems 
throughout World War II. 
In addition, Germans were guaranteed Representation on Land 
Boards and on the Advisory Board of the Land and Agricultural Bank - but 
only one member guaranteed on each. 
Smuts also agreed to take on the pensions of former civil servants 
of the German government, but only on several conditions: that they stay 
resident in South-West Africa and that they accept Union citizenship. 
Similarly, the Workmen's Compensation Act of the Union would be 
extended to South-West African Germans. 
In addition, the Union undertook to provide for the development 
of Swakopmund - a mostly German town - as an educational center and 
the principal 'watering place' in South-West Africa. 
Included in the concessions was the understanding that the 
Administration would provide 50 percent support for two German 
schools in Swakopmund and Windhoek.58 
The London agreement of 1923 facilitated the naturalization of the 
German population into the Union, and was the major watermark of this 
period as regards the Germans. 












IMMIGRATION OF UNION SETTLERS 
In 1914 there were 1800 South African citizens in German South-
west Africa.59 These - mostly Afrikaans - settlers were almost all ranchers, 
boers who ranched huge herds of cattle and sometimes smaller stock. 
They lived in extended families, many of them in the southern area of the 
Protectorate around Keetmanshoop, isolated from the cities of the Union, 
with the closest farm kilometers away and workers - white, African, 
Coloured, and bushmen - working side by side with them. 
Their lifestyle and worldview would have been very familiar to 
much of the Union's population, especially the Afrikaners of the northern 
Cape, Transvaal, and Free State who had trekked farther and farther away 
from the Cape in order to escape first Dutch East Indian authority, and 
then the British, and, finally, the urban and English supremacy in the 
Union. The Afrikaners in South-West Africa saw their exodus as going 
just a bit farther in the search for large spaces and freedom. 
For their cousins in the Union, the way was now open for new 
immigration to a country still unspoiled by large cities, with space for huge 
farms and ranches, and harsh deserts which made the country very hard 
to control for a central government. Much of the reason for the Union 
Afrikaners' support was the promise of a share in the spoils that came 
with the new territory. 
While the territory was under martial law, the Union 
government's only policy towards settlers was to lease land that they 
owned to a small group of white farmers. Between 1915 and 1918, the 
amazingly small number of 30 white farmers moved from the Union to 












take up land in the Protectorate, according to the Secretary of the 
Protectorate.60 In addition, approximately 60 Union citizens had requested 
temporary grazing rights in Protectorate territory - mostly right across the 
border from their own farms. 
A Land Board proposed by the Prime Minister was inaugurated in 
November 1919, under the chairmanship of John Adams, an inhabitant of 
Warrenton, but of Afrikaans extraction.61 
In 1921 the Administrator, Hofmeyr announce a new land 
settlement policy. 
The new policy was to allow setters more time and facilities for 
repayment of any advances for purchasing ground, likewise for the 
payment of the purchase price with the interest of the actual land 
bought. All possible help would be given to settlers, and every 
encouragement would be given to others desirous of obtaining 
ground.62 
The policy, which was implemented in 1921, followed a promise by 
Hofmeyr that previously German land would be given to settlers, not 
indigenous peoples.63 It was an expansion of the promise by Smuts to 
provide aid to incoming settlers. From it, and following government 
sources, we can see how the enticement to settlers worked. 
The government undertook to provide boreholes for water (very 
important in that desert country). It also promised to provide advances 
which could be used for land and stock purchases. 
During 1921 and 1922 the Hofmeyr administration did all it could to 
encourage settlement. The Land Bank started with an outlay of £400,000 
60 SP19/104, dated 28 November, 1918. From Gorges, Sect. of the Protectorate. to Smuts. 
61 ADM 40-20, Report of the Administrator of South West Africa for the Year 1919 .. 25 May, 
1920. 
62 Rand Daily Mail, 10th December, 1921, in Cockram, p. 50. 












in capital from the administration, which also provided £85,000 in direct 
advances to settlers. In addition, Hofmeyr modified the Land Settlement 
Laws in favour of settlers.64 As a result, the number of new settlers, 
which in 1918 was 30, totaled 730 during the years 1920,1921, and 1922. 
This was a significant increase in comparison to the limited white 
population of the territory, but probably not as much as was hoped for. 
The administration also provided 56 drills for the boring of water 
holes. One of its most important decisions, and one that limited 
settlement, was to not advertise farms which did not have 'a good and 
permanent water supply'.65 The reason for this policy is that, as Hofmeyr 
expressed in the 1922 Report of the Administrator, 'the [1920-1923] drought 
has upset all (water) calculations and the unfortunate settler who had 
selected a dry farm found himself in an awkward and difficult position.' 
Probably one of the reasons the number of Union settlers was 
limited was the drought of 1920-1923. Still, there were definitely buyers for 
the land. In 1922, 821 farmers applied for land under the Land Settlement 
Proclamation - 755 of them South African citizens and about a quarter of 
them resident in the Union. This was during a period of drought and 
depression in the area, significantly, and yet still there was great interest. 
The drought did threaten to imperil the settlement process in 
another way. In 1922, 17 percent of allotments given were surrendered 
back to the government. The report of the administrator declares: 
The absence of rain caused the drying up of fountains, boreholes, 
wells, etc., on many farms, and settlers were obliged to trek to other 
regions where they could obtain water for their stock. Other farms 













again, where the water supply was constant, were soon without 
. 66 grazmg ... 
According to Hofmeyr, the settlers were generally middle class 
(averaging 750 pounds sterling capital per family),67 they were mostly 
Afrikaans, usually young, and usually single or with only a wife - children 
were rare. Hofmeyr, in a 1923 interview with the Cape Times, said 'I make 
bold to say that such opportunities as are offered in SWA to obtain land 
will never recur in South Africa.'68 
The aid given to these immigrant pastoralists was more than that 
given to their trek-boer ancestors. Hofmeyr declared in the interview 
101,567 feet drilled for 373 boreholes, £83,000 for breeding stock and 
implements, £400,000 for effecting improvements had been given to the 
settlers. 
Much of the legislation and action carried out in South-West Africa 
was the work of the Administration, but without a doubt Smuts played a 
large role in both the creation and the implementation of these policies, as 
we see in the next four chapters. 
66 Ibid, p. 38. 













CHAPTER 7: SMUTS AND THE GOVERNING OF SWA 
The granting of the mandate had given the Union legitimacy in 
claiming sovereignty over South-West Africa in the eyes of the 
international community - the Allied and Associated Powers, the League 
of Nations, and the German government. But Smuts judged that 
international recognition was not enough to provide a secure hold on the 
Mandate and accomplish his goal of incorporating South-West Africa into 
his Union. 
In order to consolidate South Africa's influence, Smuts as Defense 
Minister implemented martial law and as Prime Minister oversaw the 
actions of the South-West African administration. His goal was not only 
to gain acceptance of the government from the various populations1 but 
also to link the Mandate to the Union administratively, legislatively, and 
economically. 
In his 1920 Speech at Windhoek, Smuts told his German and 
Afrikaans audience that: 
The Union has full powe_r to treat South-West Africa on the same 
lines as any part of the Union. It can extend to South-West Africa 
its legal system, its judicial system, its administrative system, its 
financial system, its Civil Service, its Police Service, its Railway 
service.2 
Although Smuts was mainly trying to convince the German 
audience of Union power and dissuade them from hoping for a return of 
German administration, it is obvious that Smuts was also revealing a plan 
1 These efforts will be discussed in chapters 7-10. 
2 ADM 427/18 'Speech Delivered by the Rt. Hon. Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa at 












of action which would put the Union in a position to claim South-West 
Africa in the future. 
Smuts had fought for something tangible at Versailles - that the 
Union would be able to run the Mandate without outside interference. 
The only limits he perceived were in the Union's treatment of the non-
white population.3 To his mind, South Africa could had all the powers it 
would have had if it had successfully annexed South-West Africa.4 
The task Smuts had set himself is clear, and he had started it five 
years earlier, before the surrender of the German forces had been signed, 
when Smuts was only Defense Minister in charge of a half-conquered 
territory under martial law. 
SMUTS'S ORGANIZATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION 
Before the South-West African campaign was over, Smuts was 
organizing the administration to sui  his needs. He sent Interior Minister 
Sir Edmond Gorges to South-West Africa in order to compile a report on 
the country, and in June 1915 Botha appointed Gorges Chief Civil 
Secretary (later to be Administrator) for the territory.5 Then, in his 
capacity of Defense Minister Smuts appointed Brigadier-General Percival 
Beves to be Military Governor of the Protectorate on 11 July. 
Smuts instructions to these two men were general. Their direct 
supervisor was to be Smuts himself, and he advised Beves 'You will act 
under the direction of the Union Government and receive ·your 
3 "There is no limit whatever, except in one respect and that is in regard to certain safeguards to 
protect the Natives", ibid p. 4. 
4 ibid, p. 5. 












instructions through me. '6 It was probably quite logical for the Military 
Governor to receive his orders from the Minister of Defense, but this, 
combined with Smuts's influence on Gorges (it was Smuts who first sent 
him to South-West Africa), would have given him a great ability to 
influence the course of events in the Protectorate. 
Indeed, Beves was officially superior to Gorges, since all 
proclamations were issued 'By Command of the Military Governor' and 
all civil regulations 'by and with the approval of the Military Governor~' 
This logically gave Smuts the ability to decide policy from Pretoria and 
order Beves to carry it out. 
Smuts was hoping for annexation in these pre-Mandate years, and 
his goal during this period was to convince the League of Nations that 
South-West Africa was a virtual extension of South Africa. To this end 
the military government immediately encouraged Union investment in 
the Protectorate. Already in August 1915, scarcely a month after the 
campaign had ended, the National Bank of South Africa opened its first 
branch in Windhoek.7 
Smuts's goal now became 'annexation in all but name'- the 
integration of South-West Africa into the Union to such a degree that it 
would eventually be inseparable by outside agencies or segments of the 
internal population. 
As Smuts prepared to attend the Paris Peace Conference, the 
Union Government's attempts to prove their case for direct annexation 
intensified. On 29 August, 1918, Botha sent Smuts a draft of a 
6 GG 9/59/98. Memorandum from Smuts to Beves advising him of his appointment to the position 
of Military Governor of South West Africa, dated 13 July, 1915. 
7 Gottschalk, 'South Africa in Namibia 1915-1980', in Saunders, Christopher, ed. Perspectives on 












memorandum which was intended to assist Smuts in his efforts. One of 
its declarations was that 'it is obvious that the [Union] Treasury must have 
the same control over the expenditure of the Protectorate Administration 
as it possesses over the expenditure of any Union Department of State.'8 
In essence, the government was proposing that the South-West 
African Administration become a part of the Union Cabinet. This was 
another step towards annexation - the creation of a federally administered 
territory. 9 
Between 1916 and April 1919, Smuts was too involved in German 
East Africa and Europe to take a real hand in coordinating affairs in the 
Protectorate, other than simply as an advisor to Botha, Gorges, and ~eves. 
In April 1919, however, he became Prime Minister and was once again 
central to decision making in South-West Africa. 
SMUTS'S ROLE WHILE PRIME MINISTER 
When Smuts became Prime Minister, he had no model on which to 
pattern the extent of his influence in South-West Africa. However his 
personality, and his desire to shape affairs in the protectorate (and the rest 
of Southern Africa) led him to assume a large measure of responsibility 
for the mandate. 
On 8 November, 1919, Smuts implemented his scheme for the 
Protectorate Administration in a memorandum entitled Interim System 
of Administration in South-West Africa, which was intended to organize 
8 SP CXV (2) Memorandum on the Constitution and Government of the Protectorate of South 
West Africa, 29 August, 1918, p. 5. 
9 It is unfortunately unclear exactly what Smuts's reply was, however we can speculate, based 
upon other evidence and his insinstance as Prime Minister to place the administration directly 
under his aegis, that he was probably in favour of the proposal to tum Protectorate finances over 












the administration until the Mandate came into effect. The ideas set out 
in the document conformed to Smuts's integrationalist views on South-
West Africa, altered to fit in with the concept of a mandate which had 
been agreed to by Smuts during the Paris Peace Conference. 
Much of the Prime Minister's plans, set out in this memo, dealt 
with the financial organization of the administration. In 1918 the Union 
government advised that South-West African finances be run by the 
Union treasury. That was unfeasible by 1920, since the territory was not to 
be annexed. However, Smuts got as close as he could. As revealed by his 
Prime Ministerial papers, he ordered that most of the funds raised in the 
territory be controlled by the Union Government (not the Administrator 
of South-West Africa) - thus placing them generally under cabinet control. 
The Protectorate Administration was to lay its annual budget before the 
Union Parliament, which would then approve or amend it. However, 
these funds were to remain separate from the Union treasury. Instead, the 
Secretary to the Administrator would be the accounting officer. 10 
However, the Union's Railways and Harbours Ministry was to retain 
control of revenues from the Protectorate's transportation system, and the 
rules governing their conduct were governed by Section 127 of the South 
Africa Act, thus making them an extension of the Union's transportation 
system in all ways.11 
Equally importantly, the Prime Minister organized the bureaucracy 
of the administration in order to incorporate it as fully as possible into the 
Union. Despite Smuts's remarks to the contrary,12 the Union was not 
IO PM 214/2/19 of 8th November 1919, 'Interim System of Administration in South West Africa'., 
p. 2. 
II Ibid, p. 2. See also 'Railways and Harbours Administration of the Union,' Act 42 of 1916 of the 
Union Parliament (Parliament Papers), paragraph 5. 
12 'The authority given to the Union under this Article is so complete that its practical effects are 












given authority at the Paris Peace Conference to govern South-West Africa 
as it pleased. It was, however, given full powers of administration. Smuts 
therefore made the Administrator a conduit. Each Department of State in 
the Union 13 would control the relevant officers in the Protectorate by 
acting through the Administrator. All these officials would remain 
members of the Union Service - not a separate Protectorate Service - and 
their posts 'w[ould] be shown in the Public Service List'. 14 In addition, all 
officers whose jobs were not directly related to a specific department of 
state would be directed by the Prime Minister. 
Smuts personally instituted these acts for two reasons: first, 
combined with legislation, which the Administrator was turning out at 
this time, they helped integrate the territory and the Union governments. 
Second, they increased his own personal power in dealing with the 
territories. 
It is hard to define Smuts's contr l of the administration during 
this period, besides the fact that his office governed the actions of many 
officers in the territory. Certainly, Secretary Gorges admired and listened 
to him. Even in 1918, when Botha was still Prime Minister, Gorges had 
written to Smuts to ask advice on handling Administration officers and to 
plead for help in finding him a good position in the Union government 
after the Peace was signed (and presumably his job was complete). 15 It is 
clear from the above documents, however, that Smuts intended the 
Union government, and him personally, to have a strong level of control 
over the Protectorate. 
the Union of South Africa at Windhuk (sic)', 16th September 1920. 
13 i.e. Education, Lands, etc. 
14 PM 214/2/19,'Interirn System of Administration in South West Africa', 8th November 1919, p. 
1. 












In 1919 Smuts was still pushing for annexation, although it had 
become a long-term rather than an immediate goal. To this effect, Smuts's 
urgings to the Imperial government helped cause Lord Milner (himself a 
veteran Governor-General of the Union) and later William Hughes, the 
Australian Prime Minister16 , to produce a document allowing for future 
annexation of mandated territories. The document read: 
If at any time the inhabitants of [mandated territory] express a desire 
for union with [mandatory power] and if the Allied and Associated 
Powers consider this desire to be bona fide and approved by a 
majority of the people and calculated to promote their interests, the 
Allied and Associated Governments may give effect to it, a d in 
that case [mandated territory] shall be incorporated into [mandatory 
power] for all intents and purposes, and the Administration under 
this Convention shall be regarded as at an end.17 
The article, which would have applied to South-West Africa as a 
class 'C' mandate, was never approved by the League of Nations. 
However, it would have given hope to Smuts that annexation could, in 
the future, occur.18 
The end of the Protectorate period, and the official beginning of the 
Mandate on 1st January, 1921, witnessed a South-West African 
bureaucracy and legal system based upon and supervised by Smuts's 
government. 
In fact, Smuts was planning to be directly responsible for the 
Mandate bureaucracy himself. In reply to an inquiry from the Japanese 
government, who were a mandatory power themselves, in regard to 
Smuts's planned administration of South-West Africa, Smuts replied 'in 
16 Since Australia was also a mandatory power, it can be assumed that Hughes authored this 
document with his own national interests in mind. 
17 SP WCP 211A, 'New Clause 6 for Typical Mandate Class "C",' 14th March, 1919 .. 
18 Smuts's attempts to convince the Germans to accept South African annexation, and his 
enquiries of the Permanent Mandates Commission on the possibility of such an action dependant 












so far as the administration of South-West Africa is concerned, the Union 
Government have not established a separate office for such 
administration, the control whereof has been entrusted to the Prime 
Minister's Department.' 19 The Prime Minister's ability to affect decisions 
in the Mandate quickly and efficiently was ensured. 
RAILWAYS AND HARBOURS 
Smuts's decisions regarding the integration of South-West African 
transportation with the Union's transportation system in his 1918 
memorandum were a prelude to his attempts to fully integrate the two. In 
his opinion, this was necessary for increased efficient trade and for 
financial reckoning. It would also force South-West Africans to rely on 
the Union for trade and transportation and thus, it was felt, encourage 
unification. 
It is fairly obvious that Smuts perceived proclamations Nos. 69 and 
70 of 1920, 20 which officially integrated the Union and South-West 
railways and harbours, as a logical extension of the Mandate. In addition, 
many of the railways were built by the Union, and he could have therefore 
effectively argued that they were Union property. 
When the Union government passed Act 20 of 1922, which 
officially transferred the railways from South-West African finances to the 
Union Government, Smuts justified the act as a way of helping 'the 
territory [be] thus reliev~d of the burden of financing the railways'21 · The 
19 PM 13/1 No.1048 of 31st October, 1921, in reply to Governor-General's Minute No.62/2000. 
20 SAS 12/45 Memorandum on Railways: Parliamentary Section, of 5 January, 1921, see Chapter 
6 for a full explaination. 













Union actually took a financial loss on the deal, as it was burdened with 
extra liabilities. It seems unlikely that Smuts aimed this action at simply 
alleviating the financial difficulties of the territory, since members of the 
Government were always agitating about the profitability of the territory 
to Union coffers. More probably, the increased investment of the Union 
government in SWA affairs was an attractive prospect to Smuts and other 
expansionists on his cabinet. 
WALVIS BAY 
The position of Walvis Bay was ambiguous after 1918, as explained 
in the previom? chapter. Smuts's government agitated to attach the port to 
the mandate, and Smuts was heavily involved in the process. 
On the 16th of February, 1921, Smuts wrote a letter to the Governor-
General, and hence the British representative in the Union, requesting 
that all proclamations issued by the Union's administrator 'shall, in so far 
as applicable, be operative and have the force of law within the Territory 
of Walvis Bay.'22 The Governor-General's Proclamation 145 of 1922, partly 
fulfilling this wish, was much a product of Smuts's agitation.23 
This issue was twofold. First, it was a sovereignty issue. Smuts felt 
that the enclave's presence undermined the Union's governance of the 
area because of its very different laws. Second, it was an administrative 
question, since it was unclear who had the right to control fishing, trading, 
and other economic activities in Walvis Bay. The Governor - General, 
however, did not agree. 
22 GG 4/225 Minute from Smuts to Governor-General Lord Buxton, 16th February, 1921. 












The Rex vs. Mahoney test case, which attempted to convict a 
Walvis Bay man for providing liquor to a Coloured man under Union 
law, was a setback to Smuts, and during the period he would be unable to 
place Walvis Bay totally under Union control, although the British 
allowed the Union to regulate excises and custo.ms in Walvis Bay at the 
same level as the Mandate.24 
ADMINISTRATIVE RESULTS 
In May 1923, Smuts wrote to Hofmeyr, his lieutenant in South-
west Africa, on the future of the Mandate. He wrote of the vision he had 
carried around since 1918. 'In effect South-West Africa will become part of 
the Union, but it must not be called a province and its constitution will be 
somewhat different.'25 In this qualified manner, Smuts still hoped to 
annex South-West Africa to the Union, and part of his effort was devoted 
to using administrative tools to do so. 
The real changes he effected took place between 1918 and 1922. In 
those years, Smuts, Hofmeyr, and their allies used legislation, judicial 
cases (unsuccessfully), financial decisions, and bureaucracy in an attempt 
to integrate the Administration of South-West Africa into the Union 
Government as a step towards incorporating SWA territory into their 
country. 
There were some successes. Union, Cape, and Transvaal laws were 
promulgated in the territory, which was a significant step. However, other 
steps were only qualifiably successful. Walvis Bay became a part of South-
west Africa for tax and administrative purposes but its sovereignty was 
24 Union Parliament, Act 35 of 1921, 27 May, 1921. 












not transferred , and the dream of eventual annexation seemed to fade 
away with the demise of Hughe's proposition to the League of Nations. 
Smuts, however, did not depend solely on administrative actions to 
achieve his goal. He knew that if he could convince South African 
settlers, members of the German population, and blacks and coloureds to 
agree to annexation, the League of Nations would accept it. Between 1915 













CHAPTER 8: THE PROTECTED PEOPLE 
Of the three population groups ·discussed by Smuts in his September 
1920 Windhoek speech, only one was mentioned by the Mandate for 
South-West Africa - the natives. Smuts, Wilson, and others who created 
the mandate process expressed as its purpose the protection of 'native' 
people.1 
The 'Native' - non-white - population was a diverse group, whose 
constituents were included on the basis of phenotype - basically skin 
colour. For matters of land settlement and pass policy, three distinct 
peoples - Bantu, Nama (Khoisan), and Coloured - were generally 
considered together, although there were some exceptions. For that 
reason, this chapter covers Smuts's policies towards all these groups, and 
their disparate and collective responses. 
SMUTS: RACIST OR 'NEGROPHILE'? 
Just as Jan Smuts's expansionist policy in South-West Africa was 
part of a greater plan for southern Africa, his native policy in the 
mandated territory was a product of his personal beliefs and his 
experiences, and reflects the formula he applied to his dealings with the 
native peoples in the Union - with certain differences dictated by the 
Administration's accountability to the League of Nations. 
The recent trend towards historical revisionism has cast such major 
South African heroes as Rhodes and Smuts in a negative light on the 
matter of race. Whether or not Smuts can be portrayed today as a 'racist' is 












immaterial. For this thesis, his policy towards the black and Coloured 
populations of southern Africa can only realistically be viewed in light of 
the contemporary situation of his premiership. Two of his most 
comprehensive biographers tried to explain his relationship with these 
peoples. 
Sarah Gertrude Millin completed a rather laudatory biography of 
Smuts in 1936, which has advantages such as being contemporary and 
having good access to Smuts's personal views by way of her friendliness 
towards the subject, but to her detriment her two volumes were far from 
objective for the same reason, and her work is non-academic, for she 
forgoes footnotes and references. 
Millin is useful to us because she sets up the ambiguousness of 
Smuts's actions. Smuts was well known for his cceptance of whites from 
many different backgrounds - Jews, Germans, and others who were on the 
fringe of South African white society. However, Millin informed her 
readers, 'the welcome Smuts extends to all white races he will not offer to 
yellow or black.'2 Smuts was not a proponent of racial mixing. 'Smuts's 
ideal of fusion,' Millin wrote, 'stops before the danger of lowering 
ci vilisa ti on.• 3 
Still, she casts Smuts as a rational man who was immune to the 
anti-black jingoism of his era. He voted, she cites as an example, for the 
retention of the native franchise in the Cape Province in 1935. 
His attitude towards the natives is different. They are in South 
Africa and they have rights in South Africa. He admits it. 'Africa is 
the Negro home.' In moods of romantic pessimism he even 
wonders whether Africa may not be one day the Negro empire. He 
2 Millin, General Smuts, p. 224. 











has an affection for the natives he employs: his manner towards 
them is patriarchal. He takes sweets to the native children on his 
farm: 'More, kinders' - 'Good morning, children,' he says, and pats 
their scurfy heads.4 
115 
Millin, however, fails to explain this ambiguity. She claims his 
impulses basically resemble those of his fellow boers. It seems simplistic 
to claim Smuts's attitudes towards blacks were created solely by his 
Afrikaans background and ignore his Cambridge education, his association 
with the British population of the Union, and his acknowledgment of 
international realities. It also does not explain where Smuts believed 
blacks fit into his plans (we have seen he did not plan a Negro empire.) 
W.K. Hancock is probably the most credible of Smuts's biographers. 
He was one of the organizers of the Smuts papers, and his two volume 
biography is both easily-read well well-established academically. The 
work, written in 1962, is much more objective and factual than Millin's. 
Hancock acknowledges the ambiguity in 'native policy' mentioned 
by Millin. He agreed that Smuts saw South Africa as 'not only white 
man's, but black man's country; white civilization would stand or fall 
there with the success or failure of the whites in dealing with their 
blacks.'5 There was definitely a place for the blacks in Smuts's planned 
future. 
Hancock elaborates by explaining Smuts's beliefs on that position. 
'First, ' he quotes ' there must be no intermixture of blood between the 
two colours,' and second 'white people must build their conduct on the ... 
Christian moral code.'6 Hancock portrayed Smuts as believing in certain 
rights for the black population of the Union but strongly believing in 
4 ibid, p. 224. 
5 Hancock, Sm.u..t.s.. v2/p. 112. 












segregation between the populations. Hancock gives us an inkling of 
Smuts's plan for the blacks. In his establishment of a white civilization, 
blacks must participate in the new industrial life.7 'In their development', 
Hancock writes, ' white South Africans would be using Native labour to 
serve their own economic purposes. '8 
Thus although Millin never really expresses Smuts's planned role 
for the black population, she shows the anomalies of his actions towards 
them, which Hancock is then able to take to their conclusion. For Smuts 
did not support oppression of the blacks which would alienate them from 
a role in society. To be sure, he did not support equality, for that would 
not suit his white civilisation. Instead, he saw the blacks in the role of 
labourers, who would also benefit from their part in creating a white 
society. 
Smuts cannot be called a colonialist in South Africa, for he believed 
the Union, not Great Britain, to be his country,. His family had lived there 
for many generations and to him it was home. His first opportunity at 
colonialism came with the acquisition of South-West Africa, and his 
policy towards the black and Coloured populations there was basically an 
extension o.f his policy towards blacks and coloureds in the Union. 
However, he recognized that South-West Africa was a slightly different 
situation - that it was a less developed territory than the Union and that its 
administration would be somewhat under the authority of the League of 
Nations. 
He foresaw, in 1918, that there would have to be some protection of 
these populations in the mandate, and, in a letter to President Wilson, 
7 ibid, p. 121. 












listed them as 'repression of slave trade, prohibition of & sale of firearms 
and spirits, prohibition of raising armies, etc . .'9 When the Mandate was 
assured and Smuts became Prime Minister in 1919, he began to implement 
his own policy towards the blacks and coloureds alongside his wooing of 
settlers and his reconciliation with the Germans. 
POLICY: 1919 -1924 
When it became clear that the League of Nations would not grant 
annexation, Smuts had tried for the next best thing - a mandate. The 
mandate granted near-annexation except for the protection of the non-
white population (blacks and coloureds). The protections granted were 
written in Articles 3 and 4 of the Mandate for South-West Africa: 
The Mandatory shall see that the slave trade is prohibited and that 
no forced labour is permitted, except for essential public works and 
services ... shall also see that the traffic in arms and ammunition is 
controlled ... the supply of intoxicating spirits and beverages to the 
natives shall be prohibited ... the military training of the natives ... 
shall be prohibited.10 
Smuts had himself proposed four of these protections in his letter 
to Wilson ... the repression of slave trade, prohibition and sale of firearms 
and spirits, prohibition of raising armies. They fit in well with his beliefs. 
He was opposed to native armies and even to arming natives, had 
supported acts banning alcohol sales to blacks and coloureds in the Cape 
Province, and was morally opposed to the slave trade. On the other hand, 
since he envisioned natives as labour, the prohibition of forced labour was 
a problem for him. The qualification 'except for essential public works 
9 SP 13/A, Smuts to Wilson, undated. 












and services' could, however, be interpreted in various ways. In essence, 
therefore, Smuts gave up very little to - and the black and Coloured 
peoples of the territory were only technically protected by - the League of 
Nations mandate. There was also no apparatus set up for the non-white 
population to lodge complaints with the League. 
Smuts's position on the 'Native's' role in the Mandate was made 
clear on the 16th of September, 1920, in his Windhoek Speech. Smuts did 
not discuss, in this speech, what safeguards the non-whites could expect. 
He did, however, reveal his plan for the natives - labour. 
I have impressed upon them that they must work. I have told 
them that is the law for the white man... It is the universal 
experience that good but firm treatment of the Natives brings much 
better results out of them. 11 
Smuts, in this speech, obviously saw the blacks and coloureds 
purely as a labour force, for he told his audience 'There are too few natives 
in the country and their level is too low to supply adequately the labour 
which you require.' This speech exposed Smuts's blueprint for native 
affairs in the territory. 
He acknowledged the Mandate's protection of the non-whites, 
stating repeatedly to the mostly German audience 'there is no limit 
whatever [to Union sovereignty] except in regard to the natives.' 12 
Ironically, his goal was mainly to convince the Germans that the 
Mandate's terms did not protect them. 
Mainly, however, Smuts's comments on the non-whites were 
concerned with labour. 'I have impressed upon them that they must 
work. I have told them that it is the law for the white man.' He told the 
11 ADM 427(18) Speech Deliverd by the Rt. Hon. the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa 
at Windhuk, 16 September, 1920, p12. 












Germans that native labour, working under white supervision, would 
spread civilisation throughout the territory. He did warn them, however, 
that 'they will get much more profitable labour out of the Natives if they 
treat them well.'13 
The rights of non-whites were often ignored by Smuts's 
government when they conflicted with higher priorities - such as the 
settlement of Union citizens in the territory. Non-white reserves, 
approximately 139,000 hectares of arable land, were transferred for use by 
immigrant Afrikaner farmers who were part of Smuts's settlement 
policy.14 
SMUTS'S ROLE IN THE BONDELSWARTZ REBELLION 
Smuts was in some ways responsible for the Bondelswartz uprising 
of 1922. The policies of settlement and indigenous labour planned by 
Smuts eroded their support for the government, along with other factors. 
The dog tax, increased by Proclamation 16 of 1921, provided a major 
impetus for the rebellion, which occurred in May-June 1922. 15 
Hofmeyr decided to resolve the rebellion without using South 
African regulars. However, he kept Smuts informed. He telegrammed on 
the 15th of May: 
Sunday before I left Capetown I received urgent news that 
Bondelswarts in revolt though no untoward event had taken 
place ... the cause of trouble is alleged to be the new dog tax law ... I do 
not intend to hold demonstration of force until all peaceful 
methods resolved.16 
13 ibid, p. 12. 
14 UG 44-22, Report of the Administrator of SWA for the Year 1921,10 Marcy, 1922, p. 14. 
15 ibid, p. 2, discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 












It appears Hofmeyr hoped to end the rebellion without having to 
use force. On the 15th, he still believed the rebellion to be caused directly 
by the dog tax. He proceeded directly to Warmbad, and wrote to Smuts 
several days later: 
Bondelswarts ... are resisting police in latters arrest five men for 
contravention of law... Morris who was leader hottentot rebels 
against Germans has returned.~. Am proceeding Warbad Tuesday in 
endeavor prevent bloodshed if possible.17 
Smuts was therefore well aware of the situation, even though he 
told the Assembly that he had 'very meagre information' on what was 
happening. is However, he left it to Hofmeyr to deal with the revolt. This 
is indicative of the general state of their relationship. Hofmeyr as the 
administrator resolved most of the problems, while Smuts generally made 
policy decisions. 
Further illustrating this point, on the 20th of May Hofmeyr asked 
Smuts if the SA Police might assi t his forces. Smuts, however, ordered 
the SAP not to cross the river to assist the SWA forces.19 Hancock claims 
that Smuts urged Hofmeyr's restraint.20 Nevertheless, the Union did send 
two aeroplanes, two mountain guns, and four vickers machine guns to 
help the attack, weapons which later proved instrumental in the 
subjugation of the Bondelswartz. These supplies render questionable 
Smuts's ability to claim absolute innocence in the affair. 21 Still, Smuts 
continued to claim very little knowledge of the affair in Parliament, 
17 SWAA 1836/4, Hofmeyr to Smuts, approx. 17 May, 1922. 
18 The Star, 7 June, 1922. 
l9 RPNAC Report, pp. 1031-1033, quoted in Lewis, 'The Bondelswartz Rebellion of 1922', p. 90. 
20 Hancock, Sm.lJ.1s, Vol. 2/p. 109. 












replying to Hertzog only that 'five members of a tribe refused to appear 
before the South-West courts ... the Administrator ... had been compelled to 
take steps.'22 
The Cape Times article of 1 June, 1922, 'The Bondelswartz Rising,' 
was the signal for popular criticism of the administration to begin, and 
from then on it intensified. The second attack on the administration, 
after that of the press, came in Parliament. On June 7th Smuts gave a 
report to the Parliament. Hofmeyr's job was essentially over, but Smuts's 
had just begun. Labour parliamentarians began calling Smuts a 
'murderer' and impassionately declared he was 'steeped in blood'.23 
The Star, on June 8th, reported ' .. .in view of the responsibility of 
the Union as the Mandatory Power we think that before matters reached 
the stage they did the Prime Minister should have been more fully 
consulted.'24 In reality, it appears Smuts was consulted. Hofmeyr 
telegrammed him several times and requested aid, some of which Smuts 
gave him. 
Smuts was forced by Parliament to convene a Commission of 
Enquiry into the affair. Hofmeyr replied to his detractors that he 
'welcome[d] fullest enquiry' and told Smuts to entrust the enquiry to a 
Commission of 'sufficient weight. .. to satisfy public opinion.'25 
Smuts decided to use the Native Affairs Commission to review the 
incident. Publicly and privately he defended Hofmeyr. 'General Smuts,' 
the American Ambassador reported home on July 20th, 'expressed his 
22 'Bondelswarts Rebellion', Cape Times, 30 May, 1922. 
23 PM 21/2, Hofmeyr to Mrs. Smuts defending the Prime Minister, 28 May, 1923. 
24 Star, 8 June, 1922. 












own agreement with the view that there was no alternative but for the 
Administrator to take the action which he did.'26 
After submitting his own report to Parliament on the 20th of July, 
Hofmeyr began to worry about the attacks on his actions, and in early 
1923, wrote to Smuts: 
My attorney General... urges the proclamation of an indemnity 
measure in connection with the Bondelswartz rebellion. I am so 
convinced of the correctness of every step taken by me .. that I would 
only expose myself to the charge that I wished to cover up certain 
events by the protection of an indemnity.27 
Smuts agreed, and replied 'In spite of opinion of law advisors I feel 
inclined to agree in that there is no need for indemnity proclamation.'28 
He backed this up with legal arguments in a later letter in which he wrote: 
The Administration was consequently legally justified in 
suppressing the rebellion by the employment of whatever force the 
necessity of the case demanded.29 
Smuts's argument rested on his claim to Union sovereignty. If, as 
he declared, the Union was the sovereign power in the territory, then it 
had the right to forcefully put down rebellion. The Union therefore 
successfully prosecuted Jacobus Christian in the celebrated Rex vs. 
Christian case discussed in Chapter 5. 
Smuts used this argument in Parliament as well as before the 
League of Nations Permanent Mandate Commission, which next heard 
the case during the 3rd Session, 1923. The League assembly ended up 
expressing only its 'regret'. 
26 USA 291 of 22, American Consulate General papers, 20 July, 1922. 
27 PM 21/lA Hofmeyr to Smuts, 2 February, 1923. 
28 PM 21/lA Smuts to Hofmeyr, undated. 
29 SW AA 1838/8, Smuts to Secretary for Administrator, undated, p. 3. Hofmeyr did eventually 












In 1923, at the end of his tenure as Administrator, Hofmeyr sent to 
Mrs. Smuts a letter with an enclosed telegram which, he said 'has 
tremendous bearing on the debate.' The telegram, from Smuts to 
Hofmeyr, was written during the rebellion, and read, 'I consider time has 
come to start conversations with [Bondels] with a view to ending trouble 
amicably if possible. '30 
It has become trendy to portray Smuts as a racist and a murderer, 
but through this telegram, written on 6 June (after the battle of Guruchas), 
it is clear that Smuts did not intend to wipe out the Bondels, nor in 
general was his policy intended to destroy the indigenous people of the 
territory. As stated in previous chapters, Smuts had a blueprint for South 
Africa, and anyone - German, black, Coloured, or conceivably Afrikaans -
who opposed it or stepped out of their assigned position would gain 
Smuts's hostility. 
Smuts cannot claim innocence in the Bondelswartz affair, but nor 
can he simply be blamed for the resulting slaughter. His part in the affair 
is indicative of his general involvement in 'native' affairs - as a policy 
maker. While undoubtedly a racist, because he believed in a certain 
position for the non-white population, Smuts intended that they would 
have a small share in the civilization advances his white-led superstate 
would bring. 
BLACK AND COLOURED STATUS IN 1923-1924 
By 1923 Smuts's major policy decisions of his first incumbency had 
been effected. Most of the legislative and executive decisions of the 












Administration dealing with the non-white population had been created, 
if not implemented, by Smuts. The Native Labour Regulations, Pass Law 
Proclamations, and Natives in Urban Areas Proclamations had been 
passed, native reserves created, and taxes introduced, to force non-whites 
to become a labour pool. Those who had rebelled against the moves had 
been put down - the Bondelswartz in 1922 and the Reheboth Basters the 
next year. 
In creating a labouring class for whites, Smuts had been successful. 
But Smuts's policies must be seen in a wider view than just that one issue. 
Millin and Hancock both point out that Smuts believed blacks and 
coloureds were citizens of, and had certain rights in, their territories. 
Smuts would have been concerned - in a patriarchal, father way, according 
to Millin - about the natives. He had promised that they would share in 
the benefits of 'civilisation'. Therefore their economic and social status in 
1923 would be a measure of his success. 
The English language newspapers seem to have been particularly 
concerned with the position of non-whites in South-West Africa in 1923. 
The Cape Argus, in March, 1923, published an article entitled 'Our 
Mandatory Rule.' In it, the author remarked on his trip to the territory in 
the wake of the Bondelswartz uprising of 1922: 
The anxiety and dissatisfaction which I there found expressed with 
regards to the Union Administration was such as to suggest that the 
Bondelswart affair had been merely the eruptive point of a 
generally unsettled condition of the non-European population.31 
The Argus put the blame squarely on the shoulders of the 
administration, counting amongst its crimes allowing the encroachment 












of Europeans, neglecting intermediaries in discussions with tribes, and 
most importantly turning native land over to white settlers. The writer 
listed off the numerous taxes which non-whites had to pay - livestock, 
dog, hut, and dipping taxes. The violent crushing of the Bondelswartz 
tribe added to the criticism of the government and the administration. 
The article also refutes the Union's claim to have bettered the 
natives lives. 'Vegetables, coffee, matches always,' one Herero is quoted as 
saying 'were supplied to all servants of Germans. '32 The source also 
claimed the Germans clothed and fed their servants. 
The German newspapers also refer to 'terrible fermentation among 
our natives.'33 However, they present a different picture, and the Landes-
Zeitung claims in several articles that the Union's administration was 
too lenient, allowing the black and Coloured populations to operate 
lawlessly. 
Hofmeyr defended himself from both allegations and claimed 'the 
wages paid today are higher than those paid in German times.' 34 English-
language newspapers, however, continued to blame the Administration 
for its harsh policies, and while Hofmeyr claimed in one interview that 
'Practically all reserves have been selected in agreement with the natives,' 
and that 'patient labour has brought its reward', he was forced to admit 
that 'in SW A, I should think one would be wise to be prepared for native 
unrest in one form or another.'35 
The situation of most non-whites in 1923 was one of poverty and 
disgruntlement. The policies instituted by Hofmeyr and Smuts, while 
32 ibid. 
33 "Anarchical Native Conditions", Landes-Zeitung, 12 August, 1922. 
34 "What of the South-West Protectorate?", Cape Times, 21 March, 1923. 












providing labour for the white population, failed to live up to the promise 
in the Mandate document to 'promote to the utmost the material and 
moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the 
territory ... '36 
Smuts had a limited but influential role in these affairs. In some 
instances Smuts made policy and involved himself in implementing it, 
and in others simply corresponded and advised Hofmeyr, who made the 
final decision. 
The case of the Bondelswartz uprising, however, gives us 
interesting insight into the role Smuts played in one of the most 
important interactions with the native population during the period 1919-
1924. In 1923 the League of Nations Permanent Mandate Commission 
Chairman Marquis Theodoli was vehement in his attack on the Union's 
policies, stating that: 
The Administration has pursued a policy of force rather than 
persuasion.... in the interests of the colonists... However the 
fundamental principle of the mandates was that 'first in importance 
come the interests of the natives, and secondly the interests of the 
whites.37 
In critiquing the Union's policy, Theodoli captures Smuts's 
influence in regard to the Bondelswartz affair and 'native' affairs in 
General. The non-whites, for Smuts, were there as labourers for the 
whites. The dog tax, which was so infuriating to the Bondels, was 
implemented for that purpose. They were also to be moved to make space 
for Smuts's settlers, and for that reason their reserve was encroached 
upon. 
36 League of Nations, The Mandate for South West Africa, 17 December, 1920. 












Smuts was not responsible for the incident between Morris and the 
Protectorate police which started. the Bondelswartz rebellion, but he did set 
the groundwork for the general dissatisfaction of the tribe through his 
policies. 
Smuts cannot be blamed for the use of force - that was Hofmeyr's 
decision. Smuts did, however, supply arms to the Administrator and he 
cannot claim ignorance of his actions. In addition, he continually 
supported him after the incident. 
Similarly, in dealing with indigenous people in general, Smuts had 
an indirect but powerful influence. Although Hofmeyr's administration 
carried out most of the decisions, it was Smuts's perceptions of the role, 
rights, and position of non-whites which dictated the status of South-












CHAPTER 9: SMUTS AND THE GERMANS 
'HE CANNOT LOOK TO GERMANY'l_ 
In every war, along with victors, there exist the vanquished. The 
Germans in South-West Africa at the end of 1918 were members of a 
beaten nation. Their colony was occupied by a foreign force, and their 
homeland had been forced to surrender. Throughout 1918 and 1919 the 
Treaty of Versailles was written, which placed the blame for the First 
World War fully upon their people and called for monetary reparations, 
the loss of their colonial empire, even the annexation of parts of their 
country. They did not know what the future held for them - repatriation 
to a nation in the midst of depression seemed most likely - and they were 
anxious about their future. 
Jan Smuts was the man who had their future most in his hands. 
Smuts had led some of the forces which invaded South-West Africa and 
now, as Prime Minister of the Union, he was the leader of the power 
occupying it. But Smuts was no Germanophobe. During the war, he had 
said' (love German thought and culture and hope it will yet do much for 
mankind,'2 and in his 1920 speech in Windhoek he admitted 'we shall in 
South-West Africa be all the better for a knowledge of Schiller and Goethe 
and the treasures of wisdom in them. '3 
l ADM 427(18) Speech Delivered by the Rt. Hon. the Prime Minister of the Union of South 
Africa. at Windhoek, 16 September, 1920, p. 9. 
2 SP 12/162, Smuts to Arthur Gillett, 27 September, 1914. 












The Germans, Smuts stated 'have proved themselves excellent 
colonists. '4 He promised, 'they will find the Government sympathetic to 
them and will use all endeavors to help them over their difficulties.' 
However, while Smuts obviously tried to win the loyalty and affection of 
the Germans, he cautioned them to respect the Union's power: 
This country with its population is entrusted to the Union. And 
the Union, therefore, is the only country which can speak for them 
and act for them both here and internationally. It is quite clear ... 
that the position of the German population in an annexed 
territory ... is a difficult one. In the other mandated territories the 
difficulty has been overcome by the repatriation of the German 
population.s 
That threat could scarcely have been missed by his German 
audience. But Smuts pointed out that the Union had not forcibly 
repatriated the Germans. He warned them that they could turn to neither 
the League of Nations nor the German government and urged them to 
think about their future. 'For the German population of South-West 
Africa it is a very serious question to consider for the future what they are 
going to do in the position which they are placed.'6 
In warning the Germans that they could not expect help from the 
League of Nations, Smuts pointed out that 'There is no limit whatever [to 
the Union's sovereignty], except in one respect, and that is in regard to 
certain safeguards to protect the natives.'7 
Yet Smuts did not intend the Union to be a harsh occupier. Instead, 
he was prepared to be a magnanimous conqueror because he foresaw a 
role for the Germans - not just as citizens of South-West Africa, but as 
4 Ibid, p. 2. 
5 Ibid, p. 5. 
6 Ibid, p. 8. 












partners of the British and Afrikaners, members of the white race that 
would lead the southern African superstate he was building. To this end, 
Smuts ·was willing to extend both his personal and the Union 
Government's support to the German populations - but only if he could 
ensure that they would be productive pro-Union members of the 
coalition. Thus his policy towards the Germans between 1919 and 1924 
had the goal of legally and psychologically assimilating the German 
population by deftly allowing them to retain their culture, while forcing 
them to renounce their citizenship. In these pursuits, Smuts was 
constantly personally involved. 
REPATRIATIONS AND COMPLAINTS 
Smuts fully supported the 1919 repatriations, both in order to 
exclude Germans he did not like and as a threat towards the rest of the 
German population. During his September 1920 speech, he reminded the 
Germans that 'the Union Gove nment have thought it desirable to retain 
the bulk of the German population' but warned 'they cannot look to the 
German Government for protection.'8 
Not many of the South-West African Germans wanted to leave, 
even though Governor-General Bourne urged many to. He noted in a 
letter to Smuts that 'comparatively few wish to return [to Germany]'9 
The repatriation of part of the German population was a victory for 
the Union Government. It had managed to exclude those Germans who it 
felt threatened its sovereignty. But while the remaining population did 
8 Ibid, p. 6. 












not instigate significant protests over the issue, they were a long way from 
being loyal citizens, and there were many more long-term complaints 
which the Administration had to face, and Smuts was very aware of this. 10 
The repatriations were quickly followed by Smuts's visit to the 
territory in 1920. In asserting their rights during this visit, the German 
population declared as the main concerns: 'the continuation of German 
institutions, introduction of German capital, return of repatriated 
Germans, a new German consulate, the use of German as the official 
language, and the retention of the German Civil Code,' 11 as well as 
German-medium education, in short, a return to German rule 
unofficially or no. Smuts, of course, could not agree to this, and in a large 
part the speech quoted so lavishly in this dissertation was a reply to that... 
a rebuttal of their complaints and a reply that they must accept that the 
Union was their new master. But although harsh in his admonition, 
Smuts continued throughout 1920-24 to compromise with the German 
population. The CapeTimes said 'it will be seen that the Prime Minister 
has indicated a fair and generous policy of development in the mandated 
territory.' 12 The SWA Germans may not have agreed in September 1920, 
but many of Smuts's future actions were carefully chosen to curry their 
favour. 
Smuts was certain, for example, to include them in the economic 
assistance plan which he held out to settlers in South-West Africa in 1922, 
during a drought year.13 However, he supported the removal of the 
10 See especially PM 13/1/22 of 4 July, 1922, in which Smuts enumerates the many problems. 
11 The Times, September 20, 1920, quoted in Swanson p. 653. 
12 "The South-West Mandate. Future of German Population", Cape Times, September 18, 1920. 












German Civil Law when it was replaced by Roman-Dutch Law in 1919,14 
for the Union Government could not sacrifice their general plan to 
logistically integrate South-West Africa into the Union just to please a 
portion of the population. 
In his Windhoek speech of 1920, Smuts dealt with the issue of 
education, which was important to the German population, by espousing 
Union-language medium at the higher levels. He pointed out to the 
crowd that 'In [this] way they will not only learn their own language and 
literature properly, but it will be possible for them to pass Union 
examinations in a Union language.' 15 He was thinking of the interests of 
the Union - with South-West Africa as a fifth province. In education and 
in official language, he said, the Union must be unified. 
Because of economics and national pride, issues discussed in 
Chapter 6, the German population was able to keep a number of its 
children in private schools, and this spelled the failure of Hofmeyr's 
education policies. By 1923 Smuts was personally fed up with the 
situation and subsequently took personal charge. In his proposal for his 
upcoming summit with the German government in London, Smuts 
designed to support certain German private schools for 50 percent of their 
expenditures for two years. 16 
His ideas were met with vehement opposition. The British 
(Secretary of State for the Colonies wrote 'My knowledge of Germans of 
South-West Africa ... impels me to submit that it might be unwise to grant 
them semi-subsidized German schools ... once they are brought up as true 
14 UG 40-20, Report of the Administrator of South-West Africa for the Year 1919, 25 May 1920, 
p.1. 
15 ADM 427/18, p. 9. 












Germans imbued with German traditions and culture it matters little 
what nationality they outwardly profess.'17 
Hofmeyr was even more ardent in his antagonism to the idea. He 
wrote, in a 19 October letter, that the proposal was prompted by Germans 
who did not recognize the Union's suzerainty, who would now grow up 
separately, outside the Union Government's control. He feared that 
German children would now leave the public schools in droves. 
Additionally, he confided to Smuts, 
[I] cannot emphasize too strongly that by grant of subsidy we hand 
back only key we hold to attain our ultimate object. It will nullify 
progress thus far made, which is substantial, and will mean 
irretrievable backward step.18 
This might be a sentiment with which one would expect Smuts to 
agree. Certainly his understanding of the ultimate object was the same as 
Hofmeyr's - the annexation of South-West Africa. Smuts, however, had 
to balance the long-term assimilation of the German population with the 
short-term goal of gaining their goodwill. He knew he needed them as 
allies, and soon, for he foresaw an annexation vote in the next few years 
and wrote to Marquis Theodoli, Chairman of the Permanent Mandates 
Commission, that 'the Union Government now propose to submit 
legislation to the Union Parliament next year in the sense of the 
memorandum [on future government of SWA] submitted to the 
Council.'19 If Smuts desired a vote shortly, he needed the support of the 
nearly 9,000 Germans now living in South Africa. As he told Theodoli, 
17 GG 4/246, memorandum from Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor-General of the 
Union, 19 October 1923. 
l8 PM 21/26, telegram from Hofmeyr to Smuts, 19th October, 1923. 
19 USC 801.4 Despatch No.566 of US Consul to South Africa, enclosure, letter from Smuts to 











.. .I feel that to extend our institutions to the Union population in 
the mandated territory to the exclusion of the comparatively large 
German minority would be in every way undesirable. Our whole 
policy in South-West Africa has been to extend uniform equal 
treatment as far as possible to both sections of the white 
population. 20 
134 
Smuts thus approached the London Conference of October 1923, 
firmly resolved to compromise with the Germans on the issue of 
education despite the objections of his advisors. He was willing to throw a 
bone to the Germans on the question of education in return for a victory 
on the more important issue of citizenship - an issue he hoped would 
bind them more firmly to the Union than anything else could. 
CITIZENSHIP 
In discussing the question of the Union Government's treatment of 
German citizenship in South-West Africa, it may seem that the idea 
evolved throughout the period 1919-1924. In fact, for Smuts at least, the 
idea was there from the very beginning. In his 1920 Windhoek speech, he 
declared 
We do not want to hurry or force [the German population] in any 
way. We wish to treat them with perfect fairness, and let them 
consider what is best in their own interests ... To my mind, however, 
there is no other solution possible than that they should decide to 
become citizens of the Union.21 
20 ibid 












While Smuts's mind was made up on the issue, others were not as 
sure. The Germans in the territory, for example, still looked to Germany 
for guidance and hoped for. a return of German governance for the 
colony.22 The League of Nations, which had rejected annexation of the 
territory, was also not convinced of the necessity of giving Union or 
British citizenship to the Germans, nor was the German government 
undivided in its support for the measure. Lastly, Smuts's advisors, while 
supporting the idea, were divided on what form the action was to take. 
Smuts, however, was never one to back down before opposition. 
He needed the Germans to be loyal allies of the Afrikaner-British alliance 
he was building to civilize southern Africa, and of what use was his 
decision not to repatriate them if they would not become assimilated 
within the Union? Education, the propagation of Union laws, and new 
legal practices could only go so far. Smuts concluded that if the Germans 
were not made Union citizens they would not look to the Union for 
support and governance. 
Smuts agreed with the analysis of his 1920 Commission to Report 
on the Future of Government in South-West Africa23 and also supported 
the alternative of mass naturalization, as suggested by the Commission24 • 
It would be easier to carry into effect and encourage a far greater rate of 
naturalization. He recognized, however, that there would be several 
obstacles to enacting this legislation. The first was the questionable claim 
of the Union to be able to do this in a League of Nations 'C' class mandate. 
22 This is, in fact, what prompted Smuts's declaration. 
23 UG 24-21, 'Interim Report on the Commission appointed to enquire into the question of the 
future form of Government in the South-West Africa Protectorate' .. 11 November, 1920, p. 1. 












Additionally, both the German government and the Germans in the 
Mandate might object to the forceful handling of their rights. 
Between 1920 and 1922, Hofmeyr and others plugged away at the 
problem with little success. In 1922, however, Smuts took the debate 
permanently into his hands. In that year, he addressed the Permanent 
Mandates Commission of the League of Nation, which embodied the 
limited supervisorial powers of the League. He ordered Major Herbst and 
Sir Edgar Walton, the Union's representatives to the PMC, to present the 
1920 report to the Commission. The PMC decided, before the League of 
Nations in 1922, that: 
It is for the Mandatory Powers, to whom territories are entrusted 
under C Mandate, to regulate, in conformity with their legislation, 
the acquisition individually , of their own free will, of the 
Nationality of the Mandatory by foreigners settled in these 
territories ... 25 
The Commission, however, was unconvinced that the planned 
block naturalization of all German citizens (sans those who formally 
objected) would fit this decision. They relented in April 1923, however, 
and withdrew their objections to the plan. Their acceptance was based 
upon the fact that, while natives of 'C' class mandates were distinct from 
the mandatory power, and 'not invested with the nationality of the 
mandatory Power by reason of the protection extended to them', non-
native inhabitants could 'voluntarily' accept naturalization from the 
mandatory power. 26 
Smuts then wrote to Marquis Theodoli, the chairman of the 
Commission, saying 'The acceptance of a uniform Union citizenship 
25 PMC II. P.20, quoted in Taylor, p. 18. 












under a general law seems the simplest solution, and it commends itself 
generally to both sections of the white population in South-West Africa'.27 
Smuts had been the central figure in convincing the League of 
Nations to allow for naturalization, and he now became involved in the 
resolution which would provide for naturalization. He keenly felt the 
need for German support and asked Hofmeyr ' .. .if you could, induce the 
Germans to write a letter to me, asking the same action. '28 He asked 
Hofmeyr to point out that if the naturalization vote passed, the Germans 
would be offered a vote in the constitutional bill to be presented in 1925. 
Smuts was not deterred by the opposition of segments of the 
German population which emerged from the vote, which passed in the 
territory but failed in Windhoek, because he knew he could sweeten the 
deal for them by changing his education or economic policies. His plan 
was to get the blessing of the German government, which would, he 
hoped, convince the German segment of his population to accept British 
citizenship. It was for this reason that the London Conference of October 
1923 was planned. 
THE LONDON CONFERENCE 
The support of the German government was critical to Smuts for 
several reasons. Primarily, it seemed obvious that the German 
government, which still enjoyed strong support amongst its countrymen 
in South-West Africa, could induce them to accept the forthcoming 
27 USC 801.4 Despatch No.566 of US Consul to South Africa, enclosure, letter from Smuts to 
Theodoli, 16 May, 1923. 












changes. Those who did not follow Germany's lead would feel their 
country's abandonment strongly and agree to naturalization. 
Additionally, the support of the German government would give 
legitimacy to the Union's actions in front of the international community. 
Smuts proceeded to organize a meeting with Mr. de Haas and Dr. 
Ruppel, representatives of the German Weimar Republic. 
The resulting agreement was published in a memorandum of 23 
October, 1923. Because Smuts was the South African delegate, and as 
Prime Minister reported only to himself and a friendly parliament, much 
of the agreement bears his mark. 
How much did Smuts really give away? The eleven points he 
conceded might seem substantial, but it is probable that pre-conference 
communications between the two parties had led him to expect many of 
the concessions. 
That Germans share the privileges and responsibilities of 
citizenship was perfectly acceptable to Smuts, for it would make them 
better allies for the Union. The immigration of Germans and their 
representation on proto-government committees would have the same 
effect, helping to assimilate them. The extension of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act was perfectly in line with Smuts's policy of imparting 
Union laws unto the territory; and in agreeing to pay former civil servants 
pensions, Smuts had ensured they would become Union citizens by 
compelling them to become naturalized in order to receive their pay. 
German churches and missions had been well treated by both Hofmeyr 













In fact, many of these concessions may have been planned and 
suggested by Smuts. They gave away almost nothing and produced huge 
benefits for the Union and the Administration. Perhaps the only true 
concessions were the agreement to help fund the two German schools, 
which Smuts included against the objections of the Administrator and the 
Governor-General, the use of the German language in addition to 
Afrikaans and English in public correspondance, and the promise that the 
population would not have to take arms against the German government 
for 30 years. The school funding and German language clauses were 
indeed a change to Smuts's plans, but they were the carrot with which 
Smuts hoped to bribe the German population into concordance with his 
wishes. In return for these minor concessions, Smuts received what he 
wanted - the support of the German government for his naturalization 
plans. 
Smuts's letter to de Haas foll wing the conference was both 
laudatory to the German officials and conciliatory towards the German 
population of the Mandate. He stated that Germans and Union citizens 
had worked for the common good in South-West Africa, but: 
The natural feelings of the [former] have prevented them from 
doing anything which might be construed as disloyal to their 
Fatherland. The German Government have now removed this 
difficulty and I have no doubt that they will act on your advice and 
accept the new citizenship in a good and loyal spirit.29 
Smuts's statements may have been a bit optimistic, for the actions 
of the SWA Germans were provoked by more than just their loyalty to 
Germany. Instead, their insistence upon German language and schooling 












was sustained more by a cultural than a national pride. Still, de Haas's 
reply made the German government's position clear. 
De Haas first commended Smuts on the Administration, stating in 
the name of the German government that 'the Administration ... has been 
successful in endeavoring to ameliorate the position of the Germans 
living there as much as possible.' He then proceeded to fulfill his part of 
the London Agreement, stating: 
Recognizing that the future of South-West Africa is now bound up 
with the Union of South Africa ... the German Government are 
prepared to use their influence with these Nationals to induce them 
to accept Union citizenship under a general naturalization law of 
the Union and to advise them not to exercise their rights of 
declaring themselves outside of that citizenship.30 
This may have appeared the successful conclusion of the question. 
Smuts returned and informed 13 notables of the German population, 
chosen by Hofmeyr, of the agreement. There are signs, however, that 
there was some opposition and resentment towards the decision. A 1937 
document submitted by a German in opposition to the possible 
annexation of the territory, objected that: 
The German [notables] expected that the whole question of future 
voting rights in the Territory would now be fully discussed with the 
Prime Minister. When the deputation arrived at Capetown [sic] the 
agreement entered into at London was explained to it and the 
members of the commission had merely to take notice of the 
accomplished facts.31 
The German community, in fact, was not consulted on the terms of 
the agreement, although both sides professed to be acting for its best 
interests. Smuts, however, wanted to go ahead with his plan to provide a 
30 SWAA 1315/3 Letter from de Haas to Smuts, 23 October, 1923. 
31 PEN 264, Comments on the Report of the South-West Africa Commission, Submitted by Dr. 













legislative, limited form of self-government to the territory (as each of the 
provinces maintained), and to legitimize it he needed German 
participation. 
SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF SMUTS'S GERMAN POLICY 
It was only after Smuts's defeat by Hertzog in the June 1924 elections 
that his fight to naturalize the Germans came to fruition. In September 
1924 the Naturalization of Aliens Act was applied to South-West Africa, 
with an added Section 2 which stated that each adult male European who 
was domiciled in South-West Africa in 1924, and who had lived there 
during German rule, would automatically become a British subject, unless 
he provided a written declaration that he did not so desire.32 
The vote might be counted a victory, because out of 3,400 adult male 
Germans, only 240 chose not to become British citizens.33 Certainly, the 
choice of method was instrumental in this result, because it was far 
simpler to just sit by and become a British citizen than to go to the local 
government office and sign a document refusing naturalization. 
The articles of the London Agreement were implemented m 1924, 
in part because Smuts demanded this - while the Administration of the 
Mandate opposed their immediate implementation.33 Therefore, in the 
short-term Smuts was technically successful in implementing this 
agreement. The long-term effects of his policies will be discussed in the 
conclusion. 
32 UG 21-25, Report of the Administrator of SWA for the Year 1924, April 1925. 
33 United Nations, General Assembly, 1st session, 2nd part, 4th committee, Pt. 1,, Annex 13, Doc 
N123, Statement of the Union of South Africa, Oct. 1946, in Cockram, p. 171. 












Smuts maintains that the German population of South-West Africa 
became allies in 'the building up of,European civilisation on the African 
continent, which is the main aim of the Union. '34 It was an alliance, 
however, and not an assimilation. The London agreement granted the 
Germans the right to use their language and learn it in their schools, 
although they held Union citizenship. 
Smuts believed that the technicality of their naturalization was the 
first step in bringing them into his grand plan - his 'Monroe Doctrine for 
the South.' To this end, he was willing to barter away language and 
schooling rights for the time being, trusting that the large majority of 
them would see the benefits of Union citizenship, that the public schools 
would slowly wean their children - from Standard IV onwards - away 
from the German language, and that in time they would become members 
of his white coalition. 
From the view of 1924, with 92 percent of the Germans accepting 
naturalization, he appeared to have been successful, and it was a success 
he could personally enjoy. As Prime Minister, Smuts had taken a 
personal approach to the German question, engaging not just in 
discussions, but in actions. He led the efforts to assimilate the population 
and ignored his advisors in a bid to compromise with the German 
population and bring them 'into the fold.' For better or for worse, the 
German policy in South-West Africa was Smuts's policy. 












CHAPTER 10: THE UNION SETTLERS 
Smuts had a blueprint for South-West Africa, and his plans did not 
rely solely on non-whites and Germans, whose loyalty was questionable. 
For Smuts, the point of expansion was not the rulership of other people 
but the occupation of land for the expansion of his own people - the 
Union's Boers and Britons. South-West Africa, to him, was a land of 
spoils: 
It is a good country ... for ranching it is probably one of the best in 
the World ... It wants a white population and it wants capital. It is 
impossible to run this as a civilized country with a hand-full of 
whites... As a white population comes here and the country 
becomes settled and occupied by white people you will find a very 
great change.1 
For those in the Union who lived in the city and who made 
business their livelihood, the new mandate represented mineral rights, 
harbours, markets, and labour. But for many of the rural farmers, South-
west Africa represented a chance to make the Afrikaner dream come true, 
and they set out to take it. Jan Smuts was determined to help them all. 
When Parliament had acceded to Smuts and Botha's request that 
the Union invade South-West Africa in 1915, Botha had told them that 'If 
we do not conquer German South-West Africa, the English will do it ... It is 
ours, and it is our affair',2 and on the 2nd October Smuts said, 'German 
South-West Africa [will] again form part of our Afrikaans heritage.' 3 This 
was not the business logic of the British Empire but an impassioned 
1 ADM 427(18) 'Speech Delivered by the Rt. Hon. the Prime Minister of the Union of South 
Africa at Windhoek (sic)', 16 September, 1920, p. 2. 
2 The Star, September 10, 1914, p. 2. 












statement by a leadership in touch with the Afrikaner's feelings and needs 
- South-West Africa, Botha and Smuts assured their people, 'is ours.' 
While he was at the Peace Conference, Smuts received a letter 
from Gorges, the Secretary for the Protectorate, on the Settler question. 
Smuts had been concerned by the issue but had been fully occupied in 
Europe while Botha ran the Union and the protectorate as Prime Minister. 
Gorges sent Smuts his opinions because he knew Smuts was beginning 
the fight to gain sovereignty over the Protectorate. The letter appears 
unsolicited. 
Gorges had been busy evaluating the unoccupied land available for 
settlement and was anxious to begin the process properly. 
I think you should commence to consider the terms which you will 
be prepared to offer to intending settlers. They should be liberal to 
the proper people ... This country, as you know, is no place for the 
man who has nothing.4 
This statement revealed to Smuts what he would be forced to find 
out again himself during his trip to SWA a year later, that using rhetoric 
to encourage settlement did not mean that serious immigration would 
occur. Gorges enumerated the challenges of setting up farms: 
A fairly substantial capital is necessary for the purchase of breeding 
stock, and owing to the aridity of the country boring for water or 
sinking wells is an absolute necessity. So that, quite apart from the 
cost of the ground, the expense of starting will be relatively high 
and we must remember that the farmer must house, clothe, and 
feed himself and family and pay his servants during the period -
anything from two to four years - in which his stock is growing up 
and becoming fit for the market. 
Gorges advised Smuts that most settlers would be people with little 
or no money and that the government would have to provide capital and 












land for them. For Smuts, this was not a deterrent to a plan that he 
believed was the logical extension of the Union 
Smuts, in fact, was fully committed to Union settlement of the new 
area. As far as he was concerned, settlement of the Protectorate was the 
main reason behind the Union's expansion - for South-West Africa was 
not to be ruled as a colony but, as Smuts ensured that the Mandate article 
said, 'as an integral portion'5 of the Union. In order for this to occur, 
Smuts knew that Union citizens must become the bones and sinews of the 
region, binding South-West Africa to the Union so that in the future it 
could become de jure, as well as de facto a part of the Union. 
Smuts as a delegate in Paris was could only set the framework from 
afar for this transformation from a German colony to a Union province. 
But Smuts the leader of the Union of South Africa could implement 
actual change. Therefore, when in late August 1919 Smuts became the 
Prime Minister of the Union, he set about his task immediately. 
SWA SETTLER POLICY UNDER SMUTS 
Between 10-13 September Smuts pushed through the South African 
House of Assembly his bill, the 'South-West Africa Mandate Act', which 
would accept the League of Nations Mandate when it was offered ( the 
League did not officially offer it until December 1920).6 In this drive he 
was opposed by the Nationalists led by Barry Hertzog, who argued that 
South-West Africa would be prohibitively expensive for the Union.7 
Smuts agreed that it would be expensive, saying that 'it would be necessary 
5 The Mandate for South-West Africa, League of Nations, 17 December, 1920. 
6 Union House of Assembly, Act 49 of 1919, 13 September, 1919. 












to open up the country, put in water bores, etc.; so as to make the land 
more useful for settlement purposes.' However, he argued, 'the country 
offer[s] great potentialities and can accommodate a large population. '8 His 
argument against concerns about cost was, therefore, that the new territory 
could sustain a large settler population. 
After the successful vote on the Act, Smuts spoke at Fraserburg on 
the 28 of September, and the Rand Daily Mail paraphrases him as saying: 
The government was anxious to develop that country as fast as 
possible ... he considered it desirable to get a good strong Africander 
population settled there, so as to mix with the German population. 
It would not be good, he felt, just to leave the German population 
there alone, but the two sections would be able to mix. A Land Board 
would shortly be appointed, and as soon as all the necessary steps 
had been taken for the boring of water it was intended to proceed 
with the settlement plan. 
Smuts not only used this speech to expound on his ambitions, but 
also to disclose his plans, because the time for words was over, and Smuts 
intended to take action, using the administration he had set in place in the 
Mandate to entice Union citizens to move into the newly opened territory. 
There are two interesting things to note about the 1919 Land Board 
which are revealed by the Administrator's report. 9 First, the 
administrator complains that the land board fell directly under the control 
of the Union Government, and hence Smuts.10 It appears that Smuts saw 
the settler question as important enough to warrant his personal control 
(through the Lands Department). Second, the department offices were 
filled by Union citizens, along with the Deeds and Survey Offices. While 
this may have inhibited their usefulness for the German population, it 
8 'Settlement in the Protectorate', Cape Times, 13 September, 1919. 
9 ADM ... , Report of the Administrator of South-West Africa for the Year 1919. 25 May, 1920. 
lO The report reads 'As, however, they are duirectly under the administration of the Lands 












made Union settlement much easier, pointing out the primary objectives 
of these departments,11 which was to provide Union settlers with aid in 
establishing their farms. 
There is little doubt that Smuts's government agreed with 
Hofmeyr's policies, including not making available plots without 
available water, since Smuts's people controlled the Land Board and it is 
clear they cooperated closely with the Administration. However, the acts 
themselves seem to have been instigated by the Administrator's office, not 
by Smuts. 
The provision of drills for boreholes and monetary advances/loans 
proved the commitment of the Union government to settlement 
throughout the territory, but its unwillingness to provide willing settlers 
with un-watered lands showed its good sense. Smuts may have had as a 
primary goal the expansion of the Union into this area but he was 
unwilling to expose them to untenable positions. 
Smuts's reply to the 1920-23 drought and depression was to instruct 
Hofmeyr to help the general populace: 
As I said to you it will probably be impossible to prevent certain 
people from going under. But we shall have to watch carefully the 
general condition of the people as a whole ... The rank and file of the 
population should be saved from ruin, and any great setback of the 
German population will affect the Union population also. 12 
Smuts's instructions clash with the idea that he was uniformly 
interested in promoting Union settlers over the Germans. In fact, 
although his patronage for the settlers was secure, he saw as their partners 
the German populace, telling them in his 1920 speech in Windhoek, 
11 The report reads 'they have been handicapped by the want of qualified men with a knowledge 
of German.' 












'With long years of peace and quiet before us, and hearty cooperation 
between all sections of the people, I am sure the country will advance 
rapidly and become inhabited by a large progressive population.'13 
Still, Smuts's -advocacy of the settler process was stronger than his 
support for the German population, and despite the depression's effect on 
the administration, in 1923 well boring was proceeding apace in order to 
enable a larger number of farms to be allotted in 1924.14 Because of the 
drought, the number of farms provided and the number of settlers 
interested had both declined, although. early 1924 showed a slight 
resurgence. 
It is obvious that the settlement process was continued during this 
hard period because of the government's, particularly the Prime 
Minister's, support for the process as a means to bring the Mandate closer 
to the Union. The only other logical argument would be that it was a 
financial measure, and this is unlikely for several reasons. First, the 
allotting of farms was not nearly as profitable as urban allotments, which 
the government did not advertise as strongly. In addition, the 
administration sold many of these farms during a price depression, rather 
than waiting for an increase. 
For Smuts, the issue was not money but expansion - expansion for 
the Union, and expansion for the Afrikaans people. He did not 
concentrate personally on attracting businesses to Swakopmund or 
Windhoek, although that was one of the administration's goals, because 
although it was a financial objective, it did not appeal to his passion, nor 
was it as vital to Smuts's plan of incorporating the Mandate into his 
13 ADM 427/18, 16 September, 1920, p. 17. 













future hegemony. The settlement of South-West Africa with strong, 
white settlers would provide a backbone for the territory when it became 
part of the Union, a process Smuts hoped would be repeated all over 
southern Africa. 
Hancock argues that Smuts supported settlers in South-West Africa 
because of a belief in South-West Africa as 'a part of our Afrikaans 
heritage, 15 ' to be peopled 'once again' by Afrikaners.' The passion Smuts 
felt for the settlers, the administrations appointments of Afrikaners to 
official posts, the advances for cattle farming, which did not exist for urban 
development - all these points to Smuts's support for Afrikaans settlers. 
The fact is, however, that Smuts's encouragement of the settlers 
was more a promotion of his 'Monroe Doctrine for the South16.' He urged 
a partnership between the Afrikaners and the Germans and did not 
distinguish between British and Afrikaans settlers. Smuts was not an 
'Afrikaner.' Smuts was a white South African. He did not call for an 
increase in Afrikaans settlers but encouraged white settlers to move into 
the territory. It was Smuts's expansionism, and not his ethnicity, which 
was the driving force behind his personal support of the Union 
immigrants into the Mandate. 
l5 Quoted in Hancock, Sm.l!t.s.. vl/p. 385. 












CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION 
Smuts's strategy in Namibia during the period 1914 and 1924 can be 
seen as an extension of his personal views on expansion and his 
commitment to the successful creation of a white-led African state with 
hegemony over the region, based on the Union of South Africa. 
His involvement can be divided into three distinct stages, although 
they overlapped chronologically: Between 1914 and 1916 he prepared for 
and helped lead a campaign to physically conquer the territory and to 
establish a protectorate in it. In 1916 he also began his fight to establish a 
legitimate Union sovereignty over the Protectorate before the 
international community, at first through annexation, and then through a 
gradual process under the mandate. From the 1918 Paris Peace Conference 
to the 1923 Rex vs. Christiaan case, he used various methods to press the 
Union's claim rather than the potential claims of the League of Nations 
and Great Britain. During this period, and especially as Prime Minister 
from 1919 to 1924, Smuts initiated attempts to assimilate the territory by 
integrating the territory's laws with those of the Union, introducing 
Union settlers, absorbing the German people, and organizing the non-
white population along Union lines. 
In summarizing the dissertation, this chapter has three purposes: 
The first is to evaluate the effect of Smuts's personal role on these various 
processes, the second is to gauge the successes and failures of the policies 
and acts he organized in reaching the conclusion he pursued - the 
expansion of the Union into South-West Africa. The last part of this 













SMUTS'S ROLE - A SUMMARY 
Jan Smuts was the most significant personality in shaping the 
future of the relationship between South-West Africa and South Africa 
between the years 1914 and 1924. The most important aspect of his 
operations in regard to South-West Africa was his belief in and work 
towards Union expansion into the territory. 
Hancock argued that Smuts supported the war out of personal 
loyalty. Smuts's strong loyalty to Campbell-Bannerman and England 
certainly existed, but they alone do not suffice to explain Smuts's 
passionate involvement in the camaign of 1915. Nor does L'ange's 
argument that it was an exercise in Anglo-Boer unity, or Swanson's 
insistance that it was a question of security, for the war was damaging to 
internal stability and split the Afrikaners. Furthermore, 4,000 German 
regulars were no threat to a Union which had a standing army ten times 
the size and a large militia, thanks to Smuts's Defense Bill.2 The only 
realistic explanation is Smuts's desire for expansion. Garson, who argued 
that 'Smuts's African policy amounted to the single-minded pursuit of 
formal expansion from the Union as base,'4 perceived this. However, he 
and other historians have explained it as either British-style imperialism 
or the heritage of Afrikaans trekking. Instead, it was a major step in 
Smuts's self-avowed attempt to create a white superstate in Southern 
Africa: 'a time is coming when it will be a misnomer to speak of "South 
2 Collyer, The Camoaign in South-West Africa, p. 17. 












Africa" because the Northern limits of our civilisation will have gone so 
far.' 5 
Smuts's passionate arguments against the Nationalists and others 
who opposed the war may was important in persuading both Parliament 
and the South African people to participate in the South-West African 
campaign and the war at large.6 Realistically, the Union probably would 
have joined anyway,7 but Smuts's influence cannot be discounted. 
For most of the campaign, Smuts was given the task of 
'administrative and military organisation at the seat of government in 
Pretoria'.8 All general orders were issued under his name.9 However, 
both in this role and during his one-month stint as commander of the. 
South and Central forces, his involvement was generally unremarkable -
he was a capable General but his task could have been done by others. 
Smuts's influence on policy during the war and at the surrender 
were very important in transforming the future of the territory. He 
advised Botha not to use natives in the campaign and appointed Gorges as 
Chief Civil Secretary and Beves as Military Governor but subsumed their 
positions directly under his control. 10 Both were of British extraction and 
could be counted on to remain loyal. By placing them under his direct 
orders, Smuts was able to begin his transformation of the territory. 
Even more significant was Smuts's involvement in the surrender 
terms. Botha was willing to accept the terms offered by Seitz, but Smuts 
objected to the second term, which allowed the German active troops to 
5 Smuts, JC, War Time Speeches, p. 90-91. 
6 Smuts argued in parliament on 10 September,1914, representing the Government's position and 
directly responding to Hertzog. Parliamentary Papers, fifth session, IO September, cols. 83-89. 
7 The parliamentary vote on joining the war was an overwhelming 92 for to 12 against. 
8 Hofmeyr, ~. vl/p. 385. 
9 See Union Defence Forces 'General Orders' for 1914-1915, nos. 1-64. 












retain their rifles and artillery. 11 Smuts wanted no possible opponents to 
his planned expansion. 
In fighting for recognition of South African sovereignty over 
South-West Africa, Smuts was a more central figure than he was during 
the 1915 campaign. As South Africa's representative to the Paris Peace 
Conference, first with Botha and later as the head of the delegation, Smuts 
fought to attain the annexation of South-West Africa. William Louis 
continues Swanson's arguments that Smuts's main concerns were 
security for the Union and the protection of the non-white population. 
Certainly he argued publicly that the Germans there threatened both 
lJnion and British security and that the Germans had abused the 
indigenous peoples of the territory, and assuredly security was a concern. 
Smuts's true designs on the territory, however, were revealed in his 
personal correspondence. Smuts knew that he wanted expansion into the 
territory and that his and Louis Botha's political positions would be 
unsteady without some gain being perceived by the South African people. 
The expansion theme runs throughout his letters and speeches,12 much 
more so than security or the welfare of the indigenous people. 
The acquisition of annexation rights was Smuts's task, and Smuts's 
alone. The Mandate would probably never have come about without his 
involvement. Smuts at first demanded annexation, and his work with 
the British had gained allies such as Lloyd George, who agreed that 
'German Southwest (sic) Africa could not be separated from the South 
African Union.'13 
11 SP LXIl/95, July 1915. 
12 See especially Smuts Papers vlOl/99-100 












Smuts, however, saw from Wilson's opposition to annexations that 
there was a need to compromise. Smuts was personally opposed to 
annexation of Austrian and Turkish lands in Europe and the Middle East 
and had developed the idea of the Mandate to cope with the 
administration of these territories. When Wilson included German 
colonies, Smuts at first fought against this. Realizing he was outgunned, 
he fought for the best terms which would be 'annexation in all but 
name.' 14 
Smuts wrote the drafts of many of the documents which shaped the 
Mandates, including Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant.IS He 
made the syntax of these documents fit his goals. 'Allied and Associated 
Powers' replaced 'League of Nations', limiting the League's future claims 
on regulating the mandates. The protections extended to the indigenous 
people were all protections of which Smuts approved. And Smuts 
divided the mandates into three classes and wrote the draft for the Class 
'C' Mandates, in which he included the vital phrase which was written in 
the Mandate for South West Africa as: 
The Mandatory shall have full power of administration and 
legislation over the territory .. as an integral portion of the Union of 
South Africa, and may apply the laws of the Union of South Africa 
h . 16 to t e territory .... 
No South African could have won outright annexation of South-
west Africa. But Smuts had won something so akin to annexation that he 
successfully defended his 'annexation in all but name' before challenges 
from the League of Nations between 1919 and 1924, and the British did not 
14 SP 21/5, 20 March, 1918. 
15 British Delegation, 'Draft Resolution in Reference to Mandatories', January 28, 1919. 
16 League of Nations, 'The Mandate for South-West Africa," 17 December, 1920. See also the 












challenge the Union's claims that the Mandate was their business, even 
though it was issued in the name of 'His Brittanie Majesty'. Cooper argues 
that this was because they were unwilling to commit the resources 
necessary to administer the territory,17 but the South Africans under 
Smuts in fact took the initiative to claim it, using court cases and 
legislation to enforce their claim. Smuts, for example, issued legal papers 
arguing that the King, as head of state of one of the Great Powers, had 
tacitly extended control of the region to the Union by conferring the 
mandate to 'The Union of South Africa.'18 
The League of Nations also exercised some control due to Article 7, 
which required their consent for any modification of the mandate, and 
also stated that any dispute over the Mandate should be turned over to 
them. Smuts once again personally involved himself in diminishing the 
League's power, using court cases such as Rex v. Christiaan, extending 
laws, and arguing that the Mandate had been extended by the Principle 
Allied and Associated Powers, and that the League therefore had only 
limited jurisdiction (he had personally seen to that). Another leader, less 
inclined to expansionism, would not have as rigorously pursued the case. 
Smuts, however, had developed a grand plan for South-West Africa and 
in order to carry out its internal workings, he had to assure himself of its 
immunity to outside interference. His interactions with the League and 
the Commonwealth were meant to ensure this. 
As Prime Minister, it was Smuts's his responsibility to gain 
support within South-West Africa for the Union's eventual annexation of 
the protectoratem and he therefore tried to draw the Mandate as close as 
17 Cooper, The Occupation of Namibia, p. 116. 












possible to the Union. He ended Martial Law in the territory in 1919, and 
immediately began to subordinate the territory to South Africa. The 
Administration extended Cape, Transvaal, and Union laws to South-West 
Africa by decree, regularizing economic, racial, and land laws. The 
territory's finances were regulated by the Union Treasury and its 
transportation by the Union Railways and Harbours. Union businesses 
were encouraged to expand into South-West Africa. 
Smuts neither proposed nor carried out all these changes alone. His 
position was to decide policy, in consultation with others such as his 
Administrator, and generally leave the implementation to them. 
However, the Administration was placed directly under the Prime 
Minister's department, which is significant. 19 In addition, Smuts made 
the officials in South-West Africa responsible to the relevant Departments 
of State in the Union, rather than creating a separate Protectorate Service. 
In administering the Mandate, Smuts was again a policy maker. As 
illustrated by his September 1920 speech in Windhoek,20 Smuts developed 
a blueprint for the future of the Mandated territory . His goal, since 
outright annexation had been rejected by the League of Nations in 1919, 
was the eventual incorporation of the territory into the Union by different 
means. 
Smuts evidently still hoped that annexation could occur in the 
future. He realized that there were three distinct segments of the 
population in the Mandate and that for annexation to occur, certain 
l9 GG 62/2250, Smuts response to Japanese enquiries, 31 October, 1921. 












problems would have to be resolved regarding each. The Germans would 
have to accept British naturalization and become participating, and 
hopefully enthusiastic, citizens of the Union. South African settlers 
would need to move in to provide business and infrastructure, and also to 
satisfy the Union population that annexation was in their favour. The 
position of the indigenous people would have to be equated with that of 
the blacks and coloureds in the Union, while the image of the Union as a 
protector of their rights was preserved, without causing coloured or 
indigenous groups to rebel. 
Smuts had his hands full as Prime Minister of the Union and could 
not always be personally involved in the affairs of the Mandate. The 
Administrator - whether Gorges or Hofmeyr - was responsible for carrying 
out policy and for creating some of it. Historians argue that much of the 
policy in South-West Africa was carried out by the Administration. Lewis, 
for example, declares that Smuts was not well-informed during the 
Bondelswartz affair (Chapter 10). Smuts, however, was in constant contact 
with Hofmeyr directly before the Bondelswartz affair. In addition, his 
pledge to the white population that he would create a labour force out of 
the non-whites .for their benefit was indirectly responsible for the uprising 
through the dog tax, and his commitment to Union settlers contributed to 
the transfer of indigenous lands, including some Bondelswart land, to 
whites. 
In addition, Smuts sometimes stepped in and decided policy against 
the advice of the Administrator, the Governor-General of the Union, and 
others, such as his decision to offer subsidies to German schools directly 
preceding the London Conference.21 












Smuts, it appears, stepped in when his blueprint for the integration 
of South-West Africa into his white superstate was threatened - whether 
to placate the Germans in the interest of gaining their alliance, change 
land policy to aid Union settlers, or, more rarely, to keep the non-
European population in the position he had dictated for them. 
It would be incorrect to ignore Smuts's influence in the field 
of 'native affairs'. His policy was to rigorously enforce certain of the 
Union's pledges, such as not allowing these groups access to firearms or 
alcohol, and not raising black armies. He had always supported these 
policies in the Union. Another aspect of his policy was to extend the 
Union's pass laws, taxes, the idea of reserves (which had been used by the 
Germans as well), and other South African programs to the territory. 
In regard to his dealings with the German population, 
however, Smuts was very influential. Through personal leadership, 
Smuts developed a situation which was unique among the mandated 
territories, probably unthinkable to other South African leaders, and 
which was designed to reach the objective of a Union-led white territory 
in South-West Africa which could become a part of the 'Monroe Doctrine 
for the South.'22 
Smuts and Botha's policy of repatriations, unlike that of the other 
Mandatory powers, was to expel the 'undesirables' - military and police 
personnel, the poor, and the voluntary exiles who were anti-Union; the 
other Germans were allowed to remain. When Smuts became Prime 
Minister, he was quick to remind the Germans of the magnanimity of the 
decision. 













The decision was not so magnanimous, and Smuts showed his 
need for the Germans as allies in South-West Africa several times during 
this period. He trod a line between friendship and force. He wanted the 
Germans to become willing partners in his expanded Union, but only if 
they would be loyal to the Union. Therefore, he attempted a series of 
compromises with the Germans in South-West Africa and the German 
government in an attempt to gain this desirable situation. 
Smuts's personal involvement culminated in the London 
Agreement of 1923. He personally decided on the Union's concessions -
most of which were superficial, a few of which were not. Smuts 
represented the Union at the negotiations, and the agreement was duly 
sealed. The major concession gained was that the Germans, if they 
desired, could become Union citizens.23 However much he wanted 
willing citizens, Smuts chose the path of naturalizing all the Germans 
except those who objected, instead of naturalizing only the members of the 
German population who specifically asked for it. In his quest for 
hegemony over southern Africa, Smuts believed that naturalizing as 
many Germans as possible would create a pool of good white citizens in 
the territory. 
Smuts was involved with the League of Nations over this process, 
for it was the Union government, and not the South-West African 
administration, which was aiming for the naturalization. His personal 
contact with Marquis Theodoli and others24 underlines his arguments first 
to be allowed to naturalize the Germans and later to use their 
involvement to push for an annexation vote - which never materialized. 
23 SWAA 1315/1-5, on the London Agreement, 23 October, 1923. 












Between 1919 and 1924 it was Smuts who dictated much of the 
Union's policy towards the German inhabitants of the Mandate. 
However, he did not lay all his hopes of annexation on them. 
Throughout this period, the Union was encouraging settlement by its 
citizens in the Mandated territory, and Smuts was sometimes very 
involved in this policy. 
Smuts had even more compassion for the settlers than for the 
German population. Central to his support for the Union settlers was his 
shared background with Afrikaners and British alike. He had grown up as 
the son of a dominee amongst rural boers in the Western Cape and had 
studied in England. He counted among his friends many influential 
British South Africans - Merriman, Emily Hobhouse, and J.J. Collyer. 
Hancock makes much of the role of Smuts's 'Afrikaans heritage'25 
in promoting settlement. It was more Smuts's belief in expansion of the 
Union which caused him to support the settlers. His settlement policy, 
which was mostly implemented by the Mandate Administration, made no 
distinction between Briton and Boer. 
The policy was generally to give aid to Union citizens hoping to 
emigrate to the territory in the form of loans, boring boreholes for water, 
and the cheap sale of allotments. Once he had decided on a pro-settler 
policy, Smuts only stepped in during the 1922-23 drought when he 
encouraged general aid to settlers.26 It was the rural settlers who received 
the bulk of his attention; he never seems to have interfered in Hofmeyr's 
task of attracting business and urban investment. 
25 Hancock,~, vl/p. 385. 












Smuts's personal involvement in attracting settlers may not be as 
evident as his commitment to gaining the Germans as allies. It would be 
false to conclude that he was not as interested in the settlers, however. 
The German question, fraught with problems, suited itself perfectly to 
Smuts's skills as an international diplomat, whereas the statistics showed 
that settlement proceeded apace and when, during the drought, it faltered, 
Smuts quickly became immersed in the problem. 
In conclusion, there were issues and times during the period 1914-
1924 when Smuts was deeply involved in the Union's association with 
South West Africa, and others when he was a more peripheral player. 
During the 1915 campaign, he was an important member of the team 
whose contributions were significant, but not necessarily irreplaceable. In 
dealing with settler policy, indigenous peoples, and the extension of South 
African trade and law to the Mandated territory, Smuts decided policy and 
generally let others implement it until there was a problem, when to a 
lesser or greater degree he became involved. Undoubtedly, his background 
and beliefs were very important motives for what took place, but 
Hofmeyr, Gorges, and others also made key contributions. 
However, in gaining the mandate over South-West Africa for the 
Union and in policy towards the Germans, Smuts was the most central, 
most important contributor, both creating policy and implementing it. 
Without his contribution, the Mandate, if given at all, would have 
followed a different path entirely. 
Many factors in Smuts's background may be seen to have had an 
effect on his decisions, but it was his pursuit of the creation of a successful 
white-led African state, based on South Africa, with hegemony over the 












military conquest, League of Nations accession, white general vote, 
economic and bureaucratic dependence - which he felt would achieve this 
goal. 
1914-1924: SUCCESS OR FAILURE? 
Success and failure cannot be divided into neat little sections as 
easily as the analysis of Smuts's influence on the evolution of the South 
African presence in South-West Africa. Instead, it is necessary to evaluate 
how close Smuts was to his goal of undisputed sovereignty over South-
West Africa in June 1924, when he was forced to turn the position of 
Prime Minister over to Barry Hertzog of the Nationalists. 
Having failed to win the direct annexation of South-West Africa in 
1919, despite the military victory of 1915, Smuts was compelled to pursue a 
slower course to achieve the goal of integrating the territory into the 
Union. The Mandate itself was, Smuts declared, annexation in all but 
name. Certainly he had won for the Union the right to administer the 
region as an integral portion of itself. But though Smuts argued that the 
League of Nations "never came into possession of the German Colonies, 
and can give no Mandate over them",27 the League had de facto power 
over the Mandate, and could possibly have revoked it, as its heir, the 
United Nations, would do in 1966. The League was also the guarantor of 
the rights of the indigenous peoples, and could receive and judge 
complaints from other nations over the treatment of blacks and coloureds 
in the Mandate. 












The internal population had diverse feelings over the Mandate as 
well. The coloured population had generally welcomed the Union's rule 
in 1919,28 but the German population was opposed to annexation as well 
as the Mandate and some members agitated for a return to German rule. 
The settlers were not yet sufficient in numbers to sway opinion towards 
the Union. 
By 1924 Smuts may have felt he had made his position stronger. 
The territory was economically tied to the Union, with South African 
firms investing heavily in it. The number of Union citizens had increased 
due to settler policies. Smuts had fended off the League's interference in 
the Bondelswartz Affairs and made it clear that the Union, not the British, 
was the Mandatory power. More than 90 percent of the Germans had 
become British citizens, allies in the 'civilizing of the continent' .29 Revolts 
by the Bondelswartz and Reheboth Baasters had been successfully 
repressed. Even the laws of the territory were basically extensions of the 
Union's legislation. 
In many ways, Smuts had been successful in drawing the Mandated 
territory closer to the Union and the above facts show that assimilation 
was proceeding, albeit in fits and starts. However, Smuts's mission cannot 
be considered successful for several reasons. 
First, the annexation had not occurred. This fact seems a glaring 
gauge of Smuts's success. Despite his achievements, he did not succeed in 
gaining either a vote from the white population in favour of annexation 
nor the consent of the League of Nations. 
28 GG 50/800, 2 October 1919. 












It can be argued that Smuts did not believe he had reached the 
point, by 1924, of attempting either of these things. In 1923, he still 
believed he would serve another term. Certainly, he wrote to his friends 
the Gilletts 'the indications are that I shall get in,'30 and he held this belief 
until the election. 
But we cannot evaluate Smuts's success or failure simply by 
whether or not actual annexation occurred, this analysis is not enough to 
judge Smuts a failure. 
In several ways, Smuts's successes were at least qualified. The 
number of settlers was by 1924 quite small, despite the pro-settlement 
legislation of the Administration - there were only 831 new Union settlers 
who had accepted government-offered allotments. 31 This meant that the 
majority of whites in South-West Africa were still of German extraction 
(even adding the 1800 Union citizens who had resided in the territory 
under German rule and those who had moved in to the territory without 
taking a government allotment). 
The scarcity of Union citizens in the Mandate was a stumbling block 
towards its assimilation. However, if the naturalization of German 
citizens, successful in changing their citizenship de jure, had forged the 
German population into a group of loyal, assimilated Union citizens, the 
low numbers of settlers would have been less important. 
Instead, many Germans still hoped for the return of German rule. 
They complained about the Union's 'leniency' towards the indigenous 
people32 as well as towards their own language, education, and social 
30 SP 27/357 Smuts to M.C. Gillett, 14 June 1923. 
31 UG 21-24, Report of the Administrator for the South-West Africa for the Year 1923, 31 March, 
1924. 












system. Smuts did South-West Africans of German descent a disservice by 
not consulting them prior to the London Agreement, and many felt that 
their needs were not being met.33 To a certain extent, their acceptance of 
naturalization was an acceptance of the inevitability of Union domination 
of the territory, but this was a shaky base on which to build loyalty. 
The indigenous population's unhappiness with Union rule was 
much less unambivalent. They had been disillusioned by poverty, poor 
treatment, the continuation of hated German laws and the introduction of 
Union taxes and pass laws, as well as an administration which promoted 
pro-white policies at their expense. The Bondelswartz Rebellion was 
symptomatic of the Union's treatments of the black and coloured 
populations. Although the League of Nations had expressed only 
'regret'34 over the action officially, some world leaders such as Marquis 
Theodoli questioned the Union's handling of the affair and the Mandate 
in general, and opposition to annexation was forming. 
By 1924 Smuts and his administration had created a deep but fragile 
link between South-West Africa and the Union. His policies, influenced 
by his background and belief, were not failures because he had created an 
economic and legal connection between the Uniori and South-West Africa 
and warded off international attacks on the Union's sovereignty as 
Mandatory power. However, the Union was forced to remain the 
Mandatory power, and not to incorporate the territory, because Smuts had 
failed to encourage a large number of Union citizens into the territory, 
had been only moderately successful in winning the loyalty of the German 
33 PEN 264, 17 March, 1937, p. 11. 












population, and had alienated the largest group of South-West Africans -
the indigenous population. 
Smuts's gains towards his objective were undercut by the problems 
his administration either created or failed to solve. His superstate never 
materialized. The 1924 political defeat, the end of an era, ushered his 
dreams out with him - neither Mocambique nor the High Commission 
Territories of Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland were ever incorporated 
into the Union. Only in South-West Africa could he claim some 
headway, and even there his success was limited. 
POSTSCRIPT 1924-1950 
Smuts's relationship with the territory and people which would 
become known as Namibia was not over, but between 1924 and 1939, first 
in opposition and later in the fusion government with his old opponent 
Hertzog, ·Smuts had only limited power. 
In 1939, twenty years after he had first become Prime Minister 
Smuts once again took office on the invitation of the Governor-General 
following Hertzog's resignation.35 He would hold power until 1948, when 
the resurgent Nationalist party would once again defeat him. Two years 
later, he passed away peacefully in his beloved Cape. 
During his nine years as Prime Minister 1939-1948, old problems 
regarding South-West Africa resurfaced. Particular amongst Smuts's 
antagonists were a revitalized, nationalist German population and the 
League of Nations' successor. 












Smuts's failure to instill loyalty to the Union in the German 
population came back to haunt him in the early 1930s. As Germany 
recovered her pride and instituted an extreme nationalist government, 
she. began to agitate for the return of her colonies. In 1926 a German 
official concluded that 'to withhold colonies from Germany would be a 
declaration of war against her national aspirations.'36 
As Hitler and other German leaders began to agitate for the return 
of their colonies, the SW A German population began to react. Their 
National-Socialist Labour Party and the Deutsche Bund began to agitate for 
duel citizenship and to fly the Nazi flag. Tensions mounted between the 
Union population and the German population. Luckily, by 1929 Smuts's 
immigration policy was finally seeing fruit, and the Union settlers made 
up a majority of the population.37 Here is evidence of the eventual success 
of the settler policy, at least in creating a loyal white population. 
The period of world appeasement towards Hitler, between 1933 and 
1939, made Hertzog, Smuts, and the other leaders of the fusion 
government nervous over the possibility of Germany reclaiming South-
west Africa. Lloyd George agreed, for the sake of peace, that the British 
Empire would reconsider the mandates.38 
South-West Africa became sharply divided, with the Union 
population clamoring for incorporation and the Germans39 agitating for a 
return to German rule. As Minister of Justice, Smuts took a hard line 
towards the Germans. While they had been potential allies, he had been 
willing to make concessions. But he could not abide foreign colonialism 
36 Schnee, D., German Colonization, quoted in Cockram, South West African Mandate, p. 173. 
37 Cockram, South West African Mandate. p. 175. 
38 Lloyd George, Memoirs, p. 237. 
39 The German's automatic naturalization as Union citizens was to be revoked by Union 












in an area he perceived as the Union's backyard. In early 1939, he sent 
3000 South African Police to the territory, something he had refrained 
from doing even during the Bondelswartz Rebellion. By the time Smuts 
came to power in 1939, Poland had been invaded, the appeasement policy 
dropped, and talk of returning Germany's colonies had obviously been 
abandoned. 
The post-war problems were not as successfully resolved. Although 
Smuts's settlers began to outnumber the Germans in 1929, they could 
never hope to outnumber the indigenous peoples. The end of World War 
II brought an era of decolonilization. The colonial powers were forced to 
lend a certain amount of recognition of indigenous people's rights, and 
South Africa's mandate in South-West Africa inevitably came under fire 
for its treatement of the indigenous population. 
The United Nations, the League's successor created at the end of 
World War II, almost immediately began to deal with the problem of the 
Mandates. Smuts recognized that the Mandate system had to change. 
My opinion is that the best solution will be to get rid of the 
mandatory system and to attend to the matter in a different way, 
even though we have to send a report to another organization. 40 
The majority of the Mandatory powers agreed to a Trusteeship 
agreement, which would lessen their powers to the benefit of the United 
Nations and the indigenous peoples. Smuts, however, decided that it was 
time to press for annexation. 
The Union government presented a memorandum on 17 October 
1946, stating its case.41 The main argument was that the inhabitants had 
40 Parliamentary Papers, 1945, 20 March, col.3752. 












voted for incorporation, and the government claimed 208,850 non-
Europeans supported the move, with only 33,520 opposing it. Smuts once 
again used the argument that it was in the natives' interest. He also 
argued that the area was an extension of the Union, both in population 
and in geography. These arguments were almost exactly the same as the 
ones he had used in 1919. 
Smuts's failure to gain annexation in 1919 was repeated even more 
vehemently in 1946. Not only did the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee 
reject incorporation, it also recommended that the Mandate be withdrawn 
and the territory be placed under International Trusteeship, citing the fact 
that the 
African inhabitants have not yet... reached a state in their political 
development enabling them to express a considered opinion which 
the Assembly could recognize on such an important question as the 
incorporation of their territory.42 
Smuts was defeated. His final attempt at annexation, couched in 
terms of 'native welfare' and 'logical union,' but really a cover for 
expansion, was defeated as his first attempt had been almost 30 years 
previously. When, in 1948, Smuts left office, the Union was still 
governing the territory as if it were a Mandate, but the United Nations was 
pressing for a trusteeship agreement.43 
Having lost the General Election in 1948, Smuts's long relationship 
with South-West Africa was over. In 1915, he and Louis Botha had 
invaded South-West Africa, partly to help the British, but equally to gain 
dominion over the territory. Thirty years later, Smuts, alone, had failed to 
42 adopted by the United Nations, General Committee, 14 December, 1946. 
43 on the 1 November, 1947, the General Assembly adopted a resolution urging the Union to 












achieve dominion over the territory. The South Africans would hang on 
to the territory using military power, rather unsuccessful diplomacy, and 
the goodwill of most of the white population, until 1990, but Smuts's 
failure to incorporate South-West Africa into the Union in 1919, and again 
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